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Crisis for Pakistan began with Sheikh Mujib’s election victory

US State Department document says

UNB, Dhaka
Former US president Richard Nixon sent the US warship Enterprise into the Indian Ocean during the 1971 India-Pakistan war because he feared India would not only free Bangladesh but also Pakistani Kashmir, according to an US Stale Department document.
/Mid Nixon also wrongly assumed that China would, under his guidance, attack India in 1971.
Despite these anti-India moves, it was Nixon who ended up advising Pakistan to agree to India's ceasefire terms once New Delhi won the war leading to the emergence of Bangladesh.
These are just some of many anecdotes appearing in the US Slate Department's release Friday of papers relating to the Nixon admin-istralion during 1969-76, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, PTI and IANS news agencies reported.
The document gave full coverage of the "tilt" toward Pakistan by Richard Nixon and his assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger.
The documents reveal that "Nixon was loath to intervene in Pakistan's 'internal affairs’ as Bangladesh's revolt was then considered, especially since Pakistan was Nixon’s secret conduit for a diplomatic opening to China."
The volume begins with the electoral success of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League in ihc then East Pakistan, the crisis it set off for Islamabad, the dispatch of additional troops to Dhaka by Pakistan, and Mujibur Rahman's announcement he was taking over the administration of East Pakistan.
Tracing the history of the war, (he document described political crisis triggered by the electoral success of Bengali nationalists in East Pakistan, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League, and the announcement by Pakistan President Yahya Khan on March I, 1971, that the scheduled meetings of the newly elected National Assembly would be postponed indefinitely. The announcement was met initially by popular demonstrations by the Awami League and the dispatch of additional troops to Dhaka by Pakistan's martial-law government.
On March 15, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman announced he was taking over the administration of East Pakistan and 10 days later the army arrested him and moved to suppress what it viewed as a "secessionist" movement, the release said.
American diplomats in Dhaka sent messages to Washington disagreeing with the Nixon policy of supporting Islamabad and called for the US to condemn the "indiscriminate killing" that the Pakistani Army was carrying out in Dhaka and elsewhere in East Pakistan.
Not only was Nixon not prepared to get involved in a civil war on the Indian subcontinent, he did not pay much attention to Indian concerns about 'The carnage in East Pakistan"
and the problems of refugees in West Bengal.
When Indian leaders, including the then external affairs minister Swaran Singh and prime minister Indira Gandhi, came to Washington, the Nixon administration counselled non-intervention but assumed that New Delhi planned lo go to war.
When Gandhi signed the TYeaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in August 1971, Nixon saw it as a blank cheque to India in its confrontation with Pakistan.
Nixon wanted Soviet officials not to encourage India and informed New Delhi that if it started a war with Pakistan, the US would cut off aid.
On November 22, 1971, India launched an offensive against East Pakistan. The Nixon administration cut off economic aid to India and Nixon himself decided to "tilt" toward Pakistan.
"This pro-Pakistan policy included support of Pakistan in the UN and pressure on the Soviets to discourage India, with accompanying hints that US-Soviet d£ lente would be in jeopardy if Moscow did not comply," notes the summarised State Department note accompanying the released papers.
When Nixon learned that Indian war plans were designed to liberate "Bangladesh" and southern Kashmir, and to destroy Pakistan's military armour and air strength, he ordered the US carrier Enterprise and its escorts into the Bay of
Bengal.
Nixon sent Henry Kissinger lo, meet the Chinese ambassador lo (he UN in a bid (o urge Beijing lo coordinate its military moves in support of Pakistan.
The implication conveyed by Kissinger was that if the Soviet' Union responded militarily, the US would support China in any con frontation with the Soviet Union.
When the Chinese asked lo meet Kissinger in New York two days later, the White House assumed the worst and concluded that China had already decided (o take military action against India.
"There was serious contemplation in the While House dial the crisis might lead to nuclear war, but, the general conclusion was that a regional conventional war in South Asia pitting India and the Soviet Union against China, ihe US and Pakistan was more likely," says the State’s analysis.
When the meeting took place, ihc White House learned that China’s message had nothing to do with military moves In support of Pakistan and Nixon realised that "Russia and China aren’t going to war".
In December 1971, Pakistani military forces surrendered in Ea^ Pakistan. "With US encouragement) Pakistan accepted an Indian ceasefire offer that would dramatically alter the Indian subcontinent," notes theState Department report.