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Nukes cause all the trouble

M B NAQVI writes from Karachi
**8The solution lies in Pakistan ignoring India and implementing its stated goal of Nuclear Weapons Free South Asia to the extent it can. That means getting rid of them. It is also necessary because the hoped for security from the Bomb is not available. On Islamabad's own admission one of its success has been in keeping the Bomb safe, rather than it keeping Pakistan safe.**8
AUGUST 6 and 9 were days that forced one to ponder over atomic weapons. There is global unanimity that these are not weapons of war; they are evil machines of death and destruction aimed at life itself. There is no defence against this monster; it does not discriminate between civilians and soldiers nor between man and animals. But exclusive possession of this engine of death by a few countries conferred tremendous power and influence on them. Others dearly sought NWMDs as a currency of power and status among the international community. India did just that. Pakistan acquired them to get even with India.
Thinkers and humanists everywhere have ran peace movements that put the nuclear powers on the defensive, though the interplay of money, military power, politics and immense benefits for key personnel has caused the preservation of WMDs. In fact, the Bomb acquired a key role. Still, the Big Five do not brag about these weapons the way Indians and Pakistanis went ga ga over their 'achievement' in making them. In South Asia, peace movements of the CND type are small and weak. These two proud states shout that their nuclear deterrents, being invincible, have made them secure. Many of their people have come to believe that.
It is time -- after a grand 10 month military confrontation between India and Pakistan and the Indian initiative of peacemaking -- to pause and think. The 'normalisation' talks have started, though the original hopes have already hit the encrusted positions on all the eight subjects. Suddenly the effusive expectations are being replaced by near disappointment. The realisation is growing that nothing much has changed; neither side seems ready to
change stance or make any substantial concession. The danger now is overreaction; it may prevent even minor agreements.
There never were reserves of trust and goodwill between the ruling establishments of India and Pakistan. The emergence of two antagonistic nuclear deterrents have destroyed the very possibility of acquiring a modicum of trust to make mutually beneficial agreements possible. That is due to the peculiar nature of these WMDs: they destroy trust in a radical fashion. With nuclear-tipped missiles ready to be fired at Pakistani targets, which guardian of Pakistani national security can rely on India's good sense? Similarly Pakistan's Ghoris at the ready with their nuclear payload cannot make Pakistan trustworthy enough to make India lower its guard.
Both sides had indicated that a restraint regime comprising Confidence Building Measures is possible.
The supposition was that with these CBMs in place, Pakistan and India can become civilised neighbours, cooperating with each other for mutual benefit. Not so, say I. Cold war between the west and Soviets was not similar to the bitter Indo-Pak rivalry and non-stop arms race it entails. On technical grounds, a Prithivi or Ghori will take three to five minutes to do its murderous job and that means the near impossibility of CBMs being able to do their
assigned job in the interval between the launch and hitting of the target. Political and human factors also ensure the same. CBMs between these two states are nothing new; some have been in place since long. But during high military tensions they have never worked. A general faced with an imminent threat does not reach for the hotline; he rushes to reposition his guns and troops. The problem of the Bomb itself requires some solution, though it is hard to conceive what it can be -- other than total disarmament.
Pakistani Bomb was originally meant to wipe out the shame of 1971 defeat by humbling India -- likely in Kashmir. Even otherwise it was related to Kashmir. Later it was justified on the ground that without the Bomb, the Kashmir struggle will ignite a war and India's preponderance in conventional armaments may result in another 1971. The Bomb is a guarantee against that. This guarantee is general and tran-
scends Kashmir because some security wallahs believe that India will undo Pakistan on a suitable occasion on some pretext because it has not accepted the 1947 partition at heart. So the Bomb is a permanent necessity of Pakistan's national security. We need to critically examine this security argument.
What has national security gained and what has been lost is the question. Authority said Pakistan's defences
have been made invincible by its nukes; India will stay deterred. Well, what has been disclosed by Kargil and more decisively by the credible threat of military invasion by India in 2002 is the exact opposite. It was touch and go in 2002. India was daring Pakistan to a war, unafraid of Pakistani nukes; in fact George Fernandes put down the Pak deterrent by saying let Islamabad use the nukes first. It would then wait for the riposte: that will send Pakistan back to the Stone Age. What conclusion can be drawn from the 2002 experience? There was no effective deterrent; it was Pakistan that, by staying on the defensive, was deterred by India's.
Still, deterrence can be said to have worked in some way because there was no war, after all. But look at the immediate and long-term political costs: India gained what it wanted; it wrenched an assurance from Pakistan President that no more Jihadis will go
into IHK, probably guaranteed by the US, just as it had gained from July 4, 1999 agreement: Pakistani troops vacated the heights. It would be a foolish Indian government that will go to war when it can gain its main purposes by diplomacy, albeit with the US assistance. That is the immediate cost, including the reversing of a 12-year old Kashmir policy, to be debited to the Bomb because except for it no Pakistani general could have encouraged
an armed insurrection in IHK.
A few of longer-term costs can also be ticked off: Kashmir dispute is frozen to the extent that a war with India is now impossible. The Kashmir policy so far had the sanction that, at the end of the day, Pakistan would come to the aid of embattled and threatened Kashmiris while Pakistani nukes will make India hold its horses. Without this assumption the older policy made absolutely no sense other than letting Kashmiris be killed en masse. That prospect is no more. Now there is no go other than negotiating with India. But negotiating what? If the threat of a decisive Pakistan military action is removed, the Indians will stand pat on their sovereignty over Kashmir and that will be that. Our much-hyped deterrent will be of no practical use.
The social and political consequences of the militarisation of Pakistan economy and society cannot be ignored indefinitely. Pakistan's devel-
opment has been stunted by its preoccupation with Kashmir. That was the cause of military acquiring extraordinary importance and role in national affairs. We now have a very large military establishment that cannot go to war with its named enemy. Its nuclear deterrent stands checkmated and has been rendered irrelevant. If it does not deter India from threatening invasion, and credibly too, of what use are these nukes? Pakistan now has no policy on Kashmir for the sake of which it made India its permanent enemy. Pakistan has lost far too many opportunities of growth. Its present rise in inflation and poverty is due to the continuing militarisation of the economy. The society is divided radically also because of the same orientation. And yet Kashmir is not an inch closer to its Azadi.
The whole subject is now open to debate: what should Pakistanis do with their nukes that have proved inadequate in deterrence. It is a painful conclusion that cannot be escaped from. The CBMs and the restraint regimes are fair weather birds; they will be there so long as there is peace. But when war conditions prevail, the NRR would be the first casualty. It is good to have an NRR for marginal improvements in the day-to-day situation and to prevent accidents. But it is not a solution of the problem posed by the nuclear weapons. The solution lies in Pakistan ignoring India and implementing its stated goal of Nuclear Weapons Free South Asia to the extent it can. That means getting rid of them. It is also necessary because the hoped for security from the Bomb is not available. On Islamabad's own admission one of its success has been in keeping the Bomb safe, rather than it keeping Pakistan safe.
MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.