PRESIDENT Pervez Musharraf has made a significant proposal to India: 'Let's demilitarise Kashmir'. In principle one agrees with the idea. But alas the fact is that governments all over world are generally guided by their security experts. One hopes that the Pakistani head of state had taken into account the easily predictable Indian reaction. Preliminary Indian reaction was one of irritation and being tired of the fusillade of proposals from Pakistan.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to examine the implications of this pregnant proposal. The first implication is that there is some prior (and agreed) solution of the Kashmir problem; without that how the two hostile armies will leave the contested area? Without a definite agreement, specifying various steps of implementing that agreed solution, the idea of the armies retreating out of Kashmir is putting the cart before the horse.

Secondly, unless there is a well-worked out solution somewhere with which India's authorities concur, Musharraf's speaking with India's top authorities, runs the risk of angry rejection by the Indian Army. It will ask their political masters whether they have obtained credible guarantees that Pak Army will not march in as India's gets out; or Pakistan might pull a fast one by letting its proxies fill the vacuum thus created because there are all too numerous trained Jihadis lurking in the shadows; that's how Indian generals are likely to read this idea.

Indian political parties' reaction has also to be taken into account. Don't Pakistani leaders know that the history of last 58 years is one of hostility and mistrust of India which means there would scarcely be an Indian who would trust the word of a Pakistani

general? Pakistan has no pro-Pakistan lobby in India that would recommend making a serious concession to it. Islamabad never tried to crate such a lobby. Which Indian leader will stand up in Lok Sabha and support this, or indeed any, Musharraf proposal?

The harsh political reality is total mistrust between India and Pakistan. This has been reinforced by myopic security designs on either side that made each a nuclear power. Whatever propagandist reasons are assigned for the possession of nukes by either side, its linkage with Kashmir cannot be denied. Even if one accepts the rather laboured Indian explanations of the genesis of their 1974 “PNE”, the Indians cannot opt out of present nuclear standoff so long as Pakistan retains its nukes while Pakistani Bomb is overly India specific. The presence of the two sets of hostile nuclear deterrents is a powerful argument against demilitarisation in terms of what is the security speak.

The current situation is ludicrous: It is widely known that Pakistan cannot win a war with India, whether conventional or nuclear. That means Pakistan cannot wrest Kashmir from India by military force. For close on six decades India has poured treasure

into Kashmir and has gone on to become a world military power largely because of that territory. It is far too committed politically to hang on to Kashmir, no matter what Kashmiris and others say or do. It has resisted Pakistan-sponsored Jihad in Kashmir for 15 years and is in no mood to throw in the towel.

Thus there are good security reasons why the two countries may, one day, come to lethal blows. History of last six years is illuminating. Soon after encountering Pakistani nukes, Indian PM AB Vajpayee tried to work out a détente over nuclear matters and rode a bus to Lahore. Gen. Musharraf responded with the Kargil war. Later, Musharraf tried to resume from where Pakistan and India had left off in Feb 1999. This was at Agra but with no success. And a foolish step by Jihadists led to famous virtual war of 2002. There were lessons in it for both countries.

India was anxious to teach Pakistan a lesson for its Jihad promotion. It credibly meant to mount an invasion despite the presence of Pakistani nukes. The original illusion fed by Bomb lovers to Islamabad was that nuclear weapons will make Pakistan absolutely impregnable. Vajpayee < made as if he will prove it wrong and

adumbrated a new Pakistan- specific doctrine: let Pakistan nuke India first, as its doctrine stipulates, and then wait for India's massive nuclear response in kind; Pakistan will be sent back to stone age. Irrespective of what damage India suffered, its second strike capability will destroy all urban-industrial centers of Pakistan. That was a near notional certainty. Thus it was that Pakistan credibly promised to stop sending Jihadis into Kashmir. All honour to those who promised this credibly. That is how the Peace Process could start after a long cooling off period. But the latter process is going nowhere. Also, the Jihad, the only perceived lever in Pakistani hands, has not completely stopped. However, a minimal deterrence, inherent in the weapons -- or too high costs -- helps maintain this no-peace-no-war situation.

As noted, there are all round impotencies to contend with: Pakistan cannot seize Kashmir by force; India cannot allow secession of Kashmir for political reasons. Mistrust between the two only promotes militarisation on both sides, which, in turn, strengthens the mistrust. But war too has become impossible for both. A solution of some sort has to be found, if for no other

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reason than to arrest, if not reverse, the militarisation tendencies in both countries. One is not concerned with what the Indians are likely to say or do; there are enough sensible Indians to tackle their problems. It is with Pakistan that one is concerned. It has to be saved from a process that, if left to go on working, will lead eventually to the Soviets-like implosion. World's largest military-machine and a huge nuke collection could not save the Soviet Union. Pakistanis have to beware. Therefore, a solution will have to be predicated on the recognition of foregoing realities.

There are three theoretical alternatives for a Kashmir solution: First, to permit Kashmir to become independ-ent. The second is joint control of Kashmir by India and Pakistan. The third is to permanently convert the Line of Control into an international frontier. Well, the first solution is repugnant to both countries' notions of a settlement; no one is willing to let Kashmiris actually decide their future status. The second is impractical so long as the two states remain suspicious of each other, suspicion being reinforced by nuclear weapons. The third is what the Indians would, in one's view, settle for. The question is whether Pakistan would accept it in the absence of any other solution?

American facilitators, to my mind, are trying to rephrase this third option and make it palatable to both sides. Various options that Musharraf spoke are variants of this American-supported idea. So long as India and Pakistan can be brought round to sign a settlement of Kashmir, most people will welcome it, though it is hard to see how the two can reconcile their grandiose security perceptions.

Thinking out of the box is a virtue. But it had better be thinking. As it happens, these two countries are embarked on a journey to normalisation of relations. Pray, what would be the normal relations between Pakistan and India? Had Islamabad been committed to peace, prosperity, freedom and cultural enrichment of its 150 million men, women and children, it would have no difficulty in defining the goal to be close friendship with India, to be anchored in a free union of all South Asia speaking to the outside world with one voice. And what would that voice says: for God's sake conduct international relations with the same aim that we have at home.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.