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Limited war under the nuclear shadow in South Asia

Report of the seminar presenting key findings of the USIP study

Speakers Prof Stephen Cohen and Prof PR Chart
Trof PR Chari ’Introduction
‘ if focuses on the post-1998 environ-/ment, especially the crises of the kargil war in 1999, and 'Operation Parakram’, the mass mobilisation of ?,f2001-02.
• This report concludes, contrary °Yb conventional wisdom, that ^nuclear deterrence does not prevent sub-conventional or conventional bonflict between nuclear powers, and may even exacerbate those intensions. This is the stubility-n instability paradox.
.v, The Kargil war. for example, was ^launched by Pakistan as small-scale Nitrations, possibly with a calcula-jjon that it could have escalated to full conventional war. Nuclear .deterrence allowed Pakistan to consider that it had cover for a potential conventional war, and successfully deterred both sides from escalating the conflict.
'This reflects a belief in South Asia (unlike that held in the west during the Cold War) that conventional and nuclear conflicts are disconnected, conventional wars can be waged without direct bearing on the stability of nuclear deterrence.
A war can be limited by four parameters: time, geography, weaponry used, and objectives sought. The Cold Start strategy, which seeks to call Pakistan's nuclear bluff with limited offensives, provides all corps with offensive capability and upgrades the role of Special Forces. The tactical objectives may include a rapid shallow invasion, destroying J^rorist infrastructure or Pakistani military assets, or hot pursuit of ^Utanis - all limited objectives. The Strategic objective would be to get Adia out of its post-1998 "strategic ,Wx" of being deterred by Pakistan's taclear arsenal from acting against
Pakistan’s proxy war in Kashmir.
Limited war advocates assert that the rationality of Pakistan's leader->* will preclude (heir use of nuclear weapons. It underlies stra-tegic thinking that will inform India’s operational planning and ■force structuring, and is therefore central to strategic stability In South Asia.
Conclusions of the report The 10 conclusions of the report are:
First, the Kargil and 'Operation Parakram' crises demonstrated that Mutually Assured Destruction deterrence is operating in South Asia, and that both sides have fairly recessed redlines for resorting to nuclear strikes. Second, in contrast, both sides arc prepared to engage in dangerous brinkmanship. The leadership of both countries are more aware of the utility of nuclear weapons as a political tool rather than their military implications. Stability is also undermined by a lack of substantive progress on confidence-building measures, and by the role of China, which has been benignly uninvolved in recent crises, but retains the potential to complicate future crises.
Third, each side's leadership has apparently learned little from past crises. Their provocative declarations and strategic postures indicate a belief dial deterrence works, but only in restraining the other side, not their own actions.
Both sides have sought US intervention in crises, even though both sides remain staunch advocates of bilateralism, and Pakistan still sees the US as a potential threat to its nuclear program. And while the US insists that its relations with India and Pakistan are not a zero-sum game, it remains difficult to exercise a fine balance, especially when it maintains a physical presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Overall, the US has a growing interest in the region and can play a stabilising role in crises.
Fifth, the issue of Kashmir remains central to India-Pakistan relations, as evidenced by its prominence in the Composite Dialogue process, and cannot be ignored.
Seventh, successive India-Pakistan crises have resulted in renewed attempts to develop confidence-building measures. Eighth, despite some growing interdependence, there are few signs of longterm accommodative policies in either country. Ninth, on the other hand, the recent crises have shown three potentially stabilising trends: a growing restraint in each state's crisis management behaviour, growing transparency in their strategies, and growing US involvement in crisis resolution.
It is unclear whether the nuclear tests had a positive or negative effect on regional strategic stability.
Prof Stephen Cohen
This study’s conclusions on
nuclear deterrence reflect a fundamental lack of certainty, despite extensive literature on crisis management and scenario-building. Such scenario-based studies are not reliable, since crises are inherently complex and unpredictable.
The authors were also interested in analysing the politics of crisis management - the perceptions and decision-making of each side's leadership. T here are at least two strategic triangles in the region. In the India-Pakistan-US triangle, both India and Pakistan have sought to use the US for their own ends. In the India-Pakistan-China triangle, China's role in South Asia is less predictable (but perhaps more constructive) than before.
Regional balance of power In the strategic competition between
India and Pakistan, it could be said, os Ashley Tellis has argued, that Pakistan's window of opportunity is closing as India’s power continues to rise. India’s growing economic clout, international prestige, and conventional military superiority, all contribute to limit Pakistan’s options. This will inevitably influence future crisis management.
