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Bottom line

Lessons to be learnt

At the heart of the problem lies the fact that this very agreement with former Soviet Union is being violated by the US when the Bush administration advocates Georgia to be a part of Nato, while Russia does not approve the intrusion of Nato at its underbelly in Georgia. Therefore, a game of balance of power between the US and Russia is taking place to influence political contours in Georgia, and the pro-US Georgian President Saakashvili has been sucked in.

Harun ur Rashid
GEORGIA'S President Mikhail Saakashvili was naive enough to believe that he could take on Russia on the issue of break away South Ossetia. His American-trained officers commenced military operations to integrate South Ossetia with Georgia on the very day when all world leaders focused their eyes on the opening of the Olympics in Beijing (August 8). He hopelessly miscalculated the situation in South Ossetia.
It was reported in the media that Washington had advised him not to undertake military operations in South Ossetia, because the Russians would be immediately involved. He did not listen to their advice and believed that the US would assist him to repel the retaliatory attack of Russia.
It seems that many lessons have to be learnt from this armed conflict, and some of them are described below:
The first lesson is that one should not pick a fight with or
provoke a much bigger power in armed conflict, because you would lose in the end. Friendly statesdo notwant tospend "blood and treasure" when the risks are too high and vital national interests are not involved.
In this instance, no Nato member state, including the US, wants to pick a fight with Russia on its doorstep on behalf of Georgia.
The second lesson is that a country's geographical position can condition and often seriously constrain what it is able to do. States in regions contiguous to sources of energy or great trade routes or strategic waterways are vulnerable to the political games of big powers.
For example, Georgia is located in a strategic region in the Caucasus, is close to the Caspian Sea from where oil is transported to world markets, and the western part of its territory opens up to the BlackSea.
Naturally, Georgia is likely to be drawn in a power game, and the
game is now being played by both the US and Russia in Georgia. Countries such as New Zealand or Iceland, remote from highways of politics, are left out of world power game.
The third lesson is that you accept the reality as it exists, and not what it ought to be. Do not turn a "frozen conflict" into real one. The idea that territorial disputes can be resolved within the existing framework of international law is a myth.
The fourth lesson is "practice what you preach." Russia has not argued in this crisis that it is simply doing what the West did in Kosovo, but everyone knows that, underneath, Kosovo is not far from its mind in the war in South Ossetia.
The fifth lesson is that when veto-wielding members of the Security Council are involved, no action of collective security can be taken. The UN Security Council can no more check Russia than it could block the Bush administra-
tion's preventive war against Iraq in 2003.
The sixth lesson is that in global politics, the ends usually justify the means. That means morality has no place in the "great game of power."
The seventh and final lesson is that the assumption that economic and military power somehow bestows accountability on its owners is dangerously flawed.
Power politics at play
During the time of former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, there was a gentleman's agreement by US that Nato would not be expanded to Russia's disadvantage. This meant that Nato would not expand to the borders of Russia.
At the heart of the problem lies the fact that this very agreement with former Soviet Union is being violated by the US when the Bush administration advocates Georgia to be a part of Nato, while Russia does not approve the intrusion of Nato at its underbelly in Georgia.
Therefore, a game of balance of power between the US and Russia is taking place to influence political contours in Georgia, and the pro-US Georgian President Saakashvili has been sucked in.
Furthermore, the US and the Western allies find themselves at a loss as to how to deal with resurgent and affluent Russia. To please Russia? the West accommodated it as a member of the G8.
At the same time, the Bush administration is expanding the membership of Nato to the borders of Russia, and wants to install missile defence shield surveillance equipment in the Czech Republic and Poland (former members of the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact).
On August 15, the US signed a missile defence agreement with Poland. It seems that the US and its allies are blowing cold and hot at the same time with Russia.
Georgia's former President Shevardnadze's decision in 1992, to allow Russia into South Ossetia as part of the peacekeeping force, enabled the very different Russian government under Putin to look at the problem of South Ossetia with a new attitude because of aggressive policy of the US under the Bush administration.
Russian defence commentator Colonel Viktor Litovkin sums up the perception of Russia about the West in the following words: "The Americans do not want another competitor, and their moves to achieve global strike capability are
quite provocative. Nato has deviated from its original charter and assumed responsibility on a global scale for everything that happens. The West looks as if it is imposing its ideology on others, just as the former Soviet Union did. Fortunately, we have recovered from this disease, but the Bush Administration has now-caught it."
The realpolitik advocated by Machiavelli, Cardinal Richelieu, and Henry Kissinger, disregarding morality and principles, will not vanish in international conduct during the 21st Century, irrespective of new' norms of international law and the existence of the UN.
Henry Kissinger once expressed: "The US has global interests and responsibilities, while its allies have only regional interests."
The recent armed conflict between Russia and Georgia, over the control of South Ossetia, has clearly demonstrated the grim realities of hard power. Classic realism theory assumes that all states define their interests in terms of power.
Georgia's president seems to have forgotten what Greek historian Thucydides (460-395 BC) stated: "The strong do what they have power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.*
Barrister Harun ur Rashid is a former Bangladesh Ambassador to the UN. Geneva.