HAS the Indian government established a degree of control over Naxalite activity? And has it got any wiser after almost four decades? Going by the first meeting of the Standing Committee of Chief Ministers of Naxalite-affected states on September 19, and the October 5 conference of directors-general of police, the answer isn't clear.

The CMs' meeting happened barely a month after Andhra Pradesh reimposed a ban on a range of Naxalites, followed by Chhattisgarh. Both states witnessed violent incidents.

In Chhattisgarh, the Naxals demonstrated their military prowess by

blowing up a (supposedly) mine-proof vehicle carrying Central Reserve Police personnel with a mine, sending it 35 feet up in the air. In Andhra, they killed a Congress MLA.

This deplorable violence formed the backdrop to the tough talk at the Standing Committee. But not many recalled that the violence was preceded by police brutality not just against Naxals, but ordinary villagers.

A consensus was reached on a "twopronged" approach: "firmly tackling the security threat, and simultaneously implementing programmes for socioeconomic development."

A handsome Rs 2,000 crores was allocated annually to anti-Naxal "police modernisation. " The Centre also approved the use of helicopters and armoured vehicles in anti-Naxal operations. In addition, Rs 2 crores per Naxal-affected district was granted to "accelerate socio-economic development." This works out to a much smaller Rs 280 crores.

The two "prongs," then, are unequal. Indeed, many CMs and policemen have concluded that they must step up the use of force. Thus, Andhra director-general of police

Swaranjit Sen, known for his machismo and trigger-happiness, says he'll use helicopters to "bring Naxalites out of forests."

Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand are considering the "Afghanistan Solution" -- building highways through forests to connect remote villages and create "security corridors." (But this hasn't worked in Afghanistan. Besides, destroying forests and disrupting village life will aggravate the problem.) More dramatically, Bihar is planning to use satellite imagery to track Naxals.

Such high-tech schemes are fundamentally misconceived. They miss the Naxalites' strengths and weaknesses. Satellite pictures might help if the Naxals have permanent camps. But they don't. Typically, they mix with villagers following Mao's dictum about "fish and water."

Helicopter gunships would effec-

tively mow down hamlets -- as the US did in Vietnam. But such indiscriminate violence will only foment counterviolence.

The key lies in breaking this cycle of violence-and-counter-violence, not in raising it on to a higher military-technological plane. Force can rarely deter counter-force. If states get hold of high-tech weapons, so can non-state actors, although they are much less dependent on arms.

Experience suggests that tough measures usually don't achieve their purpose. Bans cannot significantly expand the power to deal with violence. Plenty of such powers are available under existing laws, which cover a wide range of violent acts, and abetting, assisting or promoting them.

Laws like the Public Security Act are draconian. They criminalise even acts

of sympathy, including giving Naxals medical care. They punish people who might take Naxalites' help in settling disputes, which the law courts take years to resolve.

Bans can be counter-productive. Take the People's War Group, which recently merged with the Maoist Communist Centre to form the CPI-Maoist. It was banned between 1992 and July 2004, barring a short interval. Through these 12 years, the group's activities grew beyond Andhra, into Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Orissa, and even Karnataka, which now has some 600 Naxal activists.

The government's knee-jerk response is to treat Naxalism as a law-and-order or "security" problem. Yet, Naxalism -- named after an armed uprising of 1967 in Naxalbari village in West Bengal -- is different from other

militant movements which typically remain confined to single states/issues.

Indeed, over 38 years, Naxalism has grown steadily, spawning 30-odd groups. According to the Delhi-based Institute for Conflict Management, Naxalite presence expanded from 55 districts in nine states in 2003, to 170 districts in 15 states this past February. In 55 districts, the Naxalites run a parallel government.

Naxals flourish where there are huge disparities in assets and incomes, and where injustice and violence by the privileged are rampant.

Prakash Singh, former Border Security Force chief, and author of a book on Naxalism, holds: "The Naxal movement is irrepressible because it draws sustenance from the grievances of the people" including failure of land reforms.

In India, only 1.3 percent of agricultural land has been redistributedcompared to 43 percent in China, 33 in Japan, and 32 percent in South Korea.

Former Bihar Chief Secretary Kamala Prasad attributes Naxalism's success to numerous metaphors: the Failure of Law and Order, Ambiguity of Social Policy, Failings of Democratic Processes, Failure of the Party System, and Deficits of Governance.

The Naxalite phenomenon recently got aggravated with the state's withdrawal from public services, the growing illegitimacy of governance, and corruption. Agrarian distress, unemployment, and the forester-contractor mafia's depredations, have intensified discontent. As has globalisation.

The United Progressive Alliance showed some comprehension of this. Its Common Minimum Programme said that Naxalism isn't a mere law-and-order problem; the social and economic grievances underlying it must be addressed.

The government must change its priorities. More, it must add a third prong: giving the Naxals a democratic space for self-expression and

encouraging them to come overground.

This approach worked in Andhra in the late 1980s. Chief Minister YS Rajasekhar Reddy revived hopes when he held talks with the CPI-Maoist last year. The party leaders got a roaring public reception.

But the government cheated the Naxals by tracking their forest hideouts in their absence. And it refused to negotiate their reasonable demands about recovering public lands illegally grabbed by powerful interests. The talks failed. The government launched a major offensive. This brought on counterattacks.

There's a lesson here. If the government wants to control Naxal violence, it must address its structural causes. It must of course protect citizens ' lives, but in lawful, constitutional, humane ways. It must promote justice and equality. Or Naxalism will spread.

Praful Bidwai is an eminent Indian columnist.