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India's emerging strategic security paradigm and Sri Lanka policy -- Part-I

R Hariharan
THE Sri Lanka government has formally ended its ceasefire agreement signed in 2002 with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (UTE). It only regularises an existing state of war that had been going on since December 2005. It is a sad development because it shuts the door on the peace process sponsored by the Tokyo Donors Conference. While the four co-chairs of the Tokyo Conference the EU, Japan, Norway and the US, can walk out of the peace process, India, as a close strategic neighbour of Sri Lanka, cannot afford to ignore the development. It will also face the fall out of yet another round of full-scale war in Sri Lanka in some ways, because India-Sri Lanka relations have become closer than ever before.
The hesitation of the Indian Prime Minister Manhrnohan Singh in accepting the invitation of Sri Lanka to visit Sri Lanka on the occasion of the 60th Independence anniversary on February 4, 2008 would indicate that he understood the gravity of the developing situation.
Sri Lanka's close physical proximity, cultural, religious and linguistic affinity with India has imparted a unique status to the relations between the two countries. Tamil minorities' struggle for their rights in Sri Lanka had been a major source of friction between the two countries, till the two countries signed the India-Sri Lanka Agreement in 1987. After India's bid to help the country resolve the issue through physical intervention between 1987 and 1990 failed, this issue enjoys a low priority in Indian foreign policy. However, it continues to draw the sympathy of the government and population of India, particularly in the state ofTamil Nadu. In the last ten years or so, India-Sri Lanka relations which had gone cold in 1990 have thaw-ed. Both countries have assiduously built them until a convergence of strategic and economic interests.
Still at the popular level there is a lot of misunderstanding and mutual suspicion on both sides of the Palk Straits over each other's intentions and objectives in fostering the relations. Based upon the extent of India's involvement, its Sri Lanka policy can be considered in three stages: pre 1983 phase, active intervention phase 1983-90, and post intervention phase 1991-to date.The first two phases of this relation have been widely discussed, and debated. But. there is a lack of objective analysis of the relationship in the posl-1991 phase mainly due to the contin-uingTamil quest for equal rights and as a corollary the UTE insurgency.
Learning from active intervention 1983-90
Sri Lanka government has a long history of political confrontation with Tamils clamouring for equal rights since 1956. The situation
progressively degenerated with the stale increasingly depending upon the use of force to handle the Tamil agitators. As Tamils politicians lost their credibility support for a new breed of militants increased among the population.The UTE came into limelight in July 1983 when it carried out an ambush in which 13 soldiers of Sri Lanka army were killed. In retaliation violent mobs carried out a pogrom against Tamils.
The 'Black July pogrom' and its aftermath marked a watershed in India's Sri Lanka policy. From 1983 to 87 the objective of India's engagement with Sri Lanka was two fold. India wanted to help Sri Lanka government and the Tamils to evolve a workable solution to the Tamil problem. At the same time, India wanted to prevent Sn Lanka from becoming the cockpit of super power domination of the region intruding in India's sphere of influence. Initially, when Tamils were suffering at the hands of Sri Lanka security forces, India provided refuge for the militants. They were also helped with financial and arms support.
Though India's efforts at enabling the two sides to evolve a solution at Thimphu talks failed, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's keenness saw the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement in 1987. The Indian Peace Keeping Force troops sent to Sri Lanka to assist the implementation of the 1987 agreement got involved in prolonged insurgency war with the UTE which went back on its support to the agreement. India pulled out the troops in 1990 after the Sri Lanka President Premadasa and the UTE leader Prabhakaran got together to show India out of the country'. The Indo-Sri Lanka relations took a nosedive as a result. In 1991 the UT E carried out the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in a fit of vengeance. It also masterminded the massacre of Sri Lankan Tamil leaders taking refuge in India. That ended the little credibility the LTTE managed to retain among the public.
From this bitter experience India appears to have learnt one clear strategic lesson: India's strategic involvement in Sri Lanka should be on a firm foundation based upon long-term engagement with the country than on the basis of reactive intervention. Probably it also learnt the limits of external intervention in dealingwith the vexing issue oflhmil rights: for achieving a durable solution the Sri Lanka government and the Tamils themselves will have to workitout.
Strategic shifts 1987-2007 During the last two decades, India's strategic priorities in Indian Ocean Region, and as a corollary Sri Lanka, have changed. This is in keeping with a number of changes in the global economic scene and strategic power balance. Unlike the 80s, national security now means more than physical security. It has been enlarged to include economic security. free trade and commerce, energy
security, and lastly upgrade the social security of the population.
In keeping with this, India's foreign policy perceptions, conditioned earlier by the cold war considerations, have also changed. In the present world dominated by the U.S. as the sole super power, building better India - U.S relations has become number one priority. This is an important component of India's strategic linkages to safeguard its interests globally. The proposed Indo-US nuclear initiative is part of 4 this change in outlook. The US sees India as not only a valuable and stable democratic power in this region but also as a rapidly growing market and source knowledge power. The US also sees India as an important ally in its global war on terrorism because its multicultural and multi-religious society bridges the Islamic world and the rest of Asia. At the same time, India would like to maintain its close traditional ties with Russia, which continues to be an important strategic partner of India.
India's Look East policy evolved since 1990s aims at building closer ties with the ASEAN group of nations to expand India's commercial reach. It has signed a Free Trade Agreement with Thailand as a part of this policy. It is trying lo built close trading relations with Myanmar and use it as a gateway to open up the troubled India's northeast for trade with ASEAN. India is developing infrastructure to develop physical links with the region.
India had been holding talks with Pakistan to revamp its relations. Similarly. India and China have been trying to synergise their areas of convergence for mutual benefit Though many see India as a counterpoise to check the assertion of Chinese power in this region. India would like to develop a friendly ' rather than confrontational relation with China.
Indian armed forces are undergoing modernisation to make them mobile, with greater fire power. India's missile development programmes are well on way to make it a missile power with intermediate range missiles as its component Globally there had been increasing recognition of India's defence capability.
The sea-lanes of Indian Ocean have become vital for India's expanding global trade. They carry fossil fuels so vital for India's ever increasing energy needs. India sees Sri Lanka as a sentinel of its security astride the Indian Ocean. Indian navy's development as a blue water navy is on the cards to protect its maritime and economic interests. India s shift in relationship with Sri Lanka has to be understood in this broad strategic context, than in the background of its historical baggage of cold war period.
SOURCE, vww com.