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Body blow to nuclear disarmament

Praful Bidwai writes from New Delhi
IN contrast to the euphoric headlines proclaiming an end to global "Atomic Apartheid" and India's "Nuclear Dawn," the internal reception to the waiver granted to India, from the Nuclear Suppliers' Group trading rules, was sullen and frosty. When the decision was announced in Vienna, there was no applause.
A European diplomat told Reuters: "For the first time in my experience of international diplomatic negotiations, a consensus decision was followed by complete silence (...) No clapping, nothing..."
This showed the extent to which many of the NSG's45 member-states "felt pressured" by the United States' and India's furious sledgehammer-level lobbying. Very few were satisfied with the waiver, and many entered caveats through "national statements." Said a dismayed diplomat: "NPT R.I.P. (rest in peace)!"
Announcing the Non-Proliferation Treaty's death is premature, but there's no doubt that the waiver has blown a gaping hole through the nuclear
export-control and nonproliferation system.
For the first time, the world's major powers have agreed to resume nuclear trade with a country that possesses nuclear weapons, but has signed neither the NPT nor another agreement on nuclear restraint.
On a short-sighted, narrow, parochial view, the waiver -- itself part of the US-India nuclear deal -- is a historic victory signifying India's "arrival" as a Great Power. But on a broad-horizon, longterm view, it's bad news for nuclear disarmament and, eventually, for India too.
The deal's supporters have a gung-ho national-chauvinist perspective. A majority of the opponents, too, share it, and regard the deal as a litmus test of national sovereignty. Both views perversely vest sovereignty in mass-destruction weapons, not people.This column offers a different perspective, based on peace, nuclear disarmament, and equity in international relations. Seen thus, both the nuclear deal and the waiver are unmitigated disasters.
They won't enhance India's security, but will intensify an arms
race in South Asia, making its states and peoples insecure. They won't promote energy security.
First, consider three big claims. The waiver is a victory of "sweet reason." Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee's September 5 statement convinced half the NSG's prime "like-minded" dissenters --Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland — to change their stand.
Second, the waiver rights a historic wrong by lifting sanctions imposed on India after 1974. And third, it'll bring India into the "non-proliferation mainstream."
Mr. Mukherjee's was a vague statement claiming India has always opposed proliferation and arms races. This doesn't square up with India's record in initiating and sustaining a South Asian nuclear arms race for three decades. India failed to provide the assurance the world wanted: a legally binding commitment not to test.
The waiver happened not for arms-control reasons, but because of intense US pressure, described as "brutal and unconscionable" by former United Nations disarmament undersec-
retary Jayantha Dhanapala. India too practised "with-us-or-against-us" threats.
Second, it's simply not true that "innocent India" was punished unfairly for conducting the 1974 test with "indigenously" developed m a t e r i-als/technologies. The critical materials were imported or illegitimately procured.
The plutonium came from the Cirus reactor built with Canadian and US assistance, meant for "peaceful purposes." Hence, the hypocritical "peaceful nuclear explosion!" India cheated the world to become a proliferator.
Unfortunately, the NSG made a dangerous distinction between "good" and "bad" proliferators and rewarded India because it has become Washington's friend. Tomorrow, another country could exploit that distinction. This will undermine the global non-proliferation norm.
Third, the waiver won't bring India into the "non-proliferation mainstream." In fact, the deal will help India expand its nuclear arsenal. Under it, India will separate its military-nuclear facilities from civilian installations and subject some of the latter to
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, to ensure non-diversion of material to military purposes.
However, India will only put 14 of its 22 operating/planned civilian reactors under safeguards. But it can use the remaining eight reactors to produce plutonium for as many as 40 Nagasaki-type bombs every year!
This makes nonsense of India's professed "minimum deterrent." usually understood as a few dozen weapons. (After all, how many bombs would it take to flatten five Chinese or Pakistani cities? 15,20, 50?) India already has an estimated 100 to 150 bombs. The deal will, thus, accelerate India's nuclear arms race with Pakistan and China.
Is the NSG waiver "clean and unconditional," as India insisted it must be? Strictly speaking, no. India formally accepted only one of the three conditions proposed in the NSG: "periodic review" of compliance with nonproliferation commitments.
The other two conditions — exclusion of enrichment and reprocessing from trade, and terminating it in the event of testing — figure in the "national statements" by many countries, including Japan and Germany.
So, even limited nuclear trade with India will be terminated if India tests, withdraws from IAEA safeguards, or violates other nonproliferation commitments.
Many national statements interpret Mr. Mukherjee’s speech as a solemn promise not to test, which will automatically terminate cooperation in the event of a
test. This isn't quite the unconditional waiver New Delhi wanted.
Seizing on this, India's political opposition accuses the government of having betrayed its deed-related commitments, and compromising India's "strategic sovereignty."
This off-the-mark criticism exaggerates the compromise involved. Worse, it altogether misses the crucial disarmament and peace implications of the deal/waiver.
Joining the Nuclear Club, which the Indian elite has long craved, won’t remotely end "Atomic Apartheid." India will merely become another participant in its ruling regime.
India's nuclear weapons will be legitimised. And India will sanctify other countries' nuclear weapons. The last thing India will do is to demand the Club's dissolution, or a change in its rules! India will inevitably betray its JL promise to fight for a nuclear weapons-free world.
India's ruling United Progressive Alliance seems determined to ram the deal through, ; despite its divisive character. There's a good chance that with the Bush administration's hard push, the bilateral "123 agreement" will also soon clear the US Congress.
However, the deal won't win the hearts of the Indian public — S and certainly not its votes. The UPA shouldn't make it an election plank.
Prafu! &dwai is an eminent Indian columnist
He can be reached at bidwaigboLnetji.