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The praful Bibwai column

Welcome end to a dictatorship

Although Mr. Musharraf's source of real power vanished after he shed the uniform, he remained a hated symbol of arbitrary rule, with the army's implicit backing. His resignation shifts the civilian-military power balance in favour of the people's elected representatives.

Praful Bidwai writes from New Delhi
WE must all join the Pakistani public in rejoicing over Mr. Pervez Musharraf's decision to resign as president. After a show of bravado, followed by bargaining over his departure's terms, he finally ended nine years of authoritarian rule.
Mr. Musharrafs options narrowed after his allies in the MQM and the Pakistan Muslim League (Q) deserted him, following the Pakistan People's Party's decision to join the Pakistan Muslim League (N) in demanding that he quit or face impeachment.
The crunch came when US told Mr. Musharraf it wouldn't side with him, and President Bush stopped taking his calls. Saudi Arabia conveyed a similar message. Finally, the Pakistan army told him that it wouldn't support him in a confrontation over impeachment.
Although Mr. Musharraf's source of real power vanished after he shed the uniform, he remained a hated symbol of arbitrary rule, with the army's implicit
backing. His resignation shifts the civilian-military power bailee in^ favour of the people's elected representatives.
The resignation is not so much a victory of Pakistan's political parties, or proof of sagacity of the army's leadership, as a triumph of civil society, especially the lawyers' movement joined by numerous social activists, and of the media.
It must be unreservedly welcomed as a major step forward in Pakistan's democratisation.
Like all dictators, Mr. Musharraf, too, became a victim of hubris and failed to understand that he had lost legitimacy. The first dents in his legitimacy appeared within a year of taking over, when he betrayed his promise to cleanse the administrative system, make the rich pay taxes, and promote moderation. He mutilated the constitution to consolidate his rule.
In December 2004, he refused to shed his dual position as head of state and army chief. What finally destroyed his legitimacy was his sacking of the chief justice and imposition of emergency rule in November -- which earned him
the wrath of an increasingly asser-,^Yf .middle qla$^ and cjvil society organisations.
To be fair, not everything in the Musharraf legacy was negative. He increased women's reservations in legislatures, and tried to undo General Zia-ul Haq's Hudood laws. His decision to turn against al-Qaeda-Taliban after September 2001 brought Pakistan out of its isolation and revived its economy.
Domestically, Mr. Musharraf first tried to contain extremist influences, but soon compromised with them. He abolished separate electorates for religious minorities. He loosened the Zia-era oppressive restrictions on cultural activities and musical performances. He allowed private TV channels. And he held elections as promised.
The architect of Kargil executed a remarkable turn by launching the peace process with India. He also made a bold departure from Pakistan's traditional position on Kashmir, and proposed a solution which wouldn't redraw existing borders.
However, these measures were soon diluted and failed to curb bigotry and promote moderation.
In operations against al-Qaeda-Taiiban along the Afghanistan border, Mr. Musfiarraf practised’ outright deception. He diverted much of the US's $12 billion aid, and shielded the Taliban, but convinced the Americans for years that he was their indispensable ally.
Pakistan's real challenges begin now. The ruling coalition must stabilise democracy without the anti-Musharraf glue that bound it earlier.
Pakistan's economic situation is grim -- inflation at 24 percent, the rupee having dipped from 60 to the US dollar to 74, and foreign exchange reserves down from $16 billion to barely $10. Pakistan had to accept an oil bailout from Saudi Arabia.
Politically, extremism is on the rise, with the Taliban resurgent. Balochistan and the Northwest Frontier Western Province seethe with discontent. Pakistan's volatile western border poses an unprecedented challenge, aggravated by US pressure for effective operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, which lack popular support.
The ruling coalition is divided. Four differences have come to the fore: the choice of a presidential candidate, reinstatement of the sacked 60 superior court judges, trying Mr. Musharraf (or giving him indemnity), and acting along the western border.
Mr. Nawaz Sharif insists on the dismissed judges' immediate reinstatement. But PPP co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari is wavering because he fears that, if ■restored; -the deposed -Chief-Justice Iftikhar Choudhry will rule against the ordinance that granted him amnesty against corruption charges as part of a US-brokered deal which brought him back home.
The PPP and the PML (N) have divergent views on the presidential candidate issue, but Mr. Zardari remains the strongest contender. Even trickier is the question of prosecuting Musharraf on the coalition’s charge-sheet.
By all indications, Mr. Zardari was party to the "understanding" that Mr. Musharraf would get safe passage and indemnity if he resigned.
Mr. Sharif is deeply suspicious of the US Global War on Terror. Mr Zardari has probably made various commitments to the Americans on fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
As the two battle these differences out, the economic agenda might be put on the backburner. This will only erode the ruling coalition's legitimacy. Mr. Sharif may walk-out, precipitating early
elections in which he hopes to do well.
India should be sympathetically disposed towards Pakistan. It should certainly have welcomed Mr. Musharrafs resignation as a step towards democratisation. Instead, it described it as Pakistan's "internal matter."
This apparent neutrality masks New Delhi s preference for Mr. Musharraf, stated . in so many. ~rerms byNational Security Adviser
M.K. Narayanan less than one week before he quit. He said his departure would leave "a vacuum" in which extremist outfits would flourish.
This position betrays apathy towards the people of Pakistan. Worse, like much Indian TV commentary on Pakistan, it shows a paternalistic attitude that believes Pakistan is destined to remain a quasi-dictatorship.
Democracy is fine and well-deserved for India but, like the US, India prefers to deal with autocrats in its own neighbourhood. Such double standards speak poorly of Indian foreign policy.
India is taking a myopic view of the Pakistan events and has failed to express solidarity with its democratisation process. Unless it corrects course, India risks alienating Pakistani public opinion.
Worse, it stands to lose credibility as a force for democracy in South Asia -- even as it beats the democracy drum internationally.
Praful BxJwa is an eminent Indian journalist He can be reached at bdwa^bolnetin