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Plain words

Let's think coolly and talk

M B Naqvi writes from Karachi
***Can CBMs prevent the election of a party like Shiv Sena or VHP in India? What if any elected government in New Delhi, driven by militant nationalism and manipulated by vested interests, threatens a nuclear strike on Pakistan territory? Which CBM will prevent that? The same applies to Pakistan where another general or a Jihadi group can seize power. What if he threatens to nuke India unless it relents on Kashmir quickly? Pakistani rulers are known to have taken many imprudent decisions.***
THE schedule of the long-stalled Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan has been agreed. Beginning July 28, it will reach the Foreign Ministers level meeting on August 25 next. This preliminary process is to start the substantive political-level negotiations from August 25 onward where actual give and take can take place. Definitive results will start coming later.
It is notable that officials' talks are being held amidst almost a euphoria. There is, for no solid reason, hope and expectation in the air, more in Pakistan but also some in India. Not too long ago, the relations between the two countries were at an all time low and a war seemed imminent during the long military confrontation of 2002. There was intense propaganda of hate in both countries. And yet the red hot tensions quickly gave way after India's PM was mysteriously persuaded to switch from a jingoistic stance to extending a hand of friendship to Pakistan last year. Clouds of war soon began to lift and people's latent desire for peace and friendship in both countries asserted itself. What helped was, of course, the US 'facilitation', Track II diplomacy by establishment's trusted emissaries and work of innumerable Track III groups: like Pakistan India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy, many similar bodies and Imtiaz Alam's SAFMA. People's true desires were articulated by this third track of non-officials.
The common people on both sides are aware of what they have lost in the huge extravagance of vital resources in futile confrontations and mutual boycott by Paki-
stan and India. This is the true bedrock on which a real people-to-people reconciliation from grassroots up can be built if properly led -- such as has happened between the German and French peoples in postwar period. On this foundation imposing edifices of not only Pak-India friendship, free trade, economic cooperation and politically harmonious policies of peace can be raised but also real regional integration can be anchored in.
Let no one forget that Pakistan-India relationship can shift from
love to hatred quickly. This is what enabled BJP government to stir up much hatred, at least among the upper and middle classes, against Pakistan during and after Kargil affair. Pakistan could also reply in kind. Mark the swiftness with which dominant sentiment changed and all classes, at least in Pakistan, quickly awakened to the need for peace and friendship. After all South Asia used to be Historical India where Hindus and Muslims lived cheek by jowl in harmony for centuries. Thanks to the rise of acrimonious communalisms under the British it is now necessary to remind that Hindus and Muslims of India jointly created the magnificent Indo-Persian civilization; its sources, bases and imperatives are still alive -- hence a basis of close friendship exists.
Let no one forget that huge stumbling blocks to a friendship policy have been erected since 1940s. They flourish on the latent negative legacies that are also there. These are many: (a) There is the complex and difficult problem of Kashmir; two rival nation-states of unequal potential are vying for the same real estate on which so
many and so diverse people live. That it is a complicated problem is well known. It is bound to be a long haul and no quick fix seems possible or will be realistic. Both sides need patience and goodwill.
(b) Two competing nationalisms have arisen and are based on the growth of communalisms during the Raj. These contradict and violate the legacy of over seven or eight centuries of intimate Hindu-Muslim coexistence: the Indo-Pak Civilisation. The political dynamic of these nationalisms requires(
contempt and hatred for the "other". This fomented feeling is generated and strengthened by packaging it in patriotism. Allied to it is -- and which has become the outstanding feature of these rival nationalisms -- militarism and jingoism. Moreover, all large militaries create powerful vested interests. In America, they call it Industrial Military Complex. Both Pakistan and India have their own bureaucratic versions of this complex. Its leading lights can only enrich themselves and acquire importance when relations between the rival powers are worsening. They are also able to spend on propaganda handsomely and many media persons are always obliging.
(c) Another result of these nationalisms is two fully-fledged and rival nuclear deterrents in the subcontinent. One thing that nuclear weapons do with absolute certainty is to destroy basic trust among nuclear rivals. The unfortunate fact is that so long as Pakistani nukes -- the bomb, delivery vehicles and accessories -- are poised, who in India will sleep easy that they will never be used (i) as a
result of deliberate intent, (ii) accident, (iii) miscalculation or (iv) a non-state revolutionary group getting access to the red button. The same applies to Indian nukes: none in Pakistan can ignore the possibility of the use of Indian nukes in many of the same eventualities.
