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Intelligence quotient

Shahedul ANAM Khan
SEVERAL very significant events have brought the intelligence agencies under public scrutiny. Almost everyone has blamed the BDR mutiny on "failure of intelligence." Every single agency, whose job it was to look out for the tell-tale signs of anything like that brewing, failed to do so.
Whether that is entirely true is a matter of further investigation, and if anything worthwhile has to be got out of the enquiry, the government must direct the investigation committee at the national level to look at this aspect very carefully, and find out whether or not it was a failure of intelli gence or failure to recognise die intelligence indicators, or a case of willfully overlooking die indicators.
From die picture of die event that is gradually unfolding it may not be unreasonable to conclude that this may very well be a case of failure to utilise the intelligence system properly rather than entirely a case of intelligence failure.
It may also be suggested that that there is need to find out whether it was possible that a source or sources may have been compromised or neutralised, that might have caused the neutralisation of any one or more of the agencies as a consequence. However, that is a remote possibility if there were multiple agencies tasked for the job.
Another development which has great bearing on our national security has been the deposition of several witnesses indicating possible complicity of state agencies in the April 2004 illegal arms smuggling case.
These are allegations — and detailed investigadon will perhaps reveal the veracity of the statements and the extent of die Involvement. But the very fact that fingers are being pointed at the intelligence agen de* is a matter of concern. (I will deal with die arms haul issue at a later date, but suffice it to say that we had feared that such a link was not beyond the realms of possibility when the matter came to light).
In recent times, one has been often asked as to what the role of intelligence agencies is, particularly during the time of democratic governments. I do not know about all of the many agencies in the country but perhaps a few comments on the DGFI, it having come under the most severe scrutiny in recent dines, are in order.
The general criticism of the military intelligence outfit is that it had overstepped the bounds of its responsibility, particularly in the last two years, and some, particularly a few among the affected, have suggested that it be disbanded or put under the home ministry.
The criticisms are perhaps justified, but the suggested remedy must not be compelled by emotions.
There is every need for the military to have its organic intelligence resources to give it the protecdon it needs from hostile intelligence, and to that extent the DGFI is not only essential, everything must be also done to see that the unit is given adequate resources for both intelligence, both beyond and within our borders, to prepare our military for any aggression.
However, transgression of its TOR is not a
recent indulgence of the DGFI. Of necessity its beat had to cover the entire country in all aspects including political developments, but there was no scope for it to dabble in or influence politics, politicians, or political events.
However, in spite of having no specific role as such, it was nonetheless made to get involved in internal politics right from day one of its birth, during the time of a political government.
There is, in a sense, some similarity here with the ISI. The ISI, to start with, was confined to performing al) internal and external intelligence tasks till die 1960s. Ironically, it was Bhutto who in the 1970s expanded its role to include domestic politics by creating its internal wing.
It should cause us little wonder that in Bangladesh the DGFI was used as a political apparatus by the military rulers to establish and expand their political clout, to help set up political parties, to bribe politicians, and to make new parties and break the old ones. Sometimes they succeeded. And only those
with unstinted personal loyalty to the head of the government were chosen to head the organisation. It was not the right thing to do. but it was the natural inclination of the military rulers to fall back on an agency they thought they could trust fully.
But what is regrettable is that the elected political governments over the years since 1991 have continued to use the DGFI in the same vein, and perhaps at times had made it do all that it was directed by the military rulers to do, only more so.
An intelligence unit will function only as efficiently as it is tasked. It has been so with all other intelligence resources available in the country. Most of them have been used to deter, and threaten opponents of the government for purely partisan interest, thus risking the security of the state.
If it has overstepped its limit in the past it was not the fault of the DGFI alone.
Bng Gen Shahedul Anam Khan (retd) s Editor, Defence A Strategic Affairs. The Daily Star.