

## The new Middle East

RICHARD N HAASS

**I**T is early 2008. The new US strategy for Iraq, outlined by President George W Bush in January 2007, in the wake of the Iraq Study Group report, has come and gone with no discernible effect.

With 100,000 soldiers still on the ground, despite congressional calls for major withdrawals, "force protection" is the new catchphrase, given domestic intolerance of American casualties.

No one debates any longer whether Iraq is experiencing a civil war; it's in fact part failed state, part civil war and part regional war. Insurgents, militias and terrorists are more active than ever; Iraqi casualties and deaths are higher than ever.

Output of oil and electricity remains stuck at or below prewar levels. Making matters worse are the "volunteers" crossing into Iraq from Iran (to assist the Shia majority) and Syria (where Saudis and others are flocking to help the embattled Sunni minority).

Turkish troops are on alert and

-- and Syrian-backed Hezbollah. If Palestine existed, it would be a failed state, with Hamas and Fatah engaged in daily internecine war.

Egypt's aging President Hosni Mubarak clings to power, harboring hopes for a succession by his son Gamal, while the radical Muslim Brotherhood claims the loyalty of many and possibly most Egyptians.

Jordan's King Abdullah looks increasingly vulnerable as a massive influx of Iraqi refugees exacerbates longstanding social divisions. Afghanistan more and more resembles Iraq as a weak central government battles the Taliban and others schooled in the streets of Baghdad.

Iran, snubbing the UN Security Council, presses ahead with its nuclear program. Israel is reported to be readying a preventive attack. Rumors abound that the US president and his senior national-security team are divided, with some pushing to join the Israelis (using stealth aircraft and cruise missiles to attack Iranian nuclear sites) and others opposed, arguing that Iran would retaliate, that sev-

things turning out even worse. Either way, one thing is certain: the American era in the Middle East is over. More than anything else, it was the Iraq war -- the enormous military, economic and diplomatic costs, the shifting internal balances in the region -- that brought it to an end.

Other factors contributed: the demise of the "peace process," the rise of Hamas and Hezbollah, the Israeli embrace of unilateralism and the disinclination of George W. Bush and his administration to undertake active diplomacy.

The failure of traditional Arab regimes to combat the appeal of radical Islam also figures here, as does globalization. It has never been easier for individuals and groups to find money and weapons, or to spread their ideas--including violent anti-Americanism.

But let's be clear: the wounds America has suffered in the region are chiefly self-inflicted.

This is not the first such tectonic geopolitical shift in the region. The modern period dates back some 200 years, beginning in 1798 with a century of weak Ottoman rule.

Then came the post-World War I colonial era, dominated by Britain and France, to be followed in turn by the cold-war era, marked by the decline of war-drained Europe, the rise of Arab nationalism and the emergence of two superpowers.

The demise of the Soviet Union brought about the American era.

Its dominant features were the US-led liberation of Kuwait, the Madrid peace conference and the Clinton administration's intense but unsuccessful peacemaking effort at Camp David.

This American era coincided with the zenith of the "old Middle East": top-heavy Arab regimes that repressed their people; relatively low oil prices, for the most part; an uneasy coexistence between Israel and both the Palestinians and the Arabs; Israel alone as a nuclear power; a frustrated Iraq balancing an internally divided Iran, and American primacy.

How brief a span it was, giving way to a new era that is anything but welcome. How quaint those old visions of a "new Middle East" -- a region resembling Europe in its peace, prosperity and democracy -- seem today.

Instead, we can now anticipate a Middle East likely to cause great harm to itself, the United States and the world.

In this new world, the United States will enjoy far less influence than it did before Iraq. Former partners will chart increasingly independent paths. Russia will most likely oppose sanctioning Iran. Europe will oppose what it

perceives to be uncritical US sup-

port of Israel. China will focus on negotiating energy deals that guarantee the oil it needs to continue to grow, irrespective of other geopolitical considerations.

More and more, Iran will emerge as a player, a classic imperial power with ambitions to remake the region in its image and with the capabilities to potentially translate its objectives into reality.

Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia are almost certain to initiate nuclear programs of their own, if in fact Iran succeeds, as North Korea has proved able to. Israel, too, looks increasingly vulnerable, burdened with the costs of occupation and multidimensional challenges to its security.

There is unlikely to be any recognizable peace process for the foreseeable future in the absence of a Palestinian partner both able and willing to make compromises.

Tensions between Sunni and Shia Muslims will grow throughout the region and be felt acutely in divided societies such as Lebanon, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. "Militarization" will continue apace, with growing and increasingly powerful private armies in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.

Terrorism will escalate. Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt will be targeted in terrorist campaigns to weaken and discredit their governments. Faced with such challenges and the impression that democracy feeds disorder, Arab regimes, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are likely to resist reform.

