Abraham’s The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb. India’s Nuclear Bomb by Perkovich enables us to compare the circumstances of the first Pokhran test in 1974 and the second tests in 1998. No two nuc lear bombs or tests are the same. Perkovich shows clearly what happened in the volatile 1974-1978 period. Here we see the complex international reaction of nuclear powers to their long-held expectation that India ‘would go nuclear', along with their earl ier sense that India ‘couldn’t do it’. This paradox affected all the original players with an interest in nuclear India in 1974, except Britain. Their expectation about India's ‘going nuclear' was coupled to another idea that it might never happen. Moreo ver, some thought, India might acquire the ingredients, yet not actually make or not test atomic bombs. Even the fascinating disagreement over what the 1974 test's yield and the size of the first bomb was, and how the uncertainty surrounding it was actua lly used by interested parties, is part of Perkovich's analysis. Here we see the relations of politics and science at their most complex.

India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation by George Perkovich: Oxford University Press Delhi. 2000:

Rs 645

A CURIOSITY of scholarship that synthesises modern Indian history, including the good books, is that most technical, scientific or industrial works of history since 1947 are underplayed and undervalued. Even the military receives insufficient attention i n these broad works interpreting the past 50 years. This is probably so because there are few published case studies of major programmes (such as the nuclear programmes), of major institutions (such as the Department of Atomic Energy or the Planning Comm ission), or of major figures (such as Homi Bhabha or Vikram Sarabhai). It is ironic that this kind of work has not been encouraged (or even discouraged). because these are the stories of the Indian elites, and these individuals and institutions have had great Influence on the country and abroad. Integrative work about the broad sweep of politics, economics, and society do not contemplate these dimensions like the nuclear programme, and so we misunderstand, to this extent, the larger picture of modern In dia.

Abraham s The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb. India's Nuclear Bomb by Perkovich enables us to compare the circumstances of the first Pokhran test In 1974 and the second tests in 1998. No two nuc lear bombs or tests are the same. Perkovich shows clearly what happened in the volatile 1974-1978 period. Here we see the complex international reaction of nuclear powers to their long-held expectation that India would go nuclear’. along with their earl ler sense that India couldn’t do it’. This paradox affected all the original players with an interest in nuclear India in 1974, except Britain. Their expectation about India s ‘going nuclear' was coupled to another idea that It might never happen. Moreo ver. some thought. India might acquire the ingredients. yet not actually make or not test atomic bombs. Even the fascinating disagreement over what the 1974 test's yield and the size of the first bomb was, and how the uncertainty surrounding it was actua lly used by interested parties. Is part of Perkovich's analysis. Here we sec the relations of politics and science at their most complex.

Within four crucial years of India’s first nuclear bomb test in May 1974. changes occurred both to delay and accelerate India’s nuclear programme, thus creating an image of India as a nuclear enigma' until the more famous nuclear tests 20 years later, i n 1998. Why did India not weaponise its nuclear capabilities?' outsiders asked curiously, echoing or questioning calls in India to do so. Those more interested in India's history asked how did it build its nuclear capabilities?' And those interested in a global system of effective control on nuclear proliferation, asked what Is India's impact on proliferation elsewhere?'.

PERKOVICH'S monumental book leads us to the answers to these and many other questions, and thus enables us to re-read and re-thlnk India's modern history. But before considering the book, think about what Inspired him to study this subject. In a recent c onversatlon, Perkovich told this writer that though he had studied the politics and economics of nuclear weapons establishments' of the United States and the erstwhile Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) since 1982, he did not find room in conven lional international relations theory for the historical and anthropological dimensions that would help explain the behaviour of those establishments. Ten years later, in 1992, he came for the first time to India, and found it “fascinating and rather enl Ightenlng. I had no prior interest in India or knowledge of it." He met the top scientists and military specialists, and found “they thought about nuclear weapons differently than the U.S. or Soviet experts did. and differently from what the literature ’ allowed'. Perkovich said: “They avoided the hyperactive. abstract military calculus of deterrence that we created, and In-stead saw nukes as largely political-

symbolic instruments. This is what they are elsewhere, too, 1 believe, though our governments tr y to pretend otherwise. The Indian approach seemed more reasonable. If not also strange in places.” Inside this large book is a concealed doctoral dissertation. and It shows all the attention to detail which Is expected of such projects. As he told me, " the PhD was written with the book in mind”.

The first Pokhran test and its consequences foreshadowed what was to come, and suddenly revealed the strange combination of public disapproval and private acceptance by nuclear powers, as seen more recently in 1998. Part of the sequence, relying on

Perko vich and some of my own findings. was as follows:

May 1974: India explode^ one small nuclear bomb under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's orders, the explosive yield of which remained uncertain and unexplained for many years. Doubting the official announcement about the costs. Perkovich concludes th at the probable cost was Rs. 1.76 billion over the preceding five years, or S220 million in 1974 values, (for which Perkovich cites a study by N. Seshagiri. page 181) Canada suspended cooperation on a reactor and heavy-water plant: France sent a congratul atory telegram (and then withdrew it). Protests from the U.S. and the USSR were muted and more neutral.

