***The final question is: what to do? The first thing to do is to stop depending on the Bomb. Pakistan should dispose of it scientifically and in the correct political way, as South Africa did, with no conditions or reference to anyone. Islamabad has to stop running the arms race with India by opting out, the only way to end the race. This would involve lowering of foreign policy sights. Pakistan should not behave like a big power. It is a second-rank power; its people should be content with being left alone to cultivate their farms and work in their factories, if Islamabad can help build more factories.***

Islamic country where the majority of people are moulded by religious orthodoxies. True, there are liberals who think that the importance of the mullahs has been exaggerated. Their share in national vote used to vary from 5 to 8 per cent. In the 2002 election, however, they have emerged as a force, with the help of the military government and its agencies. By cooking election results all these years, Pakistan has had its stat-

signed a far reaching military pact with India. Pakistanis do not like this. America is serious about nuclear disarmament -- at least of Pakistan. However, Pakistanis will do themselves a favour by becoming realists. They should see with a clear eye how Americans regard them. There is no Pakistani interest to which Americans are committed. Pakistan's residual interest in Afghanistan evokes

Let's take stock of factual achievements. Well, Afghanistan had been conquered by Pakistan's proxies, the Taliban, though only briefly. In Kashmir, Pakistan has drawn a blank. The assumed power of the Bomb that not only kept the Kashmir jihad going for long, Pakistan Army could do what it did to the 1999 Lahore Peace Process and in Kargil. Recall the overall results. Americans

objective and Pakistan lost out politically. The Bomb proved useless, a dud.

The reason for Pakistan's suffering humiliation in Afghanistan and in 2002 was because it had fixed unattainable objectives. Naturally, the achievement was no-war-no-peace with India. Much the same holds for Afghanistan, friendly rhetoric notwithstanding. But what of now? Pakistan has no firm

AMERICAN Vice President Dick Cheney has declared: "We've got a

good idea of the general area that he (Osama bin Laden) is in. But I don't have the street address." This is the culmination of the old and persistent accusations by General Barno, Zalmay Khalilzad, Mr. Hamid Karzai and his underlings, and Pentagon officials. They claim that Osama and Mullah Umar may be hiding in Pakistan and that, for good measure, Pakistan is still allowing Taliban to go into Afghanistan to rekindle the war they lost in 2001.

This directly questions Pakistan's commitment to anti-Taliban cause. True, the US says it is satisfied about what Pakistan is doing regarding al-Qaeda, but American think tanks appear to regard this as serving as a safety valve for Pakistan. No one seems to take Pakistan's words at face value about not aiding and abetting Taliban and having done the maximum it could.

They do, however, recognise Islamabad's political compulsions; irrespective of which government is in office, it cannot ignore that many Taliban were Pakistanis or Afghan students in Pakistani Madrassas; they have an extensive support base in Pakistan. Still, Americans go further and keep Pakistan under pressure "to do more." They think that pressure on Pakistan will promote American objectives better.

Domestically, Pakistanis disagree on their identity. It is an

ure lowered and has become prone to foreign pressures.

In the Bomb-created hubris, Pakistani generals believed Pakistan's defences to have become impregnable. They then thought they could safely tweak the Indians' tail in Kashmir. Earlier they had virtually installed the Taliban government over much of Afghanistan, leaving the northern territories under Burhanuddin Rabbani. Pakistan's "success" in Afghanistan was accepted by all, though it rankled in the hearts of the Indians and the Iranians. Americans too were not amused, though they tried (unsuccessfully ) to do business with the Taliban.

Relations between Pakistan and the US are thus not as friendly as claimed. The Americans find it necessary to keep Pakistan under pressure because of a deficit in convergences. America is a promoter of India's power, prestige, and role in Asia. It has

American hostility. As for Kashmir, the US is far more on the Indian side. America also favours democracy in some measure, though it says its commitment to the Musharraf regime is as strong as ever. American advocacy of democracy is always diluted by US national interests, as they define them.

In sum, the divergences with the US seem to outweigh convergences. The Bomb needs to be seen with a clear eye, especially the hubris it produces. That was why Pakistani objectives since the 1980s were punching above its weight. The Afghanistan and Kashmir commitments could not have been conceived if Pakistanis had not believed that the Bomb had made its national security unassailable. Pakistan also dreamt of leading the Islamic world. These are basically unachievable objectives because arms races with India preempt resources for everything else.

crushed the Taliban, forcing Pakistan to join the War on Terror against the Taliban. The sequel to Kargil was that Pakistani troops could withdraw safely through American-mediated acquiescence of India. Pakistan had to make promises to India not to allow jihadis to use Pakistani territory. After that the Agra summit met the fate of the Lahore Peace Process. Indians, taking advantage of the attack on their parliament, threatened a full-scale invasion of Pakistan.

2002 is remembered for a dangerous confrontation with India. Why did the the Indians not attack? Bomb lovers assert that it was the Bomb that deterred India. Is that true? The finale actually included American mediation. Secondly, Pakistan had to undertake the cessation of jihadis going into Indian-administered Kashmir. As for the dream of leading the OIC, well, it remains a dream. In short, India gained its main

friends in the vicinity or elsewhere in the world, except a rapidly changing China.

Pakistan continues to treat America as a court of last appeal; powerful Pakistanis think nothing of doing things under American pressure. Among Pakistan's vulnerabilities, the chief one is the Bomb; it is followed closely by the dependency syndrome for economic well-being. Islamabad now depends on loans and aid from international financial institutions to an extent that exceeds what Benazir and Nawaz Sharif did. Has Islamabad reduced any of Pakistan's vulnerabilities? The answer is no.

The final question is: what to do? The first thing to do is to stop depending on the Bomb. Pakistan should dispose of it scientifically and in the correct political way, as South Africa did, with no conditions or reference to anyone. Islamabad has to stop running the arms race

with India by opting out, the only way to end the race. This would involve lowering of foreign policy sights. Pakistan should not behave like a big power. It is a second-rank power; its people should be content with being left alone to cultivate their farms and work in their factories, if Islamabad can help build more factories. But doing a South Africa will immensely enhance the prestige and stature, the way it happened with Nelson Mandela.

This would invite howls of protests. What about national security? Wouldn't India march in? Observe that except for Pakistan, all neighbours of India are non-nuclear states; all states in South-East Asia are non-nuclear. How many countries has India occupied, not counting the earlier conquests of Sikkim and Goa for consolidating its homeland. A nonnuclear Pakistan would be safer from a nuclear-capable India. We would be like all the third world countries. If the Bomb cannot give either true security or the status and power that Islamabad has wanted, it has to go.

See India with a clearer eye. It is now far more Hindu than India ever was before 1947. It simply cannot have the intent to conquer or to entice away any part of Pakistan. India would refuse to add one more Muslim to its population. Hindutva advocates' recognition of Pakistan is far greater than of many Pakistanis. They need a Pakistan to blame. They would invent a Pakistan if there wasn't any to excoriate. One is less certain about Congress; but why suppose that Sonia and Kunwar Natwar Singh recognise the reality of Pakistan any the less. India is not a radical threat to Pakistan; useful business can and should be done with it.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.