As for Iraq, it will remain weak, divided and violent for years.

Kurds, Sunnis and Shia will live separate lives, the result of ethnic cleansing as much as preference or history.

US policy will evolve from achieving success to limiting costs, both in Iraq and in the wider region. This will lead to a reduction in US forces, a reorientation of their role and greater emphasis on working to prevent what is now a civil war from metastasizing into a regional one.

America's options are limited in such a context. Its thirst for the region's oil, vulnerability to terror and commitment to Israel and a moderate Arab future require it to stay engaged. But how?

The US experience in Iraq

should serve as a caution about using military force. It has not proved effective against loosely organized militias or terrorists who are well armed, accepted by the local population and prepared to die for their cause.

And despite calls from some quarters to use force to keep Iran from getting the bomb, the case

for not doing so has grown more, rather than less, compelling over time, for reasons ranging from the dangers of retaliation to the likely oil shock to the global economy.

The United States should also rethink democracy as the centerpiece of foreign policy. Yes, mature democracies tend not to make war on one another. But how many decades would it take to create a genuine democracy anywhere in the region, under even the most ideal circumstances?

Meanwhile, it is necessary to work with many of these same non-democratic governments against other mutual challenges. Nor is democracy an answer, in itself, to the problem of terrorism.

Societies that can offer political and economic opportunities for their young people are less prone to radicalism, to be sure. Yet Britain has hardly proved immune. That both Hamas and Hezbollah fared well in elections only to carry out violent attacks afterwards reinforces the point.

Democracy is of little use when dealing with highly mobilized ideological or religious extremists.

A more relevant focus might be reforms that promote education, economic liberalism and open markets and encourage Arab and



Muslim authorities to speak out in ways that delegitimize terror and shame its supporters.

The United States must realize that it cannot impose a solution on Iraq. Washington should establish a regional forum akin to what existed to help manage events in Afghanistan. This would necessarily require bringing in both Iran and Syria. Syria is in a position to affect the movement of fighters into Iraq and arms into Lebanon. It also exercises considerable influence over Hamas.

There is a strong case for working with many of these same non-

democratic governments against other mutual challenges. Nor is

democracy an answer, in itself, to

the problem of terrorism.

Societies that can offer political

and economic opportunities for

their young people are less prone

to radicalism, to be sure. Yet Britain

has hardly proved immune. That

both Hamas and Hezbollah fared

well in elections only to carry out

violent attacks afterwards reinforces

the point.

Iran is a more difficult case. But given that regime change is not a

near-term prospect and that military strikes would be dangerous, diplomacy is the best option. Any

talks must be unconditional and comprehensive -- that is, they must

address Iran's nuclear program

and its support of terrorism and

militias.

Iran would be offered an array of economic, political, security and energy-related incentives backed as a half to the erosion of America's power and standing in the Middle East. Nor, strictly speaking, is there any one "solution" for the Middle East.

None of this guarantees success, defined however modestly as

a half to the erosion of America's power and standing in the Middle East. Nor, strictly speaking, is there any one "solution" for the Middle East.

Whatever the United States does, or does not do, the region will remain troubled for decades. But this is not a prescription for fatalism.

In history, what often matters most is degree.

There's a fundamental differ-

ence between a Middle East that

lacks formal peace agreements and one defined by terror and war; between a region that houses a

powerful Iran and one dominated by Iran; between a part of the world that has an uneasy relationship with the United States and one filled with hatred.

History shows that eras in the Middle East can last as long as a century and as briefly as fifteen years. It is clearly in America's (and the world's) interest that the current era be as brief as possible.

Richard Haass is president of the Council on Foreign Relations.

© 2006 Newsweek, Inc. Reprinted by arrangement.

carrying out forays into northern Iraq. Republicans fear that public discontent will lead to further losses in Congress and the Democratic capture of the White House in November.

Iraq is not the only "hybrid" conflict in the region. Lebanon's elected government has collapsed after months of assault from Iranian

friendly governments could fall and that the price of oil would rise above \$150 a barrel.

The overall impression is of a Middle East spinning out of control and the United States unable to do much about it.

Is this the future? With luck, not all of this will come to pass. On the other hand, it's easy to imagine

that the United States.

Most large-scale attacks on US forces are now filmed, often from multiple camera angles, and with high-resolution cameras. The footage is slickly edited into dramatic narratives: quick-cut images of Humvees exploding or US soldiers being felled by snipers are set to inspiring religious soundtracks or chanting, which lends a triumphal feel.

In some cases, US officials believe, insurgents attack American forces primarily to generate fresh footage.

Guerrillas have always sought alternative technologies to undermine their better-equipped enemies. What's different now is the power and accessibility of such tools. Production work that once required a studio can now be done on a laptop.

