LEOPARDS don't change spots. Guerrillas never willingly surrender arms, nor governments "sovereign" territory. Going by conventional wisdom, moves for negotiations on the Sri Lanka ethnic conflict must be viewed with the utmost scepticism. The LTTE may only be playing a wicked game through a unilateral cease-fire because it has lost over 2,000 cadres in a year.

Similarly, Ms Kumaratunga's government is promising talks only to ward off international opprobrium; it hasn't even reciprocated the Tigers' cease-fire.

Many arguments can be constructed to cast doubts upon the significance of Lankan developments since the November 1 meeting between Norwegian envoy Erik Solheim and LTTE chief Prabhakaran.

One can contend that no basic change has occurred in Eelam or Sinhala-chauvinist mindsets. If a militarily powerful India could not bend the LTTE to reason, how can tiny, distant Norway succeed?

And yet, a plausible scenario can be constructed for an optimistic view, based not on ignorant or n a i

ve hope, but on hard realities. This column, written after discussions in Colombo with gov-

ernment supporters, scholars, peace activists and diplomats, outlines one. It aims not to present cut-and-dried solutions, but stimulate thinking on alternatives.

Colombo and the LTTE have come close for the first time since 1987 to third-party mediation, technically called "facilitation". The Norwegians have even laid down the parameters: a one-state Sri Lanka with generous autonomy for the North and the East

Both Colombo and the LTTE have explicitly or implicitly accepted these parameters. Ms Kumaratunga recently admitted "the real cause" of the crisis is that the minorities lack "a fair or reasonable share in the ... power structure".

The Solheim visit is the first time Prabhakaran was publicly photographed on his home terrain with a foreigner. This wasn't

a mere public relations exercise. In his November 27 Heroes' Day speech, he called for "unconditional talks" for "a negotiated settlement that would be fair, just, and . satisfy the political aspirations of the Tamil people."

He also wants a cordial atmosphere and "de-escalation of war" but not as a "precondition".

A close reading of his carefully-crafted speech reveals an uncharacteristically soft tone. He directly mentions Eelam only once, and that too as a peroration much like "Jai Hind!" The only other reference to Eelam is conditional: "If the Sinhala nation fails to redeem itself from the grip of racism ., we have no alternative other than to secede."

This is markedly different from insisting on a non-negotiable Eelam.

We must distinguish Prabhakaran's declared commitment to a "political solution" from

his demand for interim steps such as de-escalation. On these, the LTTE has a shifting, exploratory, approach. It variously asks for a cease-fire, unbanning, restoring "normalcy", etc. But it has not once said that there could be no talks without these steps.

Crucially, unlike in the past, the LTTE no longer demands its three well-known preconditions: cease-fire, ending of the economic embargo and the army's removal from the Northeast. Its December 21 cease-fire declaration came despite the government's reluctance to make "further gestures of goodwill" until subsequent "negotiations proceed to ... mutual satisfaction".

The government is in two minds on de-escalation. Some hardliners oppose it because they think military pressure can decisively weaken the LTTE. It is hard to believe this. A long delay in responding to the LTTE's diplomatic offensive risks losing an unprecedented opportunity. One must hope Ms Kumaratunga rises above the narrow agenda of some colleagues, including Prime Minister Wickramanayake.

Both sides are jockeying for bargaining power. Neither has

undergone a change of heart not least the LTTE which remains one of the most, if not the most, brutal, militaristic and fascistic forces anywhere.

Nevertheless, there is a real change of posture. Both are both under enormous external pressure to negotiate. Even if there are "talks about talks", the process can build confidence.

The pressure on the government comes from western donor agencies and international banks. On December 18-19, the Sri Lanka Development Forum read the Riot Act to it for failure to meet standards of "good governance". It said conflict resolution is critical to reducing poverty. The European Union demanded peace talks and an improved "human rights record".

Colombo admits its defence expenditure has risen to the "intolerably high level of six per cent of GDP." (According to independent estimates, it may be 20 per cent). Besides this "negative" pressure, there is also the "positive " pressure from Ms Kumaratunga's own past positions favouring reconciliation.

On the LTTE, the greatest pressure comes, ironically, from its own military victories in early 2000. The Tigers found world

sympathy vanishing just as they were knocking on the gates of Jaffna. The international community rallied behind Chandrika.

It is hard to say if Prabhakran has concluded that Eelam is not internationally saleable. But he knows he must show moderation. Another source of pressure is the British threat to ban the LTTE in its international headquarters.

Sceptics argue including the non-LTTE University Teachers for Human Rights, who have valiantly fought for civil liberties that the LTTE may use any lull in fighting only to enter Jaffna and forcibly recruit young students, and then renew the fighting. They may be right.

But the LTTE must be tested on the ground in a peace process that includes all Tamil currents. The present moment offers a unique chance. Ms Kumaratunga must seize it.

Should India play a role here? India is not acceptable as an honest broker or even facilitator, given its past involvement. Nor must it promote anything resembling a two-state solution. New Delhi's past partisan politicking with different Eelam groups, including the LTTE and the EPRLF, has tainted it.

However, for India's NGOs and scholars, Sri Lanka poses a challenge. They can generate conflict resolution ideas within a radical federal framework. An imaginative formula could have applications and lessons in Kashmir and the Northeast.