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Back to ’Square Two?’

Mizanur Rahman Shelley
***It now seems that whatever the government aspired to achieve in terms of political and electoral reforms has been largely frustrated. The massive campaign against corruption also appears to have slumped, at least for the time being. The signs seem to indicate a return to the pre-1/11 scenario. Are we then set to go back to "Square Two," where the familiar political forces will call the shots pretty much in the same manner they used to do before January 11,2007?***
A spectre is now haunting Bangladesh. Politico-economic uncertainty stalks the nation. A non- political interim government presides while politics becomes increasingly fluid. Constitutionally described as a caretaker government, it is one with a difference. The like of such a caretaker government has not been seen since its formal inception in 1996 or its informal beginning in 1990.
The present caretaker government was put in place through a series of unprecedented happenings. The story of its origin in the events of January 11 and 12, 2007, is common knowledge. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that it was the product of failed politics and ineffectual democracy. Fifteen years of resurrected parliamentary democracy failed to realise its purpose. Lip service was paid to the principles and practice of democracy. Neither the culture nor the way of life of a democratic order really took roots.
Elections were held at constitu-
tionally stipulated intervals. These were largely accepted as free and fair. In reality, however, elections represented a zero-sum game in which the winner took all. The purpose of the party system, making constitutional opposition respectable, was not realised. The winning party rode roughshod over the opposition which, in turn, responded with non co-operation and militant protests. The Parliament remained ineffective and public administration was increasingly politicised. Politico-administrative and commercial corruption spread alarmingly and ate into the vitals of the society. Power became an end in itself. The entire society was riven along the divide represented by the two major political forces, which constantly confronted each other.
The backdrop of the dramatic arrival of a reconstituted caretaker government supported by the armed forces created a potential context of reformed politics. It was hoped that far reaching, meaningful and effective reforms would put the country back on an even keel. It was hoped that the institutions of democracy would be
cured of ailments and the stage would be set for a functional system of check and balance among the various branches of the government. It was also expected that the administration would be enduringly de-politicised and corruption significantly reduced. It was further hoped that the independence and efficiency of the judiciary would be securely established and local government institutions strengthened to help flower a thriving democracy.
By all counts, it was a desirable and impressive agenda. The objectives posed no problems, the difficulties lay in the very nature of the mechanism built for achieving these. The vehicle itself had its built-in limitations. The current caretaker government is a halfway house deriving initial legitimacy from the provisions of the constitution. When the stipulated ninety days of its permissible term ended it was covered in a way by the hundred and twenty days of emergency. After that limit was also exhausted the government drew its strength and legitimacy from the acquiescence of the people, broadly interpreted as consent.
Such a government, by its very nature, is non-political. Its leaders are not politicians. Its canons are political neutrality and detachment. Its tone and temper are tinged by a clinical administrative mindset. All this makes it eminently unsuitable for dealing with the exacting demands bf the politics of reforms. Reform is a transformational venture and cannot, therefore, be effectively implemented by administrative measures. Transformation of societies can be brought about only by transformational reformist political leadership or by revolution.
The present predicament of the interim government amply proves the point. Its experience during the one year and eight months in office has been an intriguing mixture of encouraging achievements and disappointing failures. The administrative and economic steps it took were procedurally correct. Doing things by the book, however, may not, and often does not, bring desirable results. Clinically correct administration without the guidance of a politically trained leadership results in stagnation. This has been the case in the present instance.
Excessive concern for observing outmoded rules and regulations coupled with fear of being perceived as corrupt reduced public administration to virtual impotence. This is evident from the record of significant failures in implementing Annual Development Programs. Economic development suffered.
The adverse impact of natural disasters such as the cyclone Sidr and floods worsened the situation. The economic scenario became grimmer as a result of the negative impact of global happenings, including the unprecedented rise in energy price, shortage of 'production and stipply of food grains and consequent increase in food price.
