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Pakistan evades core issues in N-CBMs talks with India

DR. SUBHASH KAPILA
iN the bleak landscape of Pakistan's confrontationist relations with india, even the slightest stirring is enough to generate a media hype within india. The latest such example is the N-CBMs (Nuclear Confidence Building Measures) discussions that took place between india and Pakistan in New Delhi on June 19-20, 2004.
These talks were not a new initiative by either india or Pakistan. The process and the guidelines for the N-CBMs talks were first enunciated in an additional Memorandum of Understanding attached to the Lahore Declaration and signed between Foreign secretaries K Raghunath and shamshad Khan on 21st February 1999.
in a bid to impress the international audience, exercised over Pakistan's WMD proliferation and likelihood of a nuclear flashpoint in south Asia, Pakistan seems to have gone through the motions of N-CBMs talks. it needs to be noted that the Lahore Declarationin spirit and act stood opposed by Pakistan's President, General Musharraf, then as Pakistan'sArmy Chief.
india seems to have gone through the motions without expecting anything substantial to emerge. Both could argue that a beginning of a dialogue on N-CBMs has commenced between india and Pakistan and that itself is a big achievement.
However, the above overlooks the major uncertainimplications.
in terms of gains spelt out after the talks in New Delhi, nothing substantial seems to have been achieved. On the contrary, Pakistan has evaded core N-CBMs issues and india seems to have acquiesced to this. First, a look at what has been highlighted as the achievements of these N-CBMs talks.
New Delhi N-CBMs Talks Achievements:
The indian media has listed the following achievements as "highlights" emerging from the two-day talks in New Delhi in June 2004:
l Existing hotlines between Directors General of Military Operations to be upgraded, dedicated and secured.
l Dedicated hotline to be established between Foreign secretaries of india and Pakistan.
l Draft agreement handed over by indian side requiring both countries to work towards concluding an agreement on technical parameters on prenotification of flight testing of missiles.
l Unilateral moratorium on further nuclear tests was re-affirmed by both sides; unless in exercise of national sovereignty, it decides that extraordinary events have jeopardised its supreme interests.
l Commitment by both sides to continue bilateral discussions and hold further meetings towards implementation of Lahore MOU of 1999.
l Bilateral consultations on security and non-proliferation would continue between the two countries within the context of negotiations on thoseissuesin multilateral fora.
if the above achievements are
claimed as the highlights of the N-CBMs meeting at Additional secretary level, then all that can be said on analysis is that they are not substantive and in no way lead to nuclear restraint, credible nuclear signaling mechanisms or even the minimum to build mutual faith and trustin this critical field.
Even in terms of the Lahore Accord MOU 1999, they are not substantive achievements.
"Core Points" of Lahore Accord
1999 MOU Not Covered in N-CBMs Meet June 2004:
in the just concluded N-CBMs meeting, Pakistan seems to have evaded "core points" set out in Lahore Accord MOU, 1999. The "core points" that seem to have been evaded by Pakistan, and
1999 MOU or maintaining a silence is bad policy. Differences need to be highlighted; otherwise they send wrong signals to the other side.
N-CBMs Meet Does Not Seem to Have Discussed Nuclear Signaling:
"Nuclear signaling" is an important component of 'Nuclear Risk Reduction' process. Just establishing 'hot lines' between the Foreign secretaries or improving existing lines between DGMOs (God knows what it means) is not enough.
in relation to "india-Pakistan Nuclear signaling" the stimson Center, Washingtonin a reportissuedin 2004, calls for: lindia and Pakistan should lay down clear and unambiguous principles of transparent signaling during a "crisis
india not having insisted on their discussion, as evidenced by the silence on these in media statements by official spokesmen of both countries are:
l As per Lahore MOU this was the first point listed for bilateral consultations and building of CBMs.( Comment: silence evident of disagreement or evasion by Pakistan, to maintain ambiguity)
l As per Lahore MOU both sides were to undertake national measures to reducing risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their respective control.( Comment: No discussions seem to have been taken place on this vital nuclear risks reductions measures. Evidently, all this could have naturally flowed from discussions of nuclear doctrines and security concepts.)
l Consultative Mechanism for Implementation Review: The setting up such a mechanism was stipulated in the Lahore Accord MOU, but does not seem to have figured in the outcome of N-CBMs meet.
