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Alarm bells for the UPA

Praful Bidwaj writes from New Delhi
NOTHING seems to be going right for the Indian National Congress, which has recently suffered election reverses in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Himachal and Uttarakhand. Now, the Bharatiya Janata Party has defeated them in the Karnataka Assembly elections; to rule a Southern state for the first time.
The Karnataka outcome is a huge morale-booster for Hindutua, and a source of despondency for the Congress.
It's a significant setback for secularism. But ironically, it's unlikely, as explained below, to produce a BJP breakthrough in other Souths n states. Yet, it
highlights the Congress's decline and leadership crisis, and should jolt it into radical course correction.
The BJP won 110 out of the Assembly's 224 seats, because it ran a focused campaign and got its caste/social group arithmetic basically right. This was centred on the Lingayats in the North and diverse upper-caste groups on the Southern coast.
Besides consolidating this base, the BJP gained in central Karnataka. In Bangalore, it won 17 of 28 seats because successive Congress-led governments have messed up the city.
The BJP presented a united and cohesive front, with a clearly identified leader (BS Yeddyurappa). He got sympathy because he had been unfairly dumped by the small Janata Dal
(Secular) from a power-sharing arrangement.
The Congress's campaign was lacklustre, and failed to project a leader from among many contenders with clashing identities. The JD(S) couldn't overcome the stigma of opportunism and venality, and lost more than half its seats.
The Congress was on the defensive because of rising prices, in addition to the agrarian crisis and unemployment. The BJP cynically exploited the Jaipur bombings in Karnataka's communally charged atmosphere.
The BJP also gained from divisions in the secular vote in the three-way contest. Its aggregate vote (33.9 percent) was lower than the Congress's 34.6. But it won 30 more seats --
because its vote is concentrated; the Congress's is evenly spread.
However, one must not underrate the BJP's great gains from its strategy of communally polarising Karnataka -- by laying a Hindu claim to the syncretic Sufi Baba Budangiri shrine in Chikmagalur, fomenting violence in Mangalore, Belgaum and Hubli, drumming up hysteria on false allegations of cow slaughter, and resorting to hate-speech and crime, well-documented by the Karnataka Communal Harmony Forum.
It's no accident that Mr. Narendra Modi was the BJP’s star campaigner.
Communallsm was pivotal to the BJP's dramatic growth, from 4 percent of the votes and 4 Karnataka Assembly seats in 1989, to 28 percent and 79 seats in 2004. The Congress has never fought the BJP's communalism, or questioned its lack of pluralism and inclusiveness.
However, the BJP's win in Karnataka is unlikely to open the road to power in Andhra, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. The politics of these states is dominated by two parties/coalitions.
Karnataka is the only Southern state where the main non-Congress political space was occupied by the right-wing Congress (O) in the late 1960s and, later, the Janata Party. In the other states, that space was taken by secular regional parties -- DMK, A1ADMK, Telugu Desam, etc. — and in Kerala, by the Left.
The Janata legacy facilitated the BJP's entry into Karnataka. This can't happen in the other Southern states. The Karnataka victory may be a one-off affair.
Indeed, as Election Commission data shows, the peculiar distribution of the BJP's vote in Karnataka could work against it in the national elections.
If all the assembly segments
vote in the next Lok Sabha elections exactly as they did now, the BJP would win only 10 of Karnataka's 28 seats, down from 18. The Congress would soar from8 to 14.
This won't be a breakthrough even in Karnataka, leave alone the South.
The Karnataka election’s true significance lies in the grim message it carries for the Congress: it may face a rout in the next Lok Sabha election unless it urgently takes thor-ough-going, comprehensive and radical -- as distinct from piecemeal, cosmetic and halfhearted — measures to reform itself.
The Congress faces three crucially important crises. First, there's a crisis of political strategy. This is the party's inability to garner mass support and run an efficient electoral machine while articulating a broad vision for society.
The Congress no longer works at the grassroots. It doesn't quite know what its social constituencies are, and what message it should give them. Nor does it
know how to demolish the opposition's case against it.
It's not good enough to Vave a few clever spokespersons who turn and twist words. The Congress needs leaders and cadres who speak with conviction.
Second, the Congress faces an organisational crisis. This consists in a severe lack of coordination among party units, and absence of mass following of a majority of central- level Congress leaders.
A major manifestation is the mis-assignment of leaders to functions they aren't capable of or interested in.
In Karnataka, the BJP carefully micromanaged constituencies, with targeted canvassing and excellent coordination between district leaders and RSS members under Mr. Arun Jaitley, who camped in the state for 6 weeks.
By contrast, the Congress's coordinator barely spent any time in Karnataka, and didn't project a united party image. There was no pressure to show results.
Finally, there's the leadership crisis. The Congress cannot countenance a democratic elected leadership independent of the Nehru-Gandhi family. But it lacks the courage to call this leadership to account when it loses.
The Congress still prevents the emergence of autonomous regional leaders. It doesn't project its leaders except in a dynastic mould, without subjecting them to a results-based credibility test.
Unless the Congress boldly and honestly confronts these crises, it cannot resolve them. Ultimately, the corrective measures it takes must be related to its policies and programs.
The Congress should know: it's not enough to pass the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. This has to be accompanied by mobilisation of the state and party machineries, and a high-powered public awareness campaign. This alone can prevent large-scale corruption and the scheme's sabotage.