ANY positive information with regards to IndoPakistan relations is almost always viewed cynically, if not dismissively and thought to be something to do with the peacenicks' yet another attempt to piece the peace in the volatile region. However, two successive ceasefires in strife-torn Kashmir - one offered by the Hizbul Mujahideens, the largest and most dreaded of the militant groups in the state in July last and another announced by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee on November 19, 2000 - have raised eyebrows among the observers who are struck by their sheer straight forwardness. The developments surrounding the cease-fires have also given rise to a pertinent question: who is, after all holding the string from behind? Because they could not have been offered in vacuum and were, by all probabilities, the follow-up of some invisible efforts and understanding at some level.

On July 24 last year, Abdul Majid Dar, a senior Hizb commander announced in Srinagar his organisation's decision to declare unilateral ceasefire for three months and also offered to talk with Indian administration. The offer of the Hizb - crucially dependent on Pakistan for its sustenance - not only came as a surprise, it was immediately challenged by UJC (United Jihad Council) - an Azad Kashmirbased apex body of 15 militant organisations including Hizbul Mujahideen which unanimously decided to step up attacks

against Indian security forces.

As a result the ceasefires crumbled much before the stipulated time. It is now learnt that General Pervez Musharaf constantly accused by India of "cross border terrorism" and under pressure to talk to the Indians acted, within the framework of some understanding, to initiate the ceasefire. Pakistan's Islamic fundamentalists, however, got the wind of and scuttled it before it could be effective. The July initiative ended at that but an alacrity remained in Track II diplomacy.

Later, before Mr. Vajpayee announced his cease-fire for the holy month of Ramadan he had to brush aside several obstacles to his decision even from his close aides who were however delighted to see its results in the end. As it was in July, the ceasefires immediately divided the militants into pro and anti ceasefires factions. Although the ceasefires were not strictly observed even this time it was able to create a great deal of confusions among the groups concerned. However the most significant aspect of the ceasefires was Pakistan's positive response to Vajpayee's November 19 announcement, seeking reciprocity from both Pakistan and the militants.

On December 2, Pakistan For-

eign Secretary Inamul Huq announced in Islamabad that the troops on the LoC (Line of Control) would observe maximum restraint in order to strengthen and stabilise the ceasefires. The declaration was followed by three week's cull on

the hope. Most of the militant groups mocked at Vajpayee's offer but did little to render it ineffective.

To obtain a coherent picture from these developments the attentions or are now focussed on a publication on 22 November in International Herald Tribune writing in which a US businessman Mansoor Izaz, also a nuclear physicist and investment banker talked of his initiative in bringing about a dialogue between General Musharaf and Atal Behari Vajpayee what is however interesting is his claim that his initiative had the back-ing of none other than President Clinton himself. Whether his claim is credible or not he visited Srinagar escorted by RAW people only weeks before the Hizbul Mujahideen had announced a unilateral cease-fire. It is reported that in August last, Izaz

and the US diplomatic establishment renewed their efforts and evolved a formula in which Pakistan would be brought to the negotiating table at the outset of the political discussions after ceasefires had taken hold, first bilaterally between India and Kashmiris and then, at Kashmiris' request, trilaterally. Is that process for dialogue in progress? Or the present developments are only a prelude to that?

While, for General Musharaf, it is indeed a risky gambit to deescalate in Kashmir, India is pinning its high hope in the game hoping that the US is in fact aiding India's interest in Jammu and Kashmir. However the write-up in the Herald Tribute makes clear that the US government's central objective is containing Islamic rights and Pakistan. Amidst these diverse hopes and speculations, the crucial point is how the dialogue would proceed once its process is restored. Till the process was rendered null and void with India abruptly adopting its on July 12, 1999 that talks with Pakistan on Kashmir are conditional on its ending "cross border terrorism" dialogues were in practice.

Even after the insurgency erupted in 1989 in Kashmir the prime ministers of India and Pakistan continued to meet in the course of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit and in New York during UN General Assembly sessions. The Foreign Secretaries held many rounds of talks and drew up useful agreements on Confidence Building Measures (CMBs). Despite the nuclear tests in May 1998 at Pokhran and Chagai respectively, the dialogue was revived by the prime ministers in New York on September 23, 1998. The November 1998 meeting of the Foreign Secretar-

ies however ended in bitter failure. The Lahore Declaration of February 21, 1999 revived the

peace process and gave momentum to it. But during the long haul never was it possible to bring about a lasting peace in the valley. But both sides could line with trauma and hopes. Just now, with no dialogue among them, none of the parties involved - neither Indians nor Pakistanis and certainly not the Kashmiris - can nurse those hopes. The best that is attempted through has been an invisible US diplomacy is perhaps the revival of a suspended dialogue between the subcontinent's arch-rivals to renew hopes for peace and harmony.In the past there have been several indications that the US would like to see the Muslim-majority areas of Jammu and Kashmir granted some form quasiindependence. The solution that emerged from Track II diplomacy even after Kargil episode was popularly known as 'Chenab solution', envisaging a partition of Kashmir on communal lines. The bottom-line favoured by most of APHC (All Parties Hurgat Conference) leaders is some variant of Owen Dixon plan of 1950 which also envisioned a partition of Jammu and Kashmir along Chenab river. The final deal to be struck will of course be ctated by India and Pakistan who cannot but ensure their own vital interest and security.