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Tension in Sino-Japanese relations?

KAZI ANWARUL MASUD
SINO-Japanese relations are going through a rough patch. The immediate reason for the strain is a series of antiJapanese demonstrations in some parts of China, including Beijing, protesting approval by Japanese government of school text books that critics say whitewashes Japanese war time atrocities.
Foreign Minister Machimura Nabutaka's three day trip to Beijing seeking Chinese apology and compensation for damages done to Japanese property in China by demonstrators came to naught. Seeing the results of his Foreign Minister's visit, Prime Minister Koizumi has reportedly expressed reluctance to meet Chinese President Hu Jintao in Indonesia during the Afro-Asian leaders' conference. The questions being asked are: how serious is the deterioration in relations between the two countries, if the current strain will be sustained, and whether the sustenance of the differences would serve the long term interest of the two countries.
China and Japan fought wars in the 19th and 20th centuries for predominance over East Asia. China lost the first Sino-Japanese war (1884-1885), and was forced to acknowledge the complete independence of Korea, which for centuries was a Chinese tributary, cede the island of Taiwan and parts of northern China to Japan, and to pay a large indemnity.
The second Sino-Japanese war (1937-45) was caused by the Japanese militarists' aim to expand territory to relieve the problem of overpopulation and to procure badly needed natural resources. In 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria, and by 1935, had moved into parts of Inner Mongolia and gradually captured major cities of northern, central, and southern China. China declared war on Japan following the American declaration of war after the bombing
of Pearl Harbor. Fighting against theE Japanese in China continued until the Japanese surrender following the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The formal ending of Sino-Japanese state of war took place only in 1972.
Though the current deterioration in relations is serious, it is not novel. In 1982, the Chinese government accused Japan of falsifying the history of Japanese aggression
against China by changing the words "aggression against North China" to "total advancement to North China" in school text books. In the early nineties, a Chinese analyst argued that Japan still owed the world a clear acknowledgement of, and apology for, its aggression and atrocities. It is interesting to note that most Japanese school text books use the word "advances" or "expansion" in place of "invasion." Besides, Japanese youth of today see Japan more as a victim than as an aggressor in the second world war, and their knowledge of the war appears to be meagre.
China points out that it took fifty years for a Japanese Prime Minister (Tomiichi Muruyama) to use the word "apology" for Japanese aggression, and that the Diet has failed to pass a resolution apologizing for Japanese war crimes. China's unease increased with successive Japanese leaders' expressionof Japan's desire to play a greater role in global politics.
The Chinese fear is based on their conviction that Japanese society is intrinsically an introverted society convinced of its cultural, economic, and technological superiority, and of its ability to fill the "power vacuum" left by the Soviet
withdrawal from the region. The Chinese fear was further fuelled by the 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century, seen by China as an attempt to strategically contain China, and also as reflecting a shift in Japanese defense strategy from defensive to offensive role.
Some analysts believe that the American long term interest in the region is to prevent emergence of a
great power or a "big power bloc" that could challenge the US preeminence. While the US may want Japan to play a greater political role, it will not allow Japan to become a great political power and play a dominant role in the region.
Similarly, Robert Kagan believes that China aims in the near term to replace the US as the dominant power in East Asia, and in the long term to challenge the American position as the dominant power in the world.
Harvard Professor Joseph Nye totally disagrees with this hypothesis. Nye argues that if the American economy grows at 2 per cent per annum and China's at 6 percent, the two economies would be equal in size sometimes around 2020. Yet China would still have a vast underdeveloped countryside and would not equal the US in per capita income until the end of the 21st century. Nye does not see the possibility of China becoming a peer competitor of the US on a global basis.
Indeed, in China's preferential schedule of national interests, emphasis is placed on "comprehensive national power" in the achievement of which a powerful modern economy is essential. In the matrix
of China's economic development, Japan plays a vital role. By the early nineties of the last century Japan became China's largest trading partner, while China emerged for Japan as the second largest trading partner after the US.
Japan is now the fourth largest investor in China after Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the US. For continued development of China's economy, both the US and Japan must play a
crucial role. Japan remains a very important source for capital and technology, for which China has a voracious appetite. Though the possibility remains that China could become a potential economic competitor, Japan does not appear to be unduly worried because she is convinced that considerable technological gap will remain, which would not disturb Japan's economic security.
Perhaps because of historical reasons, China has a polygonal view of Japan. According to Ian Wilson, China sees Japan as "a cruel invader, an economic model, a military threat, and an important source of aid, investment, and technology." With such contradictory perceptions, China has to navigate its ship of diplomacy in Japanese waters with care. If China were to drive a wedge between the US and Japan, and the latter were to feel threatened, then Japan could with ease become a powerful military nation. Japan has the money and the technology, her Self Defense Force (SDF) is reportedly the best equipped military force in Asia, and her defense expenditure is second highest in the world.
It therefore makes sense that China would insist that North Korea
abandon her nuclear ambition because otherwise Japan, threatened by a nuclear North Korea, could amend her constitutional obligation to "forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or the use of force as a means of settling disputes" and go for nuclear weapons. Paradoxically, therefore, China may not want to see an end to the US-Japan security relations, which provides a con-
straint on Japan's possible militarism though the US-Japan alliance is believed to be directed at containment of Chinese power. Despite prevailing distrust between Japan and China, which is unlikely to disappear in the near future, the possibility of Japan becoming militaristic as it did before the second world war does not exist. Pacifism still remains the dominant force in the Japanese psyche.
The Chinese official position on the Japanese aim for a permanent seat in the UNSC is ambivalent. Chinese leader Jiang Zemin had once observed that for the UNSC permanent membership "the wealth of a country should not be the sole condition and that the principle of fair regional distribution and the principle of unanimity of consultation should be fully honoured in approaching this issue."
These remarks could be seen as Chinese opposition to Japanese membership of the UNSC because of Japan's UNSC ambition is primarily based on her economic strength. Besides, as both China and Japan are situated in North East Asia, Japan's inclusion as a permanent member would not be in accordance with the principle of regional distribution. As opposed to this, Japan
has been able to establish stable and cooperative relations with members of Asean, some having been victims of Japanese aggression during the second world war, and with countries of South Asia.
Perhaps the Chinese are exasperated by Japan's inconstant policy on the question of apology for her war atrocities. As late as April 20, then Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori told the Japanese parliament that regarding the war, "it takes peoples' judgment on history" to decide whether Japan launched "a war of aggression." But in 1998, Japan gave a written apology during South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung's visit to Tokyo by expressing "deep remorse and heartfelt apology to the people of South Korea, having humbly accepted the historical fact that Japan inflicted heavy damage and pain on the people of South Korea through its colonial rule [during the period 1910-1945]."
Despite continuing strain on Sino-Japanese relations, it is unlikely that either party would take it to breaking point. Since foreign policy is dictated by national interest and the two countries give preeminence to economic development to the mutual benefit of both, it is very likely that their relations will resume their normal course in the near future. Unstable relations between the two Asian giants would adversely affect peace and stability in Asia and in the world. It would serve the interest of the international community if both Japan and China would address each other's concerns and find an amicable way to settle their differences.
Kazi Anwarul Masud is a former Secretary and Ambassador.