IT'S no small irony that curfew had to be re-imposed in the Kashmir Valley the very day a settlement with the Sri Amarnath Yatra Sangharsh Samiti (SAYSS) was announced, which ended the two-and-a-half months-long agitation in the Jammu region.

The settlement hasn’t impressed too many people in the Valley. It may even prove to be a poor consolation in Jammu as well.

Had the negotiation involved the Valley's politicians, it would have had a wider acceptance. The Valley -- land transfer for the Amarnath pilgrimage — is where the political and physical origins of the recent discontent lie.

The settlement is flawed. It reserves 100 acres exclusively for the Amarnath Shrine Board, barring sheep-grazers and other traditional users. It compensates Jammu residents for the losses caused by the agitation, but not the Valley people who suffered a sevenweek long blockade, which cut off supplies and despatched perishablefruit.

Had the Valley’s representatives been involved in the agreement, they wouldn't have been able to blame the government for its flaws. The accusation that it didn't consult all sides to the dispute is potentially opened to exploitation to communal or regionalist ends.

But evidently, Indian policymakers have learnt little from Kashmir's recent history, which shows that such potential will nearly always be exploited. If this continues, turmoil in the Valley could, yet again, become a serious problem, with unpleasant implications for India-Pakistan relations.

In Jammu, the settlement hasn't neutralised the agitators agenda, many allied to the Bharatiya Janata Party. This agenda favours the state's trifurcation into a predominantly Hindu Jammu, a Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley, and a Buddhist Ladakh.

Multiple blunders have brought J&K to this pass, after six years of relative peace. After encouraging the yatra, which led to a 25-fold increase in the pilgrims' number over 20 years, the government extended its duration well beyond

the ice lingam's survival period.

This was seen in the Valley as promoting aggressive Hindutva "nationalism" to counter Kashmiri separatism.

Then, to placate Hindu-communal sentiment, the government transferred land to the SASB. It failed to anticipate the Islamic-separatist reaction, and Jammu's more militant counter-reaction to the transfer's cancellation, leading to a blockade in the Valley. It refused to lift the blockade until the Valley's pear crop had perished.

Meanwhile, the Jammu protests turned viciously communal as the BJP fished in troubled waters. Unfortunately, the Congress' Jammu leaders too joined the agitators. Their rough acidthrowing methods drew flak from the rest of India.

The agitators' display of trishuls with the National Flag, espousal of Hindutva, and demonisation of all Kashmiri Muslims as "antinational," added to the ferocity of the Valley protests.

In the second week of August, the government cracked down on

them. On August 11, it allowed a lakhs-strong procession to form on the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad highway and fired on it. It deployed double standards: "rubber bullets in Jammu, live bullets in the Valley," where some 40 people were killed.

This only heightened the Valley's alienation from the Indian state and brought extremists like Syed Ali Shah Geelani out of the woodwork

Indian policymakers deluded themselves that popular alienation had disappeared in the last few years with the return of relative normality: The extremists were isolated. Why, the Hurriyat was about to decide not to demand a boycott of elections!

Better sense prevailed around August 15-18, when the government allowed peaceful protests. Governor NN Vohra ordered that there should be no firing. This helped the Hurriyat's moderate faction adopt sober positions.

Soon, however, National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan intervened. He criticised Mr. Vohra for his "soft line" and engineered the massive crackdown of August 24-25. Nine districts were handed over to the army, newspapers banned, TV channels closed, and mobile-telephone SMS services disabled.

This cost of the Indian state was a massive loss of legitimacy. Yet, says Yusuf Tarigami, a widely respected Communist Party of India (Marxist) MLA "Mercifully, popular alienation isn't as severe as in the early 1990s, and may prove transient."

In the post-1989 climate, armed groups, including the indigenous Hizbul Mujaheedin, hyperactively demanded Kashmir's separation. They subdued the moderate Hurriyat Pakistan armed them, and lent them logistical support Savage repression by Indian forces helped them build a base.

Militant groups can no longer recruit in theValley. Kashmir hasn't been a live political issue in Pakistan since the peace process with India started. It still isn't The most noticeable difference from the past is the bitterness and anger among the youth, who grew up amidst violence, humiliation and hatred in the 1990s. Yet, it isn't too late to rescue the situation.

I take the view that the right to self-determination isn't absolute, and must be balanced by democracy, pluralism and the rights of "minorities within the minorities." One shouldn't view the present, possibly transitory, mood in Kashmir as unqualified endorsement of azadi, interpreted as a sovereign, independent state or

Kashmir's merger with Pakistan.

Yet, business-as-usual is not an option in J&K. Hardliners, like Mr. Narayanan, indulge in dangerous self-delusion when they declare that Kashmir will become normal "in 10 days' time," presumably without a pro-reconciliation initiative.

They underestimate the seriousness of Kashmiri alienation and disgust with the overwhelming presence of Indian security forces.

The Indian state must radicallyrethink Kashmir and reach out to its people with the up-front offer of a dialogue and autonomy. The dialogue must also include pro-azadi extremists.

For a fruitful dialogue, four things are essential. First, opening of the border with Pakistani Kashmir. This will facilitate trade and people-to-people exchanges, and also allow theValley Kashmiris to critically evaluate the quality of life and politics in "Azad Kashmir."

Second, strengthening Kashmir's special status under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which has been greatly diluted.

Third, discussion of the regional/interregional autonomy proposals made 10 years ago by the Balraj Puri committee. And finally, thinning out the presence of securityforces in theValley.

The Indian state must courageously take these steps to build confidence among the Kashmiris. Or. the Kashmir problem could soon become intractable.

Prafof Bidwai is an eminent indan columnist.