This mistrust is fundamental; it is an inescapable product of two rival nuclear deterrents. In the presence of these WMDs, long-term prospects of Pakistan-India friendship will retain a roller-coaster quality.
These can prevent the bright possibilities from being realised. There is no solution to the problem they pose. South Asia can never settle down to peaceful pursuits so long as WMDs are not consigned to the dustbin of history through more enlightened and more focused agreements of far reaching mutual dependence.
True, the two Foreign Secretaries are discussing the nuclear subject. The official publicists on both sides have given a great build up to the proposals that the Foreign Secretaries have exchanged in their last meeting in New Delhi. India has proposed several nuclear Confidence Building Measures. Pakistan has also proposed an elaborate set of the same genre, called Nuclear Restraint Regime. One suspects the origin of both sets of CBMs is common. In fact it may be a notional and 'in-principle' agreement between Pakistan and India that the US has helped shape through the Track II diplomacy -that itself came into being as a result of US initiative. The agreement is that both should remain nuclear powers and seeking recognition as nuclear powers. The US
only desires that India and Pakistan should strengthen their Command and Control Systems so that the possibility of accidents, unintended, miscalculated or unauthorized launch should be prevented by timely mutual consultation.
The US diplomacy has evolved voluminous literature on how two military enemies can arrive at detente to prevent accidents, unauthorised launch and how to keep the WMDs safe from terrorists. They acquired this wisdom from a generation-long negotia-
tions with the Soviets. They have shared it with both India and Pakistan and both seem to have lapped it up because both love to have the tacit American approval of their nuclear status. Thus, by seeming to be a selfless do gooder, the US has the gratitude of both countries' establishments. Cost of it all is that the US is now the arbiter of IndoPakistan affairs and the two new nuclear powers are eating out of American hands. But the biggest negative point is that the two countries are now more likely to negotiate CBMs and ignore the real problems posed by WMDs from a long-term viewpoint.
Are CBMs, no matter how perfect, a solution to the problems posed by NWMDs? One should not be misunderstood: one is not against CBMs as such; one supports all real CBMs. But when we have eliminated the chances of accidents in storage, transportation, servicing and have a perfect C3 for the WMDs, including preventing their unauthorised use and present rulers' finger staying firmly over the final button, what then?
Can such CBMs prevent the election of a party like Shiv Sena or
VHP in India? What if any elected government in New Delhi, driven by militant nationalism and manipulated by vested interests, threatens a nuclear strike on Pakistan territory? Which CBM will prevent that? The same applies to Pakistan where another general or a Jihadi group can seize power. What if he threatens to nuke India unless it relents on Kashmir quickly? Pakistani rulers are known to have taken many imprudent decisions.
Is it wise for Pakistan and India to preserve NWMDs and remain on high alert for all times to come? One will go so far as to say that Pakistan cannot go on living on edge, constantly worrying about the balance of power, balance of terror and the constant effort to upgrade its deterrents. That involves huge opportunity losses and a financial burden that will snuff out real development and can lead to the Soviets'-like implosion. Such a possibility needs to be obviated. Pakistanis need higher living standards and more freedoms. That requires working for a Nuclear Free South Asia as a first step. We should aim at that.
CBMs, while being unexceptionable, are no solution. The only solution is to do away with the WMDs altogether. But one encounter with any informed Indian will show that the constituency for doing away with the nukes and reverting to a non-nuclear South Asia is tiny. India is likely to go on becoming ever more powerful, with more of all kinds of weapons. Pakistan is claimed to be irrelevant to it. That, realistically speaking, is a given. Policy makers in Islamabad however know no better than to go on scrapping the bottom of the barrel to keep up with the Indian Joneses. Would that do the job? Unfortunately, it will neither enable Pakistan to keep up a given power ratio with India nor will it ever be able to attend to the problems facing the common Pakistanis, with all the attendant political, economic and social risks.
The situation poses a big challenge.
MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.