Nuclear crises in South Asia cannot disregard the role of China. Prof Chari claimed, however, that with the passage of time, China would seek to work itself out of (he South Asian strategic triangle, to become less entangled and more balanced between India and Pakistan.
Prof Chari noted some points to suggest a long-term improvement in India- Pakistan ties, based on systemic factors. Third, people- to-peoplc links andTYack-II processesaregrowing.
Economic dimension ofcrises
It is also important to analyse the economic dimension of crises. However, Prof Chari disagreed with the contention that'Operation Parakram' was initiated to economically coerce Pakistan - the cost was very high on both sides. Moreover, Prof Cohen argued, India cannot afford to have a failing Pakistan - in a doomsday scenario, that could leave 3-4 Pakistani corps commanders with control over nuclear weapons, which could poten- tially be used against India or transferred to terrorists.
On the issue of economic development. we should study Southeast Asia, where interdependence is overcoming political fears, or China-Japan relations, where mutual threat perceptions do not preclude large and growing investments.
US intervention
According to the Bruce Riedel report on the Kargil war, the US played a central role in resolving the crisis by "bullying" Sharif. Prof Chari asserted (and Prof Cohen agreed) that the Riedel report is believable because it was corroborated by Strobe Talbot.
Some participants insisted, however, that no nuclear preparations were made at any point during the Kargil war, on either side. US intelligence (on Pakistani nuclear preparations) may not be blemish- free, many participants agreed, but Prof Cohen argued that it was believed by the Clinton Administration, and so its political consequences were real.
Pakistani control of nuclear arsenal
The safe custody of the Pakistani arsenal will be critical in future crises. Pakistani officials have assured India and the world that their arsenal is safe. Prof Chari noted that India and Pakistan are both undergoing a learning process on how to be nuclear powers.
Defining limited war
There is apparently a need to redefine limited war in (he South Asian context. One participant suggested that it be defined as the conduct of hostilities with the intent of restoring grand-strategic (not simply nuclear or even military) deterrence as quickly as possible, through political, economic, and diplomatic means. The Cold War was a broad conflict, but rarely territorial as the rivalry is in South Asia. Pakistan has consistently seen territorial gain as its objective, and seen military means as viable. In this context, keeping a conflict limited will be very difficult, especially given the narrow military structure of Pakistan's leadership, and a body of strategic thinking that has always considered nuclear weapons as a war-fighting weapon.
Coldstart
The fundamental objective of Cold Start is not to wage offensive operations more effectively, but to prepare for operations more efficiently, by avoiding a long, drawn-out mobilisation process. By integrating offensive and defensive formations, India may be able to avoid repealing the failings of 'Operation Parakram', which in effect negated India's conventional superiority.
Irrational behaviour
in crises
Prof Chari pointed out that, by all rational calculations, the Kargil war was a strategic blunder by Pakistan. Even if it was tactically successful, it failed to account for the international environment and completely mis-
read India's reaction. As Prof Cohen noted, this highlights the importance of personalities in crisis management. especially in Pakistan.
Limited war as a policy option
Limited war may or may not be militarily feasible, but the question remains whether It is advisable, given the uncertainties of escalation control and Pakistan’s traditionally risk-taking behaviour.
Objectives in limited war Keeping war limited requires an acceptance by both sides of limited success as well as limited failure. The Kargil war, for example, may have been a failure in garnering international support for Pakistan's stance on Kashmir, but it was a success in bolstering the position of the army in Pakistan. It may not have been a strategic success, but it may nevertheless have provided some political success to some Pakistani elements. Prof Chari, however, cautioned against using ex post facto rationalisations, which may be manipulated by interested parties for narrow political advantage.
Stability of strategic deterrence
Recent crises (Kargil and 'Operation Parakram') have shown that both sides continue to take risks. However. Prof Cohen argued, tension and crisis may be creative - brinkmanship and coercive diplomacy may achieve positive results, if conducted carefully.
This triangle links the Middle East (through Pakistan) and Northeast Asia (through China), so the dynamics of India- Pakistan relations have very far-reaching effects o n proliferation.
Confidence-building measures
Attempts to build effective CBMs always suffer from difficulties in understanding each side’s intent and language. This Is an abridged version of the report presented at on IPCS seminar hold in Now Delhi recently.