June 1974: The Aid India Consortium voted an Increased aid budget at the World Bank-managed Paris Club meetings: the U.S. sent Its routine delivery of enriched uranium fuel for an (ill-functioning) American reactor near Bombay;

August 1974: Canada eventually began quiet negotiations to restore nuclear cooperation with India, to work

on an (ill-functioning) Canadian reactor in Rajasthan; U.S. Congress directed U.S. representatives to the World Bank to vote against loans t o 'any country which develops any nuclear explosive device’ unless that country adheres to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;

September 1974. Following severe problems with the supply of heavy water for reactors. India again approached the USSR as a source for new supplies.

April 1975: India launched its first satellite on a Soviet rocket from a Soviet launch site;

June 1975: Indira Gandhi declares a state of emergency owing to her apprehension of an insurrection, and suspends normal political activity: eventually thousands of political and labour activists, intellectuals, students. etc., were imprisoned und er Maintenance of Internal Security Act’ (MISA):

Spring 1976: The Canadian Cabinet rejected an agreement, drafted and approved by senior Indian and Canadian officials, to reopen nuclear cooperation; evidence appears of the rapid advancement of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, a programme wh Ich had actually begun in earnest In 1972. Indira Gandhi said that she did not wish to hear about any more Indian nuclear tests, when atomic energy scientists raise this question hopefully with her;

July 1976: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission opened hearings on the shipment of enriched uranium, and opponents caused a wide review of U.S. nuclear reactor export programme: the Nuclear Commissioners became divided over the decision to ship fuel for Tarapur;

March 1977: Indira Gandhi held national elections and was soundly defeated; 21-month emergency period

was over.

July 1977: Prime Minister Morarj! Desai, against some internal’ opposition. publicly rejects any further bomb development programme, and is somewhat disregarded by scientists who continue to work on the bomb programme. Construction begins on Dhr uva’. a new research reactor, to replace the Canada-India reactor as the source of plutonium for the weapons programme; Desai yields to the Soviet demand that further shipments of heavy water, and the (‘Canadian’) reactor for which it was destined, be pl aced under safeguards.

March-July 1978: U.S. Congress passed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. Morarj! Desai and President Jimmy Carter met in Washington, and discussed weapons. Congress approved President Carter's decision to allow the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ship enriched uranium for the U.S. reactor near Bombay; the U.S. finalises negotiations with France to become a replacement-source for enriched uranium reactor fuel for India.

AND there, in 1978. the enigma rested for 20 years. Everyone knew something was happening, yet ’nothing’ happened. In Perkovich’s words. “The Pokhran blast had put India In a mirror-lined box: the reflection revealed the frailty of India s nuclear capacl ty. and the primacy of other issues" (page 204). During this period officials and scientists knew which Minister was pro-bomb or antibomb. Scientists worked on their bomb objective, surviving occasional budget cuts and administrative changes. They went to extraordinary lengths, and at times devious lengths, to keep their programme going (as with clandestine contracts for heavy water In the 1980s). And some people gradually changed positions, as dramatically so In the case o! socialist

leader George Fer nandes (the Minister of Defence and deeply involved in the 1998 nuclear tests):

after the 1974 tests he wrote (from prison) "And should any government discuss such a proposition (the bomb) seriously without first taking steps to provide all citizens of t he country with food, clothes, shelter, pure drinking water, education, and a chance to live a life befitting human beings, such a government can be called nothing but criminal." In 1998. as Minister of Defence and deeply Involved, he applauded the secon d tests.

During this ensuing period, atomic energy's contribution to the national electrical grid increased only slightly, as reactors came on stream: but this occurred at a great cost, given the delays and shutdowns. The Department of Atomic Energy remained the biggest financier of big science, and a lot of good science done in India, far outside its mandate'. Meanwhile the voice of the Jan Sangh and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). plus voices such as K. Subrahmanyam's waited for their turn. and. as we know . approved a bomb test after their election success In 1996. Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee then cancelled that test just before Parliament's vote of no-confidence. But finally Vajpayee scheduled a nuclear bomb test immediately after their first electoral victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led front in 1998. This electoral victory in March 1998, however, was not attributable to espousal of a pro-bomb policy, but more to issues such as the price of onions. The BJP-led front s re-election in 1999 also mi ght not have occurred but for a conventional war' with Pakistan on the high-altitude border of Kashmir - it is unlikely the 1998 nuclear tests would have had much effect at the electoral level. But the tests did add to an image of a strong India' in th e border clashes using conventional weapons. Is India still In a mirror-lined box'?

As important as the consequences of the 1974 test are, the other question of how the nuclear capabilities were built from the late 1940s by Nehru, Bhabha, and others is more Important for the broad picture of India's history. Perkovich skilfully shows ho w the Atomic Energy Commission gradually built research reactors, plutonium separation plants, uranium fuel rod manufacturing and reprocessing facilities and so on. combining international assistance and domestic

Tobeconunued