IT'S rare for an event lasting just 10 minutes to hold the potential to undo the damage inflicted by rival nations over 18 months. Pakistan Prime Minister Jamali's April 28 telephone call to Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee is a candidate for this.

It sets the ball rolling for an India-Pakistan thaw. Cautious optimism is growing as both governments make probing moves.

Pakistan's leaders seem to have decided to pursue Mr Vajpayee's offer positively. General Pervez Musharraf's comment that it's "a good offer" is a strong sign. Even more welcome is his post-April 18 remark to Pakistani editors that if India-Pakistan talks were to begin, the "victory would be neither mine nor Prime Minister Vajpayee's. It would be the victory of negotiation and dialogue."

Mr Jamali has since said Pakistan would walk "the extra mile". Short of a tactless action like raising Kashmir in the UN Security Council, or a big terrorist attack, the process seems set to move for-

ward--despite hitches.

On the issue of prime concern to India, "cross-border" activities of jehadis, Pakistan's Interior Minister Hayat has made positive signals. On April 28, he said jehadis won't be allowed to use Pakistan's soil for hostile activities against another country. This reiterates Gen Musharraf's January 12, 2002 address, which India welcomed.

He also said that the AntiTerrorism Act would be applied to banned jehadis who "have

resumed activities under new names". Mr Jamali also told Mr Vajpayee: "Terrorism in all forms should be condemned".

This suggests that Pakistan's "system" or Establishment has decided to give dialogue a fair chance.

Both New Delhi and Islamabad must seize the moment. Mr Vajpayee's talks offer has been widely welcomed in India, even by the RSS. Its only opponents are maverick Hindutva extremists like Mr Ashok Singhal, who call even Mr L.K. Advani a "traitor".

The consensus is, Mr Vajpayee's move signals the end of a sterile phase of rigid "coercive diplomacy".

It's irrelevant whether Mr Vajpayee's move was made from a position of strength. Regardless of motivations, it represents a live-and-let-live policy vis-a-vis a neighbour, with whom we have to co-exist.

India-Pakistan reconciliation is a precondition for the security and prosperity of both. It's also necessary to combat the scourges of chauvinism, militarism and, above all, communalism.

Assuming Mr Vajpayee's offer

was made after serious deliberation, it could only have resulted from a mix of factors: gentle external goading, and anticipation of greater, overt, US pressure for talks with Pakistan.

Mr Vajpayee may also have other motives: assert himself within the NDA (where challenges to him have weakened), and do something before the coming Assembly elections. Reviving SAARC, moribund because of India's refusal to attend its last summit, may also be a motive.

Mr Vajpayee must now get his own party to back his overture solidly.

India and Pakistan must break the logjam in which they find

themselves. Both have pursued a policy of compellence, especially since the December 2001 Parliament attack. India tried to bend Pakistan to its will by mobilising 700,000 troops and issuing ultimatums on 20 terrorists.

Pakistan too has used coercion to try to get India to discuss Kashmir. It deployed 300,000 soldiers at the border. Both dangerously ratcheted up their war machines and at least twice came close to actual combat--with a potential

for nuclear escalation.

However, coercion didn't work because compellence is even more difficult to achieve than deterrence. Deterrence is about preventing your adversary from doing what you don't want him to do--by threatening "unacceptable damage". Compellence is about forcing your adversary to do what you want him to do.

Deterrence can, theoretically, work between equal or unequal adversaries who can inflict unconscionable damage upon each other. It doesn't matter much if one has 3,000 nuclear missiles, and the other 800. Both can wipe each other out. In practice, deterrence, as this Column has often argued, is

unstable, degenerative, and prone to failure.

Compellence is worse. It assumes a big disproportion between rivals. You can't compel your adversary unless you have overwhelming superiority.

Between India and Pakistan, there's no such asymmetry--only a conventional superiority of under 1:5-to-1, and nuclear-level disproportion of 3-to-1.

Thus, even within the (flawed)

"realist" framework, it was foolhardy of India and Pakistan to resort to compellence. The dangers of raising their military standoff to its highest pitch are great given their systemic hostility, complicated by competing notions of nationhood, territorial disputes, distrust and religious factors.

So the turn against coercionbased approaches is a long-overdue correction. This gain must not be dissipated. That can only happen if some hard-to-reverse steps are taken. As of now, five have been identified: economic cooperation, cultural exchanges, people-to-people contacts, resumption of flights, and sporting links.

These are worthy, but fall short

of the critical minimum for a breakthrough. This minimum derives from the logic of returning to non-coercive diplomacy.

What's needed is the restoration of all communications links and diplomatic relations severed or downgraded in December 2001. Their continued disruption is causing hardship to people without giving either government advantage.

There's no reason why India shouldn't unilaterally restore such relations as a prelude to a structured dialogue on Kashmir, end of support to militancy, economic relations, Siachen, and other matters. The two missions must be upgraded and new High Commissioners appointed.

This isn't an excessive demand. Rupturing links was a reaction to the Parliament attack followed by escalated military rivalry. The deescalation and end of that rivalry now entails restoration.

Here lies the test of the principle of bilateralism which India advocates. If India and Pakistan don't pursue reconciliation, they will invite external intervention. The coming visit by US Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage and the G-8 summit coincide with a hardening of US positions post-Iraq under neo-conservative influence.

This could create new challenges to bilateralism. India and Pakistan must show a resolve to walk the talk--before domestic and global uncertainties complicate matters.

Praful Bidwai is an eminent Indian columnist.

***What's needed is the restoration of all communications Vinks and diplomatic relations severed or downgraded in December 2001. Their continued disruption is causing hardship to people without giving either government advantage...There's no reason why India shouldn't unilaterally restore such relations as a prelude to a structured dialogue on Kashmir, end of support to militancy, economic relations, Siachen, and other matters.***