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Dissolving the Bihar Assembly

Move is ham-handed, not vile

Praful Bidwai writes from New Delhi
WAS it an anti-democracy coup, or a move to prevent horse-trading which mocks at democracy? It's not easy to take black-and-white positions on the Bihar Assembly's dissolution. Arguments on both sides have merit.
Yet, the way the United Progressive Alliance handled Bihar is likely to be seen as tactless and ham-handed. This might give the shrinking National Democratic Alliance a small, undeserved, shot in the arm.
Supporters of the Assembly's dissolution claim that Bihar witnessed terrible horse-trading in violation of the popular mandate. The mandate was fragmented between three blocs within the 243-member assembly: Rashtriya Janata Dal-Left (79 seats), Janata Dal (United)-Bharatiya Janata Party (92 seats), and Congress and Dalit leader Ram Vilas Paswan's Lok Janashakti Party
(39 seats).
The worst culprits in the horsetrading were LJP MLAs, mostly upper-caste goons. They had no loyalty to Mr Paswan, and were elected because of their opposition to Mr Laloo Prasad. They were always ready to defect.
Mr Paswan first refused any truck with the RJD or the BJP (although he played footsie with the latter). But his MLAs cut a deal with the JD(U). After several MLAs
were spirited away into BJP-ruled Jharkhand, he suddenly offered to ally with the RJD.
Dissolution, its supporters argue, was the only way to prevent artificial, unrepresentative, and undemocratic outcomes. The UPA acted in good faith. At any rate, the decision needs Parliament's sanction.
Now, consider the antidissolution argument. This holds that the UPA acted in unseemly haste -- getting President Kalam to sign the proclamation in Moscow in the middle of the night -- because the NDA was mustering an Assembly majority. Dissolution violates the Supreme Court's judgment in
the Bommai case, which says it: "is not a matter of course. It should be resorted to only [when] necessary."
The move, claims the NDA, was typical of the Congress's past conduct in scuttling Opposition-led governments.
All opponents of dissolution don't carry the argument to its conclusion by demanding it be reversed. NDA chairman Atal
Behari Vajpayee only wants Assembly elections held "as soon
as possible." They also miss the point that President Kalam, no putty in UPA hands, was sounded on dissolution in advance and consulted legal advisers.
Equally important, the dissolution cannot take effect until Parliament approves it. The action is not irreversible, nor a fait accompli.
One crucial assumption which dissolution's opponents make is that two-thirds of the LJP's 29 MLAs were about to join hands with the JD(U)). This would have enabled it to stitch together an Assembly majority by drawing in independents too.
This assumption is open to question. A day before the procla-
mation, Mr Paswan paraded 10 LJP MLAs. He also claimed the support of four MLAs who are in jail. By all accounts, Mr Kumar had the support of 13 to 15 MLAs.
But this wasn't good enough: the anti-defection law requires two-thirds of a party's MLAs to form a separate group to avoid disqualification. Mr Kumar showed himself weak on numbers. When asked by the press on May 22 to give a break-up of his support-base, he
said, "numbers are not important."
However, the UPA chose the worst moment in appealing to the President and allowed the NDA to behave as if it already had a clear majority. Had the UPA acted as soon as indications of likely defections came in, the NDA would not have been able to capture the moral high ground. Clear indications were available by May 13.
Alternatively, the UPA could have given Nitish Kumar & Co more time to gather the required numbers. They would have discredited themselves by failing to cobble a majority -- despite bribery and abduction.
The UPA underestimated the
hostility that Mr Laloo Prasad evokes among the middle classes and sections of the media. He represents the self-assertion of the underprivileged in a uniquely emphatic way, which annoys the elite. The elite believes he's an interloper.
Similarly, the UPA underestimated the degree of sympathy the BJP and the NDA still enjoy in many newspapers and magazines. Above all, it underesti-
mated the Congress's negative image -- because of its past authoritarian record.
The NDA's is equally bad in this respect. It toppled elected governments at least six times in as many years, including in Bihar (twice), Goa, Arunachal, Manipur, and Nagaland. Bihar Governor Bhandari wanted Ms Rabri Devi dismissed in 1999 on bogus grounds. President Narayanan overruled him.
In 2002, Governor Vinod Pandey swore in Mr Nitish Kumar who patently lacked majority support and quit without a vote. The Jana Sangh led the campaign in 1977 to dismiss all Congress-ruled
state governments.
For the BJP, democracy and the Constitution are instruments. In 1998, it tried to alter the Constitution's core by ushering in a highly centralised, unitarian, presidential system.
What happens in Bihar will probably be decided by a legal challenge to the dissolution. This is a thorny issue because of the messy Assembly and confusion over the Constitution's 10th Schedule. Under the Schedule, the power of deciding on defections lies with the Speaker. But the Bihar Assembly has no Speaker!
Therefore, the courts will probably step in. They must tread carefully and not repeat what they did in Jharkhand, when they converted a conditional clause into a definite ruling: "If the averments of the petitioner are correct, then [the Governor's action] ... is a fraud on the Constitution." The "if" is allimportant. The Supreme Court made this harsh indictment without determining the truth of the allegations.
The next elections' mandate may be different if the RJD can properly ally with the Congress and Left -unlike in February, when the Congress went with the LJP. Much will also depend on whether the RJD can recoup its own vote, which has eroded by a third.
Recovering the old base may not be easy for the RJD. But can NDA do any better?
Praful Bidwai is an eminent Indian columnist.