LOOK at what is happening in Sindh. The decibal of nationalist rhetoric is rising and sounds irreconcilable; the loudest is the new entrant to nationalist ranks: Muttaheda Qaumi

Movement. Authority, having penetrated and bought many of their leaders, treats them with benign neglect. Nationalists roar against the "agencies," the crucial part of uniformed bureaucracy and the latter smiles. But this may be hubris born of success the Army has had in keeping all major departments of public life subordinated all these years. But the Army shouldn't forget the very real and pervasive unrest among Sindhis who want to break the bonds that are keeping them tethered to an oppressive and uncaring system and a constitution that denies them their due. The dynamics of politics,

especially in conjunction with foreign policy's vicissitudes, can produce alarming situations.

Balochistan is aflame in more than merely metaphorical sense. Indeed there are several separate flames. Let's take the brightest first: whether or not the Balochistan Liberation Army exists, a struggle with rifles and rocket launchers is being waged against Pakistan Army and its subsidiary, the Frontier Constabulary. It is a serious affair. Authority's habitually maladroit reactions face a serious challenge from all Baloch (and Pushtoon) Nationalists for a radical change. Doubtless, these inchoate forces cannot defeat Pakistan Army with its modern weapons. But is that all to sustain complacency in the Pak Army in the face of flares ups in Kohlu, Kahan, Sui, and Dera Bugti? Can they see no worrying possibilities as a result of the vicissitudes of international politics?

The second Baloch force causing trouble and worry comprises Taliban and their friends, with or without al Qaeda cooperation. Taliban show two faces: They are making life difficult for American, NATO, and Afghan forces. Whether there is still some support and guidance from their old mentors inside Pak Army, as

the American media allege, they are one of several nemeses of Karzai regime. Their second face is one of the decimaters of the Kafirs within: the Shias. Both faces of Taliban are familiar and equally dangerous. Pakistan military, the only policy makers in Pakistan, should organize war games on and about Balochistan with its mineral strategic value in mind. If it does, it may hear scenarios that will dent its sangfroid.

It is hard to compress the complexities of NWFP politics by one who sits so physically far from it. But Afghanistan abuts even more on NWFP (or rather Pakhtun-khawa) than on Balochis-tan. One emerging reality is the evolution of a mindset that results from the confluence of two notionally-related streams of thought: Taliban and al Qaeda. Current politics of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal is only slightly a moderate version of the mindset that mainly rules Pakhtunkhawa and is also in an unavowed alliance with Pak Army. The more extremist force is fighting a slow intensity insurgency against Pak Armyand Pakistanthat is so much in the news and is making Americans exasperated enough to violate Pakistan's sovereignty by what is hot pursuit inside Pakistan.

Americans not only refuse to apologise, they seem to be claiming the right to what may be hot pursuit at will into Pakistan in days to come.

Eggheads in Pak Army should objectively assess the true state of Pakistan's relationship with the US. The Americans are 100 per cent serious about hunting down both Taliban and al Qaeda wherever they may be hiding. Pakistan in Americans eyesif Pakistanis remove their blinkers from their eyesis working both sides of the street; official Pakistan is trying to hunt with the American hound and run with the Islamicist hare. This is an inherently unstable and dangerous state of affairs. Should there be properly conducted war games on NWFP, may be the same as for Balochistan, troubling scenarios would emerge.

Pakhtunkhawa is also home to secular Pushtoon nationalists. They were eclipsed by MMA in 2002 polls thanks to the magic comprising Musharraf regime's role in the creation of MMA and the "agencies." Most war gamers, one ventures to predict, would recommend another really free election without the political magic of 2002 polls being employed. The outlook will be different then.

No one has ever taken the trouble to investigate what ails the Northern Areas. Why can't the Shias and Sunnis live together as brothers, the way they have lived for centuries. Who is breaking peace? Is it not a fact that most people there want normal civic rights and self-government? Who opposes it and why? Who is deflecting attention? Why major opposition parties do not investigate the troubled politics of NAs. Indeed a non-official panel of independent jurists, columnists,

intellectuals and noted writers should be constituted by some NGO with funding from small, distant powers who are not part of the renewed Great Game in Central Asia. Parallel investigations by several panels will speedily bring out the sifted facts. That will also underline the reforms Pakistan needs.

Talking about Azad Kashmir is hard and also easy. It is straightforward: give to Azad Kashmir what Islamabad wants for Indian-controlled Kashmir: a measure of self-determination through a free election and investing more powers in the regional government. Factually, Islamabad is not sure of what it may demand, or agree to, vis-a-vis Indian-controlled Kashmir. However, remembering a few facts will be useful.

Original Pakistan demand was to hold a free plebiscite as a preliminary to its joining Pakistan. No clear commitment is available about what amount of autonomy will Islamabad give to Srinagar government. Will that government be like Azad Kashmir's or something like Quetta or Peshawar? Neither does one know what Pakistan has in mind for Jammu or Ladakh areas. It is clear that these will never form part of Pakistan. Since Pakistanis go on insisting on a change in Kashmir Valley's status, they should renounce claim over Jammu and Ladakh. Additionally, show in practice in Muzaffarabad what they actually intend for the Srinagar authorities. Today's over-centralised military regime is an argument against Kashmiris joining Pakistanwhere democracy is for ever subordinated to the Army.

As for Punjab, things seem to be very congenial for the Army.

Today, Islamabad policies have 2007 election in view. Next year is significant for both national election and for President Pervez Musharraf's re-election. There is another decision that is due in October that year: whether Mr. Musharraf will demit the office of Chief of Army Staff or will he soldier on in uniform. KBD was a bait to Punjabi voters. That has made Musharraf the cynasure of Punjabi eyes, or so it seems. Once elections are over, all dams will take their place on the plate of Mr. Shaukat Aziz. "Agencies" appear to be sanguine about Punjab voting as Musharraf desiresfor Q League.

Pakistan political life is splintered along provincial lines. The fact that should occupy all minds is how have we reached the present pass. Doubtless Pak Army's rise to become a politically decisive factor goes back to 1950s. It has subjugated all departments of public life ever since, except for a brief interlude (1971-1977) due to special circumstances of 1971. Let's think of what can happen as a result of this permanent Army-controlled policy-making

The Army is unlikely to let go its stranglehold on the government and economy. This will go on infuriating all ethnic nationalists. At some stage, Army, a colossus, will clash mightily with variously combined nationalists. Army thinks it can put down this challenge. Nationalists rely on the maxim that a nation so deeply divided and afflicted with conflict invites foreign intervention. That is the context of mentioning 1971.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.