Compilation videos of attacks on US forces sell in Baghdad markets for as little as 50 cents on video CDs. Advancements in cell-phone technology have made such devices particularly useful. Their small video files -- the filming of Saddam Hussein's hanging took up just over one megabyte -- are especially easy to download and disseminate.

"Literally, it's only hours after an attack and the videos are available," says Andrew Garfield, a British counterinsurgency expert who has advised US forces in Baghdad. "You can really say it's only a cell-phone call away."

What the insurgents understand better than the Americans is how Iraqis consume information. Tapes of beheadings are stored on cell phones along with baby pictures and wedding videos. Popular Arab satellite channels like al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya air far more graphic images than are typically seen on US TV -- leaving the impression, say US military officials that America is on the run.

Sunni insurgents in particular have become expert at using technology to underscore -- some would say exaggerate -- their effectiveness. "The sophistication of the way the enemy is using the news media is huge," Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli, the former commander of US forces in Iraq, told Newsweek just before he returned to the US.

What's even more telling is that the Iraqi messages -- the very next section -- are still "TBD," to be determined.

Indeed, the document so much as admits that despite spending hundreds of millions of dollars, the

United States has lost the battle for Iraqi public opinion: "Insurgents, sectarian elements, and others are taking control of the message at the

publiclevel."

Videos of US soldiers being shot and blown up, and of the bloody work of sectarian death squads, are now pervasive. The images inspire new recruits and intimidate those who might stand against them. "Inadequate message control in Iraq," the draft warns, "is feeding the escalating cycle of violence." (A US Embassy spokesperson claims the document reflects Cruz's personal views, not official policy.)

Sunni insurgents in particular have

become expert at using technology to underscore -- some would say exaggerate -- their effectiveness. "The sophistication of the way the enemy is using the news media is huge," Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli, the former commander of US forces in Iraq, told Newsweek just before he returned to the US.

What's even more telling is that the

Iraqi messages -- the very next

section -- are still "TBD," to be

determined.

Indeed, the document so much as

admits that despite spending

hundreds of millions of dollars,

the United States has lost the battle for

Iraqi public opinion: "Insurgents,

sectarian elements, and others are

taking control of the message at the

The clips are accompanied by commentary, often in English, admonishing Iraqis to "focus your utmost rage against the occupation." Among Sunnis and even some Shias, Zawra has become one of the most popular stations in Iraq. "I get e-mails from girls in their 20s from Arab countries; some of them are very wealthy," Jibouri boasts. "Some offer to work for free, some offer money."

The US military's response, on the other hand, usually sticks to traditional channels like press releases. These can take hours to prepare and are often outdated by the time they're issued.

Lt. Col. Barry Johnson, director of the military's press operations in Baghdad until this past September, complains that all military-related information has to be processed upward through a laborious and bureaucratic chain of command. "The military wants to control the environment around it, but as we try to do (so), it only slows us down further," he says.

The consequences of losing the propaganda battle are real. "One of these videos is worth a division of

tanks to those people," says Robert Steele, a former US Marine Corps intelligence officer. Not only do the insurgent videos draw recruits and donations, they don't give ordinary Iraqis much incentive to cooperate with the Americans.

Videos put out by sectarian death squads, like the one shown to Newsweek by the watchdog SITE institute in which a Sunni militant

saws the head off a Shiite prisoner with a five-inch knife, enraged the targeted community.

The release of the ghoulish video of Saddam's hanging prompted thousands of Sunnis to protest in Anbar province. Residents of Fallujah -- the target of a multimillion-dollar hearts-and-minds campaign -- renamed the city's main thoroughfare the Street of the Martyr Saddam Hussein.

The damage goes beyond Iraq. Al-Qaeda's media arm, As-Sahab ("The Cloud"), has similarly improved the quality and frequency of its videos; the group, says former State Department adviser Philip Zelikow, uses "the Internet to provide a sense of virtual identity" now that its Afghan training camps have largely been destroyed.

The question is how to fight back, when today's most powerful technologies -- the Web, cell phones -- are better suited to small, nimble organizations. Back in the 1930s national leaders could almost wholly control the framing of their messages, says Donald Shaw, a professor of media theory at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill who has written about reforms for military public-affairs officers. But now, "the podium has lost its influence." For those who once stood behind it, that message at least is very clear.

With Michael Hastings in Baghdad and Benjamin Sutherland in Treviso

© 2006 Newsweek, Inc. Reprinted by arrangement.

SCOTT JOHNSON

INSURGENTS using simple cell-phone cameras, laptop editing programs and the Web are beating the United States in the fierce battle for Iraqi public opinion.

For nearly four years, US military officials have briefed the Baghdad press corps from behind an imposing wooden podium. No longer.