While one cannot deny that there are genuine problems in South Asia that give rise to security concerns, not only of India's but of other countries of the region as well, these cannot be mitigated by unilateral actions to either change the government or physically intervene to 'bring them back'. There is a vast scope of mutual cooperation between Bangladesh and India. Not all avenues have been fully explored. It is mutual cooperation and cooperative relationship that ensure a state of amity, which is the best means of security and peace.***

CERTAIN comments in a section of the Indian press and writings on recent developments in their neighboring countries by certain Indian strategic analysts engage our interest, most of all because these appear to appropriate the 'Bushian' philosophy of intervention in a third country.

Of particular interest are two articles namely, "India's options in Nepal are not many" and "Ending the regional shift" by C. Raja Mohan, that appeared recently in the Gulf News and the Hindu respectively, focus on Nepal but mainly on the author's concern at recent developments in India's neighbourhood including Bangladesh and Maldives.

What is of interest to us, as India's neighbours, are the options that the author offers for tackling the possible security scenario that is likely to stem from the recent political developments in these countries.

Rajamohan suggestions that it is for India to take upon itself to provide solutions to the problems that ails its neighbours, quite like what the lone super power feels in respect of the rest of the world, and that the use of force should be a part of its 'diplomatic toolkit' smacks of 'Bushian' predilection of playing the world's policeman. Such pronouncements simply cannot acceptable to India's neighbours.

Those familiar with the writings of the above school of thought in India should not be surprised at such utterances that propound the full use of the 'stick', These writings only validate a fifteen chapter treatise, written almost two thousand five hundred years ago that advocates the concept of the 'mandala" and the 'danda'.

Interestingly, there is a continuity of thought in the enunciations, from that of Panikkar, to Dixit and now to Raja Mohan. Not only do his suggestions mirror Kautilya's, Raja Mohan's comments echo Panikkar's characterisation of South Asia as being under India's security orbit, and Dixit's power projection ethos. These are rights, that, according to these scholars, India should arrogate to itself.

Compare the similarity of the author's statement, "The Nepal crisis has brought back into focus the question of India's use of force in the neighbourhood. ... Prudence on use of force is always a sensible policy. But to suggest it will not be considered at all, as the recent Indian foreign policy tended to is not wise," with Dixit's description of the IPKF's role in Sri Lanka which reads, "It is an external projection of our influence to tell our neighbours that if, because of your compulsions or your aberrations, you pose a threat to us, we are capable of or we have a political will to project ourselves within your territorial jurisdiction for the limited purpose of bringing you back", spoken to the United Services of India almost two decades ago. The essential elements that prop up the remarks, and which capture our interest are, that there is wisdom in projecting power internationally; that power projection, i.e., use of force, is necessary in the neighbouring countries, especially when the political developments there are not in accord with the scheme of things at home, and which in the long run might affect India's security. Thus, power projection becomes an inevitability to physically intervene to effect government-change in India's neighbourhood.

Although not in so many words, the author also pegs his argument on the now commonly touted rationale of President Bush the principle of preemption. If India's interest is threatened, and its predominance in South Asia diluted, it would do well not to stick to soft options only but go for the more direct (and the dangerous) option of physically chastising its neighbours, so the author avers.

The concerns of Rajamohan stem from the recent blockade of Katmandu by the Maoists, which, he feels, could cause a state collapse in Nepal. He feels alarmed at India's three pronged Nepal policies being put under stress and so is India's security continuum, and therefore, diplomacy alone would not be enough to address the resultant threats to India's national interests.

The fact is that the Nepalese Maoists were never in the good books of the South Block. Their anti-Indian policy, manifested in their targeting of the Indian business establishment in Nepal, as well as their opposition to free movement of people across the Indo-Nepal border, were a matter of concern for the Indian government. But if the Maoists' blockade causes collapse of Nepal's state structure how does one explain the fact that Nepal was practically cutoff when India slapped a virtual blockade on it in 1988 because of Nepal's military cooperation with China, which India considered to be in violation of the 1950 IndoNepal Treaty?

For India's part it may be true that the prospect of Maoists' coming to power in Nepal may hold dangerous potential for India's internal political dynamics, but, the fact remains that the sole determinant of Nepal's political future are the people of Nepal themselves. It is for the people of Nepal to chose the type of government they want. To suggest that externally infused changes are more efficacious is misleading to say the least

The other cause for concern isthe apprehension that the antiIndian activities are being helped by its neighbours, if not directly then at least by turning a blind eye to these. Bangladesh have been particularly singled out in the past, almost to the point of suggesting that all that is happening in the Indian Northeast are of its making.

Again, it is well to remember that a greater part of Indo-Bangladesh border has been fenced and are manned regularly. It is difficult to see how large-scale infiltration is possible under these circumstances. But more importantly, the scholars conveniently overlook the fact that the situation in the Northeast has historical roots predating the British rule in India, certainly it goes beyond the partition of 1947, and is fomented by India's internal dynamics. It also does not help the neighbours, most certainly not Bangladesh, to fester anti-Indian elements.

The Sri-Lankan experience should demonstrate that force can do very little to solve political problem. If force must be used it will have to be with the consent of the local population, which in the current context is a remote possibility.

While one cannot deny that there are genuine problems in South Asia that give rise to security concerns, not only of India's but of other countries of the region as well, these cannot be mitigated by unilateral actions to either change the government or physically intervene to 'bring them back'.

There is a vast scope of mutual cooperation between Bangladesh and India. Not all avenues have been fully explored. It is mutual cooperation and cooperative relationship that ensure a state of amity, which is the best means of security and peace, not changes that are infused externally or by force.

While one cannot question the perceptions of the 'threat' (malady) the suggested 'remedy' (antidote) that Rajamohan offers will be even more problematic.

It is true, as the he points out, that India's policy to acquire international leadership role before fulfilling its regional obligation may need to be reassessed. However, retaining an option of intervention and going for unilateral solutions, replicating the policy of Mr. Bush, is fraught with danger.

There is no virtue in intervention. The consequences of such an act will be disastrous.

The author is Editor, Defense and Strategic Affairs, the Daily Star