HARTALS in Bangladesh

have so far affected the country's future, democ-

racy and development in a positive as well as negative way, in varying degrees though, relative to time and space. An in-depth research on the hartal impacts could, among other things, assist Bangladeshis in their effort towards determining the national, as well as personal losses and gains on account of hartal in a given period of time. But such factors as the difficulties associated with the sourcing of pertinent, as well as useable data and information concerning hartal (particularly, in the absence of proper records) and the challenges of quantifying the non-physical consequences of hartal for accounting purposes, might constrain the determination efforts in a number of ways.

An analysis of the outcome(s) of the above research reflecting inter alia on the cause, causality and effect of hartal and a wide dissemination of relevant findings resulting from the analysis might afford the people of Bangladesh, the political parties and others an opportunity to re-think plus re-consider their current, as well as 'future' position with regard to hartal at conceptual as well as operation and impact creation levels. Further, it could perhaps help the majority of common Bangladeshis to decide, among other things, whether or not they would prefer to 'witness' (given their current weak role in influencing Bangladeshi politics and politicians) a continuing development of hartal assisted politics in the country through the foreseeable future? or, otherwise?

Hartal, in one form or another, has a long tradition in the politics of the geographical area that became Bangladesh in 1971. Despite that and other related facts, predicting the future of hartal in Bangladesh with a greater accuracy at this point in time would not be an easy task. There are several reasons for it -- for example: the hartal has by now attained a hydra-headed stature in the political, social and economic dimensions of Bangladesh; its forward and backward linkages with the outcome of pre and post election politics are getting stronger in cases; the gap between the emotional and the non-emotional aspects of hartal is widening; and

the arguments offered by the political parties and others, both in favour of and against the hartal, are overwhelming.

Why is the politics of independent Bangladesh becoming hartal dependent (in a sense)? Here are some of the factors that have so far contributed, directly or indirectly or both, to the making, as well as shaping the future of hartal in Bangladesh.

The demand for the people's support and for that matter the voters' in the contemporary political market of Bangladesh may inter alia and in an average sense be characterised as a seasonal and time bound opportunity for the political parties and others to harness and benefit from it. At the supply end, the mere casting of vote, say, in a gen-

eral election, whether as a result of informed decisions or otherwise, appears to most voters as something like a total fulfilment of their obligations pertaining to the country's democratic process, per se -per election cycle. it is perhaps one of the reasons why the demand for, and the supply of, the people's support normally attain the peak from almost a ground zero position during the country's election season and shrink rapidly thereafter. A failure on the part of the majority of Bangladeshis to sustain the above demand during the intervening period between the elections and an absence of aggressive political will, as well as strategy for help ensuring their continuing, and meaningful participation in the country's governance have been affecting inter alia the bottom-up transactions and the top-down accountability in the country's political and developmental dimensions. Besides, a windfall from the above development has been instrumental in enriching the breeding ground for the attributes, such as: over confidence, arrogance, tunnel vision and naive realism in Bangladeshi politics. Moreover, the political parties have

not yet recovered fully from the preindependence hartal mindset.

The factors, such as: poverty related pre-occupations; current rate of illiteracy; capacity related limitations for informed decisions, on say, the matter of national interest; insufficiently organised and poorly harnessed civil society; rising individualism (used in a negative sense); an increasing lack of trust; and a slow progress in the cultivation of culture of political innovation, as well as diversification have been isolating the majority of Bangladeshis from the country's mainstream politics and stalling their effort towards holding the political parties accountable for their promises and actions, to mention a few.

The present ^ay institutions, as

well as modus operandi for resolving political disputes in Bangladesh are neither sufficient and nor fully effective. There is hardly any arrangement like, the servo mechanism (used in an engineering sense) to deal with those disputes in a timely fashion, per se.

in an average sense, the negative consequences of unresolved political disputes and the continuation of imitational politics in Bangladesh have, among other things, been taking a toll on the country's image and progress in the forms of, say, anti-people ramifications of hartal and a less than desired governance. Further, the absence of an enforceable Hartal Act is, in many respects, hampering the efforts towards, say, protecting the economic rights and interests of Bangladeshis and others (for example, the foreign investors) during and after the hartal; defining, as well as enforcing hartal related accountabilities and liabilities in pertinent areas; and establishing a process of conciliation, as well as arbitration in the pursuit of resolving the disputes in a productive manner.

The pro and anti-hartal activities have so far, in one way or another,

been instrumental in: promoting a sense of insecurity among the people of Bangladesh and its stakeholders; increasing their vulnerability to uncertainties, limiting their development related choices at least in the short term, shaking their confidence in the political parties and the institutions; and making them more confused and directionless when it comes to their role in bringing about positive changes in the country's politics and democracy, to mention a few.

Taking cognisance of the present day nature, scope and trend of hartal assisted politics in Bangladesh, one of the ways of looking at the future of hartal could be through defining, as well as analysing its development potentials over a given period of time,

using a 3-track matrix. The tracks could be called -- the fast track, the slow track and the intermediate track. in the fast track, it is expected the hartal (of an extreme type) and not the country's parliament will be used more frequently than ever as the major source of, and force for, facilitating changes, positive or negative or in the domains of politics, democracy, development and governance. The slow track, on the other hand, would witness a rare use of a modified type hartal. The modified type of hartal would have greater impact potentials for ensuring positive changes (used in a relative sense) at local, national and global levels. Further, the decision pertaining to such hartal would be taken in a more democratic fashion and the eventual hartal would be least harmful for Bangladeshis and the stakeholders in terms of consequences. one of the assumptions here is, the slow track will coincide with the start of a stabilisation phase of people-centred democracy and democratic processes in the country. in the intermediate track, the development of hartal assisted politics would be locked in between the fast and the slow tracks.

in a democracy, whether transitional or otherwise, hartals are not unusual. But to what extent? At what cost? Bangladesh cannot afford the costs of hartal beyond its relatively limited tolerance level nor can it allow the root causes of hartals to continue to persist indefinitely, resulting perhaps in more hartals and more anti-people consequences.

The government and the political parties should be more honest, proactive, reactive, pragmatic, time sensitive and people-oriented in dealing and resolving hartal related political disputes. The people of Bangladesh should, with or without the help of civil society, the development partners and others, accelerate their efforts towards mobilising and sustaining popular support against the anti-people aspects of hartal. They could do it in a number of ways. For example, they might wish to establish counseling centres at community levels (for example) for the political parties to receive the people's counseling on how to deal with hartal issues and how to make an inevitable hartal least antipeople, to mention a few. They might post Ads on the mass media (both print and electronic) seeking the support of fellow countrymen and women in the pursuit of forming a grand coalition of Bangladeshis for fighting against anti-people aspects of hartal and for mainstreaming in the future election agendas of the political parties pertinent preventive measures.

Bangladesh would need to create additional opportunities for managing its political disputes. it should be able to promote parliament assisted democracy in the country, until a breakthrough surpasses the benefit of that democracy in favour of a higher return. The office of ombudsman should be established and functionalised for improving transparency and bottom-up transaction in the country's governance. A windfall from the development could facilitate the enhancement of the accountability of political parties to the people.

The last word: the time is ripe now for the people to rise to the occasion and assume the responsibility of an arbitrator for ensuring a quick and fair resolution of the disputes between the ruling and the opposition parties.