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JANE'S REPORT ON CTG ARMS HAUL

Weapons loaded at HK, S'pore; headed for Indian insurgents

STAR REPORT
Jane's Intelligence Review (JIR), the leading defence magazine of the world, in an investigative report on the Chittagong arms haul in April last has said the arms and ammunition were shipped from Hong Kong and then more weapons were added to the consignment in Singapore before being brought to Bangladesh.
It said before the cache was
seized by police and BDR following a probable tip-off from Indian intelligence sources, one loaded truck is believed to have left the jetty.
According to the JIR report filed by Anthony Davis datelined July 6, the shipment involved two key insurgent movements from India's northeast -- the United Liberation Front of Assam (Ulfa) and the Isak-Muivah faction of the Nationalist
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Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM).
The abortive shipment involved two important figures in the Indian northeastern insurgencies -- Ulfa military chief Paresh Barua -- reportedly in Chittagong during the offloading, and the NSCN's chief procurement officer Anthony Shimray, who had flown into Bangladesh via Bangkok around the time of shipment.
For the first time, the JIR report reveals any substantial information on the arms haul. It said although a reliable list of the seized weapons is yet to be made public, the shipment altogether worth an estimated $4.5 million to $7 million, is known to have included around 2,000 automatic and semi-automatic weapons, among them 1,290 Type 56-1/Type 56-2 Kalashnikov-type assault rifles; 150T-69 rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launchers; quantities of 40mm RPG ammunition; 25,000 hand grenades; and 1.8m rounds of small-arms ammunition.
THE REPORT
Following one of SouthAsia'slargest ever seizures of illicit weaponry in the Bangladeshi port of Chittagong in April, there has been considerable interest within regional security and intelligence circles in ablishing the background to an incident.
Intelligence sources outlined to JIR the salient features of a shipment which, had it been successful, could have had a hugely destablising impact on India's insurgency-prone northeastern states.
Speculation in the regional press in the immediate aftermath of the 2 April seizure suggested the consignment was moved overland from southwestern China to the port of Sittwe on Myanmar's Arakan coast on the Bay of Bengal. However, sources familiar with the case told JIR that the consignment originated from the port of Hong Kong and, at that point, only involved new Chinese weaponry.
No reliable list of the seized weapons has yet to be made public. However the shipment altogether worth an estimated US$4.5m-57m is known to have included around 2,000 automatic and semi-automatic weapons, among them 1,290 Type 56-1/Type 56-2 Kalashnikov-type assault rifles; 150T-69 rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launchers; quantities of 40 mm RPG ammunition; 25,000 hand grenades; and 1.8m rounds of small-arms ammunition.
From Hong Kong, the main consignment was shipped to Singapore where more weapons were added. The second consignment is understood to have comprised all the non-Chinese weaponry involved. According to Bangladeshi press reports, this included weapons of both Israeli and US manufacture, although it remains unclear whether additional ammunition was also added to the shipmentin Singapore.
The shipment was then transported north through the Strait of Malacca to be transshipped in the Bay of Bengal to two trawlers, the Kazaddan and Amanat, which ferried the weaponry to a jetty on the Karnaphuli River, Chittagong.
Following a tip-off-understood to have probably come from Indian intelligence sources the off-loading of the weapons was interrupted in the early hours of 2 April by the Chittagong Port Police and Bangladesh Rifles. Nine truckloads of munitions were seized, although it is believed that one loaded truck had left the jetty before the arrival of the port police.
According to JIR's sources, the shipment involved two key insurgent movements from India's northeast the United Liberation Front ofAssam (ULFA) and the Isak-Muivah faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM), which since 1997 has been in protracted peace talks with the Indian
government, held mostlyin Bangkok.
Traditionally, ties between ULFA and the NSCN-IM have been strained, and ULFA has cultivated far better links with the Nagainsurgents' rival Kaplang faction (NSCN-K) based in the remote border areas of Myanmar's Sagaing Division. However, following the severe setbacks suffered by the ULFA as a result of the loss of camps in Bhutan in December 2003, a new entente has developed. One intelligence official noted: "The NSCN and ULFA were working this jointly. The NSCN has better contracts in the arms trade while ULFA has the money and the foreign political connections." According to JIR sources, the purchases were financed by a foreign intelligence service seeking to destablise India's northeast, and payment for the original shipment was made by the NSCN-IM to an agentin Hong Kong.
The abortive shipment involved two important figures in the northeastern insurgencies: ULFA military chief Paresh Barua reportedly in Chittagong during the off loading and the NSCN's chief procurement officer Anthony Shimray, who is based in Manila but had flown into Bangladesh via Bangkok around the time of the shipment. The original idea, according to JIR sources, was to transport the munitions to northeastern India via a route across northern Myanmar's Kachin State. However, this idea was eventually shelved owing to security concerns over moving so large a shipment across territory wherelocal Kachins were seen as pro-Indian.
The NSCN's regional operations have continued to run into difficulties. JIR has learned that in early July, several NSCN operatives believed to be travelling on Bangladeshi passports were detained at Jakarta international airport for carrying suspiciouslylarge amounts of cash. Shimray, who was in the Indonesian capital at the same time, was reported to be making frantic efforts to engineer their swift release.
The presence of NSCN operatives in the Indonesian capital has puzzled intelligence analystys, as unlike Thailand and Cambodia, Indonesia is not generally known as a source of illicit smallarms.
The NSCN's regional forays, and in particular the Chittagong seizure, have raised concerns that the group may be considering a return to war. Peace talks in Bangkok and Amsterdam have made virtually no progress at all, largely due to the NSCN's insistence on the recognition by New Delhi of 'Nagalim' or a Greater Nagaland which would embrace majority. Naga areas of the neighbouring state of M Manipur, as well as smaller parts of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. Given the unwillingness of these state governments to countenance any reduction of their current boundaries, negotiations could well founder over the issue of Nagalim'.