THE Sri Lankan government has rejected an offer by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to extend a unilateral ceasefire until February 24. Instead, the Sri Lankan military continued a major offensive on the Jaffna peninsula, recapturing nearly all territory lost to the LTTE in fierce fighting last year. Government forces are reportedly gearing up for a final offensive to push the LTTE from Elephant Pass, a strategic rebel-held land corridor linking the peninsula with the rest of the country.

However, President Chandrika Kumaratunga called on Sunday for a definite date to begin peace talks with the LTTE but said there would be no ceasefire until the two sides reached a lasting agreement on ending the war.

Then again, despite talk of a truce and attempted mediation by a peace envoy from Norway, the government in Colombo is clearly seeking a military solution to the 18-year ethnic war. With overwhelming forces poised to launch land and air strikes on LTTE positions, the military is likely to drive them back into the jungles. But what if the government victory turns out to be short-lived; what if the rebels revert to guerrilla and terrorist tactics better suited to their abilities.

Since 1983, the LTTE have been fighting for an ethnic Tamil homeland in the north and east. The years of fighting have left more than 64,000 people dead and severely hampered economic growth and development in Sri Lanka. In April last year, LTTE forces overran the strategic military base at Elephant Pass, pushing forward to capture much of Jaffna peninsula. Before recapturing the city of Jaffna which has significant historical and cultural meaning for the Tamils government forces have reportedly received an influx of new weapons, stopping the Tigers short of their goal. Government and Tiger forces have since hunkered down in a trenchwarfare campaign, with each side alternately gaining and losing ground.

Better-armed and prepared for conventional warfare, the government troops now appear to have regained the upper hand in the conflict on the peninsula. Sri Lankan infantry troops are positioned about 10 miles from the edge of the main rebel base at Elephant Pass. Currently the military deploys light and medium tanks, field and medium artillery, and 16 multiple barrel rocket launchers (MLRS). The military also has nearly unopposed air superiority, flying groundattack missions with Israeli-made Kfir and Russian-made MiGs.

The Tigers counter with Chinese-made 122mm and 152mm artillery pieces, as well as MLRS, mortars -mostly 81mm - and landmines that inflict significant casualties on government troops. Gradually, the LTTE accrued weapons in ambushes or when pushing back

government troops. They also have some tanks and various rockets in reserve.

If government troops retake the Pass, rebel forces on the peninsula will be cut off from their supply routes to the country's interior. The loss of the peninsula will further jeopardise the Tiger's food and armaments supply route.

While a victory in Elephant Pass and the peninsula would boost the government and its military forces, it may be short-lived, say Sri Lanka observers. Far from ending the conflict, the fighting may simply shift from the current conventional war, which heavily now favours government troops, to the more traditional jungle war that would favour the Tigers.

Although many thought Prabhakaran's ceasefire offer as a time-out for regrouping, the government seems to have misinterpreted their truce offer as an indicator of weakness. Though the LTTE apparently need time for regrouping after the last heavy battles, there are no signs that their number or morale is declining. The latest losses of dozens of men, as reported in the media, could not decrease the strength of the guerrillas.

Nor has there been any news of desertion, even in minor numbers. If their track record is any guide, all LTTE cadre comprise unpaid volunteers who are prepared for selfsacrifice. Tigers prefer to take cyanide rather than surrender, said the Lake House paper on January 18.

As Sri Lankan troops push the LTTE back into the jungles, in all likelihood the Tigers may launch guerrilla-type operations, combined with terrorist actions all around the country. The government would answer with counter-insurgency operations and heavy aerial bombardments. In this type of war, however, the government forces are unlikely to continue enjoying success or to eliminate the LTTE's armed resistance.

The army's responsibilities are already stretched: half an army is defending the Peninsula and fighting rebels while the other half guards strategic positions all around the country. The physical topography and size of most of the war theatre consists of jungle, precluding the possibility of eliminating LTTE cadres.

According to available reports on various web sites, with the exception of a major sea base in Mullaittivu, all major LTTE bases are scattered throughout a large jungle area of about 5,000 square miles, with heavy woods, bad roads and a sparse population. This region is ideal for guerrilla forces and presents serious difficulties for motorised and infantry units of a conventional army. Even if Sri Lankan troops managed to occupy LTTE-held urban centres of the littoral south of Jaffna peninsula, the rebels can retreat into this interior jungle region. It affords safe haven and a prime area from which to mount surprise incursions.

In addition to jungle warfare, however, the Tigers rely on terrorist tactics to advance their cause. According to an international defence journal, the LTTE has the world's highest suicide bombing rate, with 62 per cent of such cases involving the LTTE between 1980 and 2000. Out of the 271 suicide bombings in the world between 1980 and 2000, they carried out 168. With the government rejecting the LTTE's ceasefire and the latter suffering setbacks on battlefield, the Tigers likely to expand their terrorist activities.

The annihilation or expulsion of Tigers from these jungles and physical occupation of the interior would require a considerable increase in the number of government troops. The current ratio of 10 to 1 in favour of the army [roughly 110,000 government troops and 11,000 guerrillas] may be sufficient for conventional war, but looks quite insufficient for finding and destroying Tigers in the jungle. Nor would the number be adequate to blockade the Tigers, as the area covered would be too large.

In general, the rebel fighters are much more determined than government soldiers. Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake, an advocate of taking a hardline against the LTTE, plans to establish

a new volunteer brigade to boost the military campaign against them. But enthusiasm is not high among Sinhalese youth. Students were reported to have taken to wearing black-and-white bands protesting the government's rejection of the rebels' ceasefire, said to The Lanka Academic on January 25.

In contrast, Tigers continue to enjoy support among ordinary Tamils of the island. Many still feel oppressed by the central government and Sinhalese majority and see Tigers as their only defenders. Parliament has yet to debate the promise to give broad autonomy to the Tamils, on which Kumaratunga rose to power last year. The broad sympathies and support given to Tigers by a few million Tamils is a guarantee and indicator that their armed struggle would continue no matter what success the government achieves on the battlefield.

The government appears prepared to launch a final offensive to drive the Tigers off the Jaffna peninsula. The most likely consequence may be the change in the armed conflict from conventional war to a guerrilla one, with an increased terrorist campaign by Tigers. And that's not at all a good augury for the government in Colombo.

Ekram is a Daily Star staffer