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Iraq exit strategies
THE polls held on January 30 are said to hold the key to the US exit strategy from Iraq. An elected Iraqi government will soon emerge; for all its initial troubles, bombings, boycotts and compromises, Iraq has had national polls. Some deny that the new government truly represents Iraqis. Sunni exclusion from the process is clear. Kurds were happily onboard. That is thanks to US sympathy for Kurdish wishes and latter's distrust of Arab intentions. They want substantial autonomy in under a federal set up. Shias are cautious and pragmatist; they have given least trouble to Americans and the British, wanting early polls to corner as much power as may be feasible.
The first question should be taken up first. How keenly do the Americans want an early exit strategy? Arguably, the Iraqi war planners ignored the likelihood of popular resistance. Even so, it is strange that world's mightiest power and a nicely-working democracy could be pushed into an ill thought-out war in a sensitive region while virtually the whole world opposed the Anglo-American project.
No war in history was so much opposed by common citizens every-
where. It is impossible that the war party did not have compelling reasons or interests to start a war of aggression. Only they did not choose to convince the world. Thus one will need to be convinced that the desire for exiting from Iraq is so deeply felt that (a) the US is prepared to forget those initial reasons or interests, or (b) that the exit strategy will be so designed as also to serve the original American interests or purposes, while still sharply reducing GI casualties. In short, the idea may be to combine the so-called departure with ensuring the promotion of the original objectives. Wouldn't the US try to do that? After all, why did it go to war? At the whim of King George W?
One is not denying that the US will adopt an exit strategy. The question is what kind of strategy it will be. Will it be simply getting out of Iraq soon after the new Iraqi government results from the January 30 election? Or will the GIs stay on "at the request" of an embattled government that is likely to have its representative character questioned. The emphasis on training a new army that will effectively kill the opponents in Iraq suggests that the Americans are not leaving next month or the month after that. Then, the polls may have worsened the
differences among Iraq's three main communities: Kurds, Sunnis, and the Shia majority.
Long before the longer-term consequences come to pass, there is the problem of the legitimacy of the polls and the government it has produced. An election held under foreign occupation is anyhow suspect. And in the January 30 polls, at least one community, the Sunnis, did not take part in bulk; they actively opposed the polls and asked the people to boycott. True, an effort will be made to associate them somehow with constitution writing. That can only be on an ad hoc basis of selection of "moderate" Sunnis. What legitimacy such deputies or experts will have? Endless contention can be expected.
There are fears about the constitution-to-be not being acceptable to all. Kurds lay claim to Kirkuk and oil fields around it that is bound to be opposed by many Arabs. Remember, Saddam tried to change the demography of Kirkuk by settling a large number of Arabs. This, plus the Kurd's demand for substantial autonomy from the Baghdad government, can spark possible civil strife. Many foreign intelligence agencies, mainly of Israel, America and Great Britain, are said to be
egging on the Kurds to stand firm on the autonomy demand. There are other international complications: Kurds live in fairly large numbers in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and what is now Russian Federation. None among these states wants to see a Kurdish state or even a truly autonomous province in Iraq; Turks make no bones about their intentions: they will intervene and perhaps occupy the Kurdish region.
But the biggest putative threat is a civil war between Sunnis and Shias of Iraq. It is the first time that Shias are going to be dominant in any Arab state. This civil war is hugely feared in Arab ruling circles throughout the Middle East. The Jordanian King has raised the bogey of an arc of Shia power spanning from Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, parts of Syria and Lebanon; Shia minorities in Gulf states, especially in Saudi Arabia's oil-rich Rub-al-Khali, will start demanding rights and may take help from other Shia states. An analysis of American policies in Iraq and their separate dealings with each of its three main communities, and of course their media twists, produce dark suspicions of US probably wanting to see that civil war happen. Maybe a break up of Iraq along confessional lines might promote long-term
objectives of the war.
It used to be said that both Sunnis and Shias of Iraq understood each other and were loath to fight; perhaps Saddam and the Baathists had sufficiently secularized Iraq. Lately, al Qaeda and Zarqawi have become more prominent in the resistance and some Sunni militants have begun choosing Shia targets. Even so Shia reaction is restrained; they have not retaliated. No communal clash has taken place. All manner of western pundits were forecasting a Sunni-Shia civil war because Shias were kept suppressed ever since 1920s; it is assumed that Sunni minority will not tolerate Shia empowerment. But a Shia-Sunni civil war might yet not be on the cards; Iraqis may be more sophisticated than western experts had expected.
In part, Iraqis have had truly secular governments for the last 38 years or more; the contribution of Baathist Arab nationalism has made Iraq different from traditionalist Arab states: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, or even UAE. Current peace is due to the sophisticated Shia clerics, especially Ayatollah Sistani. The latter belongs to the more traditional Shiism that emphasized individual piety, prayers, and good works, and little politics. This quietist tendency
today meshes in with pragmatism. Even as Sunnis are riding a crest of popular resistance and many younger Shia clergy -- remember Muqtada-al-Sadr last year -- echo their sentiments, qua Arabs. But Sistani, shunning publicity or active political role, asked for early elections and a fair share in power. It is more mature politics: majority's right to rule is going to be written into the constitution. That will open many doors for Shias.
But a Shia-Sunni conflict and dark apprehensions about Iraq's future remain possibilities; they are not necessarily likely. Much will depend on the Shia and Sunni leaderships. So far, both appear to believe in living together in one state nor their main actions have belied this assessment. As for al Qaeda's entry into Iraq, from probably Saudi Arabia -- the main nursery of Militant Sunni Islam -- requires careful investigation of who may be using it.
Iraq's future depends on many factors. The biggest is posed by the US: what do its priorities re the Middle East require? Oil is a major consideration. So is Israel's security. Should the neo-cons again convince the US that the goal of permanently benefiting from Iraqi oil can be achieved through destroying a united Iraqi state by dividing it -- thus enhancing Israel's capacity to assist the US -the outlook for the Middle East is bleak. Accidents apart, the disappearance of Iraq will throw the whole Middle East in the melting pot; new dictators, more intolerant and militant, might give Israel and the US a harder time than did the old Kings and Amirs.