When the omission of these "core points" of Lahore Accord 1999 MOU are comparatively analysed with whatever has come out in official statements of both sides,it can be stated that:
* N-CBMs meet on June 2004, has dwelt more on the "theoretical points" of CBMs
* N-CBMs meet silence on the "core points" of Lahore Accord MOU 1999 indicates that Pakistan has evaded discussion on these substantive issues so as to retain ambiguity.
* india's lack of insistence on discussion of the "core points" of Lahore Accord
period" which may even involve the breakdown of normal diplomatic channels.
lThe Number of "actors" authorized to initiate signaling should be severely restricted to avoid contradictions.
l"Actors" should be competent to assess "the internal dynamics operating within respective political systems."
lindia and Pakistan should devise "back channel of communication", which can facilitate provision of trusted and accurate interpretation of crisis signaling.
lMost importantly, the report adds that the above would demand "the need to be authorized at the highest political level, as well as insulated from existing political tension."
india and Pakistan seem to be long way away from reaching this stage of sophistication in terms of N-CBMs. Both sides also lack persons of caliber who can become "actors" in such a process.
it also needs to be noted that in all such processes, "mutual faith" and "mutual trust" are key ingredients. To say that it exists in india-Pakistan relations would be stretching credulity, a bit too far.
Pakistan's Overall Approach to CBMs With India:
Pakistan's overall approach to CBMs with india, of which N-CBMs is an important component, seems to be now driven by one word, namely "flexibility" on every issue from Kashmir to opening of bus services and to
nuclear risk reduction. This has become the buzz word from General Musharraf down to Pakistan interlocutors negotiating with india.
Pakistan is avoiding emphasis on "compromises" in CBM negotiations. This for a very good reason and that is "compromises" entails moving away from stated or existing positions by both parties to a negotiation. Pakistan by its overemphasis on "Flexibility" is trying to connote and convey that in any CBMs, there is only a one way street and that is that india needs to bend backwards to accommodate/adjust to Pakistan's positions on variousissues.
such an approach so persistently being maintained by Pakistan cannot obviously add any momentum to CBM negotiations. in terms of N-CBMs negotiations with india, Pakistan would expect india to be "Flexible" to accept far more strategic restraints than Pakistan would. The aim being to whittle down india's superiority in nuclear weapons. Perceiving that it has offset india's conventional warfare superiority by the Pakistan nuclear weapons arsenal, Pakistan would now seek to offset india's nuclear weapon superiority by "strategic restraints" via the N-CBMs route.
india needs to be wary of such approaches and the connotation of each word of the text/records /state-ments of Pakistan need to be minutely weighed.
it is also surprising that Pakistani official spokesman covering N-CBMs were more elaborative on the differences that persisted in N-CBMs discussions in New Delhi, compared to the reticence of the indian side.
Concluding Observations:
Pakistan continues to be evasive on the "core issues" of N-CBMs and until nuclear doctrine, security concepts doctrines and institutional mechanisms for nuclear risks reduction do not come into existence, no substantive progress can be said to be achieved.
Evidence of Pakistan's evasiveness on core issues can be exemplified by Pakistan's Foreign Office spokesman Masood Khan's observations when asked whether india's proposal of "No First Use" was discussed, he retorted: "india says no-first-use. We have been saying no-use-of force. At one point, we talked about a no-war pact or nonaggression pact".
such approaches of Pakistan to core issues of N-CBMs do not induce optimism of progress or breakthroughs. And where progress is directly linked to "progress on Kashmir", as General Musharraf maintains, no grounds for optimism exists in N-CBMs negotiations.
Source: South Asia Analysis Group, New Delhi website.