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Would Iraqis rise to the occasion?

M B Naqvi writes from Karachi
ELECTIONS to a 'permanent' Iraqi Assembly have been successfully completed; American political architecture there for a democracy is nearly complete. Is that QED? It all depends on how Iraqis view the credibility of these polls and above all on how they utilize the theoretical opportunity thus afforded circumscribed by the presence of occupation armies, local circumstances and the framework of American geostrategic
purposes. Despite American presence and the sub-rosa role of Israel, a lot depends on how Iraqis make use of the opportunities they can create.
Eearlier Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had called a conference of significant Iraqi groups in order to forge unity in their ranks to promote American objectives. The conference, despite early negative indications, did succeed in maybe papering over their differences. They did produce a common statement that was a breath of fresh air.
The conference of chosen -- by whom? -- representatives of the Kurds, Shias and Sunnis agreed to preserve the integrity of the Iraqi state. Their resolve to live together in one state was reaffirmed. The outstanding feature was they agreed to demand “immediate withdrawal” of foreign occupation troops, hitherto the chief Sunni demand. There was some mutual accommodation whereby the results of the Referendum on Constitution were accepted and that opened the road for the elections. But the key question is whether a federal dispensation will now be accepted by some Sunni groups remains unclear.
Thus, it is too early to say that the hump has been crossed. But a hopeful vista is now open in which
inter-denominational cooperation can flourish. The acid test of it would be whether the daily suicide bombers and car bomb attacks would subside, if not end. Unless that happens the hopes of a peaceful future for Iraq would be unrealistic. That would mean antioccupation insurgency continues.
The danger inherent in the situation is a drift into a full-scale Shia-Sunni civil war, while Kurds would consolidate their zone's autonomy and probably move towards independence. That would involve trouble from, and to, neighbours of Iraq: Syria, Turkey and Iran. But that remains a relatively distant possibility while the ugly consequences of a continued Shia-Sunni split can speedily lead to the demise of Iraqi state. That had better be avoided to preserve the region's stability and all Arabs. The dynamics of Shia-Sunni split in Iraq, apart from Iraq's own future, will open a Pandora's box for
the entire Middle East. All old faultlines will become active.
There are Shia minorities in most Middle Eastern countries and in some states they are a sizeable majority; the important eastern oil bearing region of Saudi Arabia is Shia and Shias are a majority in Lebanon and Bahrain. In other places, they are a minority of varying sizes. They are also sub-sects of Shias in Yemen, Syria and Egypt. No Arab country will escape the
consequences of that event.
While the Cairo Agreement was a hopeful factor, its success cannot be taken for granted even after the election. Its success would require substantial acts of faith from both Shias and Sunnis. The Iraqi Shias hitherto have behaved with a sense of responsibility. While Al-Zarqawi's men have been attacking Shia targets for many months, the Shia retaliation has not been equal and opposite; it is strangely forebearing. But this cannot last for ever.
The Sunnis have to come to terms with the other major elements of Iraqi society: the Kurds and the Shias together constitute 80 percent of Iraq's population. For all of these three groups to hang together, the glue can only be equal rights and democratic freedoms for all amidst true rule of law. Much bad blood has already been accumulated. These sectarian attacks must end and the promi-
nent leaders of each group must sit together in a democratic spirit to steer Iraq out of violence's vortex.
True, it is easier said than done amidst so much bloodshed. And yet nothing else will serve the best interests of both Shias and Sunnis. The violence, now directed at Shias, originally began as acts of 'national' resistance against foreign occupation forces. That had a justification of its own and posed no danger to Iraq's integ-
rity. How or why did this change of targets come about? It seems so short-sighted. Everyone must remember that there is a huge overhang of past sectarian killings in Iraq's 84 years history. Shias revolted in 1920-21. The British suppressed them brutally and the Sunni domination from the Ottoman days continued. Then Saddam bloodily suppressed them twice in order to maintain the power and social status quo in Iraq, the last time being after 1991 war. There is enough motivation among Shias for revenge. The mischievous friends are misleading Sunnis. The Sunnis will do themselves a favour by reciprocating the Shia forbearance to preserve Iraq's integrity.
Few can be surprised at Iraq's splitting up three ways along denominational lines. This state was invented in 1921 by the British. It comprised various provinces of
the Ottoman Empire that were held together by Ottoman Caliph's power. Because of historical quirks and British overlords' policy of preserving the status quo that Sunnis have remained in a dominant position. They occupied most of the key seats of power and pelf. That position has to change; both history and democracy demand a change. Democracy means end of special privileges for any set of citizens. The Sunni elements in
Iraq have to reconcile themselves to the demands of democracy and not insist on what they have had. The past is dead; it cannot be recreated. Any attempt to recreate the past would plunge Iraq into bloodshed once again.
Doubtless much will depend on the policies and purposes of the US, Israel and America's Industrial-Military Complex. It remains a mystery why did the US invade and occupy Iraq without an exit strategy. Evidently their regime change policy carries no ascertainable methodology. Nor was there clear idea of how to disengage after achieving the primary objective. It makes no sense. That is why conspiracy theories abound. One such theory concerns American Neocons' coup to occupy key decision-making slots in Washington. But that begs the main question: How come the strongest, most organized and demo-
cratic hyper power can undertake an expensive military invasion without thinking through the project and fixing intermediate and ultimate objectives? Character quirks of George W cannot explain what the US has done unless it is to be assumed that ultimate objectives cannot be disclosed. Iraqis should beware.
The ideal course would be for all the three major sectarian groups to agree to a federation, as the constitution formally lays down. The three main federating units would be the Kurds in the north, the Shias in the south and the Sunnis in the middle. So long as democracy is honestly worked, and no particular community is discriminated against, the road to progress and preservation of Iraq will be open, provided foreign troops actually withdraw. If this course is not adopted with honesty and determination, the future would be bleak for both Iraq and the Middle East.
Compromise requires normalization of concrete material interests with an enlightened view of what history demands. Take Iraqi Sunnis: they are confronted with loss of oil revenues if Shia South and Kurd North become autonomous to appropriate oil revenues from their respective soils. Good Lord has not chosen to bless Sunni areas with hydrocarbons. It is just their hard luck. They can work for a stronger federation, able to ensure investment of oil income in all areas on merit -- optimum returns -- so that all Iraqis would benefit. But for that guns are an unsuitable way of arguing while reasonable argumentation and emphasis on commonalities of history and common purposes with both Kurds and Shias are needed.
MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.