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Perspectives

Nato’s dilemma over the Georgian crisis

Even if the US successfully maneuvers to admit Georgia, or Georgia and Ukraine both into Nato - for which the US has been pressing for long - it is highly unlikely that Europe would be able to guarantee their security under the Nato umbrella because, according to the intelligence consultancy Stratford, most of the alliance's members have minimal forces and are poorly armed and trained at the moment.

M. Abdul Hafiz
CREATED in 1949 to protect Western Europe from a likely onslaught of Soviet forces, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) is a classic case of institutional survival in the face of changing politico-Strategic realities.
The Soviet threat that prompted the creation of Nato virtually vanished in 1989 with the collapse and disintegration of Soviet Union. Yet, Nato does not only exist it has also expanded, subsuming in it all the former satellite states of Eastern Europe and even Bailie republics that had been part of the Russian empire for more than 200 years. It is reckoned, however, that the current Georgian debate could finally break it.
In the eastern and central European countries that were once under the thrall of Moscow, the presence and movement of Russian armoured columns in Georgia — no more a part of Russia, the successor state of
Soviet Union has reawakened ail the old fears.
Last week, Poland scurried to let the US place anti-missile sites on its soil, apparently to beef up its own security. It has also demanded a full-fledged American military base -- something usually disliked by a nation in normal circumstances. Poland obviously wants the US to be involved in the fracas if it is attacked by Russia.
What drives such hysteria is only the historical memory, not any specific strategic calculation, because Russia isn't planning just now to invade Poland. But the emotions it invokes are very powerful. That's also why Estonian military volunteers are already in Georgia.
The rhetoric among the new Nato members has been almost as hysterical as that of Georgia itself. A similar rhetoric pervades the US media, where the fact that it was Georgia, which started the war by unleashing a merciless artillery barrage in South Ossetia -- a Russian ethnic enclave -- has been virtually
erased from the story line.
It's also the US State Department and Pentagon which had been building Georgia up as a key American ally on Russia's southern flank. Yet, the US Secretary of State, Ms. Condoleezza Rice, looked deeply uncomfortable last week as the stood beside ranting Georgian President Saakashvilli. Perhaps she was worrying about the "old Europe" of Germany, France and Italy, which do not uncritically back Georgia and the US's commitment there. They tend to see the issue through their own prism.
This will be a problem if the US wishes to pursue her goal of bringing Georgia and Ukraine into Nato's fold, since the "old Europe” is, in fact, the core of the military alliance, with three times the population and five times the wealth of "new Europe."
The US secretary of states may however rely on the loyalty of "new labour" -- at least its present dispensation -- but none of the other great states ofWestern
Europe thinks that having a confrontation with Russia is good idea.
After meeting President Medvedov of Russia, Dr. Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, carefully tailored her views in the following words: "Some of Russia's actions were disproportionate, but it is rare that all the blame is on one side."
The Italian government has warned against trying to build an anti-Moscow coalition. The French foreign minister, working for the most pro-American French leader, Nicholas Sarkozy, also warned against making any moral judgment on the Georgian conflict.
However, all this will be seen as "appeasement" by the neoconservatives who still rule the roost in Washington, but to most ofWestern Europe it's a matter of gumption when the countries there are deeply dependent on Russian energy.
Even if the US successfully maneuvers to admit Georgia, or Georgia and Ukraine both, into Nato -- for which the US has
been pressing for long -- it is highly unlikely that Europe would be able to guarantee their security under the Nato umbrella because, according to the intelligence consultancy Sratford, most of the alliance's members have minimal forces and are poorly armed and trained at the moment.
It also said that there had also been a tectonic shift in the geography. From a compact West European alliance the Nato has now become a sprawling entity, ranging from an exposed and barely defended flank in the Baltics to - if they are at all included --totally undefended Ukraine and Georgia.
All said and done with regard to the US-provoked conflict in the Caucasus, the Russians will stay in Georgia until they have dismantled
the Georgian army and navy bases that could threaten the ethnic enclaves of South Ossetia again, and then remove all the new American weaponry that gave Georgia an offensive military capa -bility.
Only after that will they withdraw to the enclaves, as the ceasefire brokered by none other than Sarkozy requires. This apparently anti-US term was agreed to by the French leader, who did not view Russia as an aggressor in Georgia Moreover, Europe also has to bal ance its ties with Russia with con cems over the country's new offensives posture. After all, Europe has to confront its direct hit, if any. In the meantime, Nato - for the first time -lacked cohesion in its outlook and strategy'.
Bog (retd) Ha?z s farmer DG of BUSS.