& çâÌæÚUæð´ ·¤è ¥ôÚU Îð¹Ùæ ÁæÚUè ÚU¹ð´ ¥ÍæüÌ ¥ÂÙð ÜÿØ ÂÚU ŠØæÙ ÚU¹ð´Ð ãæÚU Ù ×æÙð´, €UØô´ç·¤ ·¤æ× ·¤ÚUÙð âð ¥æÂ·¤ô ©gðàØ ·¤è Âýæç# ãôÌè ãñ ¥õÚU ÁèßÙ ·¤æ ¹æÜèÂÙ ÎêÚU ãôÌæ ãñÐ ÖÜð ãè ÁèßÙ ×ð´ ç·¤ÌÙè Öè ·¤çÆÙæ§ü €UØô´ Ù ¥æ°, çÁ™ææâæ ¥õÚU ©ˆâæã ÕÙæ° ÚU¹ð´Ð ŠØæÙ ÚU¹ð´, ÜÿØ ã×ðàææ ¥æÂ·Ô¤ Âæâ ãôÌð ãñ´ çÁ‹ãð´ ÂæÙð ·Ô¤ çÜ° ÂýØæâ ¥æÂ ·¤Öè Öè àæéM¤ ·¤ÚU â·¤Ìð ãñ´Ð

Playing a straight bat
***The opening session of Pakistan's newly elected National Assembly has raised hopes and revived fears about the country's return to democracy. The hopes are the result of unprecedented cooperation between the leaders of major political forces. The fears stem from Pakistan’s chequered history of political manipulation by an over-arching establishment.***
Husain Haqqani
THE opening session of Pakistan's newly elected National Assembly has ^raised hopes and revived fears about the country's return to democracy. The hopes are the result of unprecedented cooperation between the leaders of major political forces. The fears stem from Pakistan's chequered history of political manipulation by an over-arching establishment.
A weakened General (retired) Pervez Musharraf is already warning against "confrontation" between the presidency and the newly elected parliament. The politicians, notably PPP co-chairman Asif Zardari, have made it clear that they want a return to constitutional rule without conflict.
Pakistan has one of its best chances of finding political stability if Musharraf can resist the temptation to follow the pattern of vice legal rulers dating back to governors general, Ghulam Muhammad and Iskander Mirza during the 1950s.
There will be no confrontation if parliament is allowed to exercise its sovereignty. Musharraf may not want the elected parliament to vote on the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO), the decree that he used to amend the country's constitution once again in November 2007. The majority parties in parliament argue that it is parliament's privilege to examine the arbitrary amendments to Pakistan's basic law.
When the country's previous military rulers, from Ayub Khan to Ziaul Haq, allowed a phased return to democracy after several years of direct military rule, they allowed the new parliament to vote on constitutional amendments proposed by them.
By claiming that the PCO should not be debated, Musharraf is failing to adhere even to that precedent set by his military predecessors.
Over the years, Pakistan has become a state that stands only on one pillar -- that of the executive branch of government represented by the security and intelligence services. The judiciary lost its standing by repeatedly endorsing
extra-constitutional interventions, and only regained its stature last year when the judges stood up to Musharraf 's arbitrariness.
Even now, Musharraf claims that his authority to amend the constitution derives from a Supreme Court ruling, confirming his desire to keep the judiciary subservient to theexecutive.
There is no recognition of the basic logic that the judicature, which has the right to interpret but not to amend the constitution, simply cannot confer a right it does not have itself on someone else.
In the past, the military or civilian executives had constantly circumscribed the legislature in its functions, if and when the legislature was allowed to exist at all. Political parties operated in the shadow of larger than life figures, slandered, jailed or exiled with alarming frequency.
And then there were the ubiquitous intelligence agencies, hidden from public view but frequently seen pulling the strings in Pakistan's complex political drama.
If the new parliament is to rep-
resent a new beginning for the country then political parties must be given an opportunity to operate without the constraints of the past. The legislature and political parties are important institutions and, along with the judiciary and media, they are essential for Pakistan's evolution into a normal, functioningdemocracy.
Given tire result of the February 18 election, and the army's critical decision to disassociate itself from politics, Musharraf simply cannot expect to rule Pakistan with a veneer of elected, albeit powerless, institutions.
Pakistan has aspired for democratic rule since its inception. Power has alternated between civilian-democratic dispensations and military rulers claiming to control institutional decline, politi-
cal chaos, and economic disarray.
When Musharraf took power he promised to restore democracy within three years, after creating institutional checks and balances and introducing reforms that would forever end the alteration of power between authoritarian military rulers and ineffective elected civilians.
Even before he achieved the status of a US ally, Musharraf had started espousing political ideas that rested on his continuation in office rather than on the effectiveness of institutions such as an independent judiciary or a government truly accountable to parliament.
It should by now have become obvious to all that various plans for controlled democracy have compounded Pakistan's problems.
Pakistan needs democracy not controlled democracy, the notion of which was formally introduced by Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan who ruled for a decade from 1958-1969. General Ziaul Haq presided over the country from 1979 till his death in 1988, benefiting from Pakistan's role as the frontline state in the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan.
Ayub wrote his own constitution while Zia revised the existing con-stitution to suit him. Like Musharraf, they established a one-legged system revolving around them, instead of allowing other institutions of state to participate as equals in running the country. All this led to social unrest, corruption and eventual economic stagnation.
True democracy facilitates peaceful removal from power as well as the prospect of returning to it. Losing office while respecting dissent and accepting the role of national institutions is not as bad as risking everything.
instead of trying to impose or manipulate the fulfillment of his will by creating new polarisation. Musharraf should work with parliament and let the constitutional democratic process take its course.
Husain Haqqani. Director of Boston University's Center for international Relations, is Co-Chair of the Hudson Institute's Project on Islam and Democracy. Ho is the author of the Carnegie Endowment book 'Pakistan Between Mosque and Military’(2005)