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Bypassing the Malacca Straits

Julien Levesque
The Straits of Malacca, the shortest sea route from East and Southeast Asia to the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, Africa and Europe, has increasingly suffered from congestion as Asia's integration in international trade has deepened. Today, around 1,300-1,400 ships per day cross the Straits, while 600 dock at Singapore daily. Less than two miles wide at its narrowest, the straits can easily be locked during a conflict, thus interrupting the flow of trade and, more importantly, of vital resources such as oil. In addition, piracy and terrorism are a constant threat in the Straits. Therefore, in order to secure sea-lanes and facilitate eastwest movement between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, concretizing alternatives to the Straits of Malacca - some of which had been thought of as early as the 18th century - has now become an imperative.
Although certainly the best option, the Kra Canal project has been abandoned following Thailand's refusal and despite China's readiness to provide funding. The several routes proposed to cut through the Isthmus of Kra - the strip of land separating mainland Southeast Asia from the Malay Peninsula and that, at a point, is only 44kms wide - would have, in Bangkok's mind, physically isolated the five Southern Muslim majority districts and thus fuelled secessionism, a perspective unacceptable to Thai authorities. The Kra Canal project presents numerous advantages: it would shorten the distance between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean by about 1,1 OOkms, save two to five days and US$300,000 in transportation costs per tanker. Moreover, it would equally allow both goods and energy to pass through, and could even be paralleled with
a pipeline. However, the Kra Canal is estimated to cost USS20 billion over a construction period of 15 to 20 years -thus excluding it from shortterm projections. Finally, the Kra Canal would certainly tighten China's relations with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore - three countries that, sitting on the Malacca Straits, enjoy large revenues from maritime flows.
The second means of avoiding the Malacca Straits is the 312km-Iong trans-peninsular Yan-Bachok pipeline that China is presently developing in Malaysia. Agreed to by Malaysia in May 2007, the US$23 billion project includes the construction of two refineries on the western coast, which will allow refined oil to be transported to the eastern coast and shipped to China. Hence, the project should carry 450,000 barrels of oil a day by 2010, but will not allow the transshipment of goods. In addition, it will have to face numerous challenges. Waters are generally shallow near the Malay Peninsula, making it difficult for large tankers to dock. Worse, monsoon rains degrade the sea condition along the Kelantan coast where Bachok is located. In addition, oil will have to be pumped up the 2,000m-high Titiwangsa Mountains, using a part of the transported oil to supply the necessary power for pumping.
Finally, as highlighted by Thai Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej during his recent visit to Yangon, Myanmar, the option chosen by Thailand is to develop a deep-sea port at Dawei (Tavoy), the capital of Myanmar's Tanintharyi Division. Less than 300kms from Bangkok and standingon one of the proposed routes for the Southern Corridor of the Trans-Asian Railway, Dawei could become Thailand's direct link with South Asia, West Asia, Africa and Europe. Dawei could be connected through the Amyar Pass on the
Myanmar-Thai border to Ratchaburi in Thailand, where the Yadana pipeline delivers natural gas to be transformed into electricity - and further on to Bangkok.
India had long ago noticed Dawei's potential to enhance its connectivity with mainland Southeast Asia and favor its Look East Policy. In 2003, the Ministry of External Affairs referred to a trilateral project to build a land bridge from Dawei to Kanchanaburi. In 2005, it was announced that India would conduct a feasibility study as part of the activities of the subregional organization BIMST-EC. However, now that New Delhi has concluded with Myanmar, the agreement for the Kaladan project - which comprises of the development of Sittwe port on the Rakhine Coast and its linking with Mizoram through waterways. Dawei seems to be less of a priority. However, as India and Thailand have set themselves the objective of reaching a total bilateral trade of US$7 billion by 2010-11 (from about US$4 billion today), India's present involvement in Dawei would ensure a safe conduct for the realization of this goal. Exchanges with Indochina would also be facilitated. In addition, as East Asia has now become India's first trade partner, diversification of commercial routes to avoid the Malacca Straits is a crucial step to keep up that trend. Therefore, India should not abandon its ambitions in Dawei but continue its collaboration with Thailand.
One of the world's major chokepoints, the Straits of Malacca is the object of wide-ranging strategic considerations. Alleviating the strain on the Straits will not only case East Asia's access to oil resources but also favor panAsianintegration.
By arrangement with IPCS, New Delhi