A correct but timorous administration led by detached and neutral leadership failed to inspire strong and vibrant measures to ensure reduction of the economic woes of the people. Lack of business opportunities in the private sector, shrinking scope of employment in both the public and private sectors, and sloth in overall economic development put severe limits on the purchasing power of common men. Soaring prices of essentials, especially food-grains and edible oil, caused serious strains on popular tolerance. The illiterate masses and even the conscious and educated middle-classes, despite their knowledge of global crises, have been driven to the outer limits of their patience. Active support for the government of the day, therefore, underwent significant reduction. All this set the stage for the erosion of the political strength of the incumbent administration.
It is no wonder that the government chose the soft option in dealing with increasingly restive politics. Despite the state of emergency, a crisis of hope led to diminishing confidence. Various
potent segments of the society, including the organised labour force and politicised students' communities staged agitations. Sporadic incidents of violent confrontations kept on threatening law and order. An avowedly non-political government could not supply the political strength to effectively implement its agenda of politico-administrative reforms and anti-corruption drive.
Civil society organisations, non-political entities as they are, also remained limited in their impact on the people. Lack of capable leadership and popular appeal also made the efforts at fabricating credible alterative political forces largely ineffective. The government has, thus, been left helplessly alone on its reformist track. Its avowed detachment from politics seems to have boomeranged in the return of politics and politicians in evident triumph. Despite cases of alleged corruption pending against them in the courts both the top political leaders of the country are at large.
The Awami League leader and former prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, was released earlier by an executive order for treatment abroad. The BNP chairperson and former prime minister, Begum Khaleda Zia, was enlarged on bail in early September. The rigid requirements of emergency regulations were relaxed in the cases of other political leaders held in jails on charges of alleged corruption. Consequently, many of them were
released on bail within a short time while others are waiting in the queue.
It is clear that the government is treading the soft path to pave the way for a participatory election to the national assembly .before the year-ond^ChiefAdviser • Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed announced in a televised address to the nation that the Election Commission has scheduled the national elections for the December 18 and, in deference to the wishes of the major political parties, the upazilla elections on December 24 and 28.
Meanwhile, the political parties, especially the principal ones, are stepping up pressure on the government and the Election Commission to modify the rigid provisions of the amended Representation of People Ordinance. They are also demanding that the upazilla elections be held at a later time. Further, they are going ahead with the preparations for elections and formation of electoral alliances.
It now seems that whatever the government aspired to achieve in terms of political and electoral reforms has been largely frustrated. The massive campaign against corruption also appears to have slumped, at least for the time being. The signs seem to indicate a return to the pre-1/11 scenario. Are we then set to go back to "Square Two," where the familiar political forces will call the shots pretty much in the same manner
they used to do before January 11, 2007?
Nobody knows for certain. Evidently, the government is trying to mount a rear-guard operation to salvage whatever is possible of the reform agenda. The
■ •advise<&^nd«ther3-a^e'ewgaged'T^, ■ overt and covert activities to-get_ the two principal leaders to meet and decide on a virtual national charter of reform politics. It is difficult to predict whether this desirable objective will be achieved in time. If the attempts do not succeed and confrontation between two major political forces stages a return, the country may face grave uncertainty. This is the last thing the nation desires.
We cannot afford the luxury of further incertitude. The times are grim. Those who are still in the driving seat must be careful. So must the major political leaders, their parties and political alliances. They can fail in the task of reshaping politics and administration only at their own peril. Lack of success in this all-important task will deepen and complicate the crisis of the state. That will be a prescription for disaster at this troubled time of global economic crisis and political uncertainty. Nothing succeeds like success. As in Tudor England so also in today's Bangladesh, "nothing will succeed but success."
Dr. Mizanur Rahman Shel'ey, a noted thinker and social scientist is the founder Chairman, Centre for Development Research, Bangladesh (CDRB). and Editor'Asian Affairs.’