***With democracy’s roller coaster ride under the two large political forces during the last nine years, the future is hard to predict. However, democracy’s fortune in Bangladesh at least in the medium term hangs on two strong personalities: Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia. Since they are not even in talking terms, it is not a healthy environment for the democracy to be nurtured effectively.***
F TER the AL assumed government in 1996, it seemed that democracy tn Bangladesh was taking a shape of UK style, having two major political parties and a party with an important third place. One anticipated that this third party (undivided JP) would occupy an important role in making future governments in Bangladesh since the large two parties (AL and BNP) were unlikely to get an absolute majority tn the parliament and govern on their own rights. However. during the last four years things have changed and the wind has taken a turn. If one examines the present day political environment in the country. it is clear that the AL remains as a single largest force and the four-party alliance (BNP. JP Ershad. Jamaat and IOJ) makes the other. At present, the electorate has no choice of a third established force except voting for an independent candidate or candidates from other minor parties. 11 any. It Is unlikely that the left or the centre left force is going to be strong enough to occupy the role of a third force in the near future Here, the alms are to analyse closely the two democratic regimes of Bangladesh since 1991. and to make some observations on democracy’s future.
BNP-led democratically elected government (1991-96)
Almost all pre-election opinion polls in 1991 had suggested that the AL was to win with an absolute majority. But it did not happen and the pollsters proved wrong. The BNP with the support of Jamaat came out as the majority party in the Parliament and formed a government led by Begum Khaleda Zia. Begum Zia's regime was making a good progress in the economic front with an efficient finance minister (Saifur Rahman) at the helm, but her mentors in political front had been making strategical errors one after another. That was. of course, no wrong doing on the part of the BNP's political strategists but their lack of experience on par-liamentary practices. This was
due mainly to the presidential form of government the country was experiencing before 1991. *l£re0Ver’ a 8°°d number of MPs and ministers of Begum Zia s government had served under either General Zia or General Ershads presidential regime between 1977 and 1990. These politicians in 1991 were not only ill equipped for newk found parliamentary governance in Bangladesh but also refused to adapt quickly with such a system. One could recall that although Begum Zia was a Prime Minister but her style of governance followed closely a presidential character.
As seen in the past, the BNP has supported a parliamentary form of governance with reluctance. This was proved true by its actions during 1991-96 period. In the mean time, the AL rightly identified the weaknesses of Begum Zia's regime and was successful in branding Begum Zia as a Prime Minister with presidential style of governance. In her five years rule, she was indifferent to use parliament as the nucleus of nation's politics. This distanced the BNP to an extent from the electorate. Moreover, the BNP's political strategists took some unparliamentary and undemocratic decisions to arrest the opposition's (AL-led) strong movement initially on the issue of rigged by-elections and later on establishing a caretaker government before the general election In 1996. For example, holding a unilateral general election on 15 February 1996 was a suicidal move and is universally accepted as the cause of the BNP's unprecedented defeat in 1996 general election. Uncompromising attitudes of some of the BNP hardliners towards popular demand steered by the AL-led opposition (although with a damaging movement like non-stop hartals) further divorced the BNP from people. In contrast, (he AL took all opportunities from such a shaky ground of the Begum Zia's government and the BNP's half-hearted commitment towards parliamentary democracy The AL's strategy paid off
AL-led democratically elected government (1996 - present)
It was perceived that (he AL-led government would make politics difficult for the BNP after assuming power'In 1996. It has been true to some extent Until now it appears hard for the BNP so that its hardliners forced to form an alliance with two formerly rejected forces (General Ersnad's JP and Go-lam Azam's Jamaat) of the country to wage movement against Sheikh Hasina government. This made the BNP look weak and injured to the eyes of the neutral voters as opposed to BNP's position before 1996 general election. One should not forget that in a democracy the neutral or swing voters make or break a party in power. It is likely that these voters will desert BNP in the 2001 general election due to its electoral alliance with the rejected forces. Once again, the BNP's political strategists perhaps have been making wrong moves.
Under this situation, of course, the winner Is the AL although only in the short run In the long run. this advantage to the AL is not going to bring a healthy democratic environment lor the nation. A weak and Ineffective opposition, like in the past (mid- 1970s and 80s), may seek unconstitutional means to grab power. President Zia's assuming power in 1977 with Pakistani style yes/no vote and with the support of civil politicians from both left and right camps (late Mashiur Rahman and Shah Aziz respectively) is a point in mind. It was highly unlikely that Mashiur or Aziz could ever become part of a government under a par-llamentary form, although they had personal popularity in
(heir local electorate. They were handpicked by Zia to form a political party. The subsequent regime of Genera) Ershad was also a repeat act In 1981 with the support of Kazi Zafar. Shah Moazzam and co. There is no dearth of so called left and right politicians now as well. A weak opposition could make the AL. once again, a target of the conspirators (the Prime Minister alluded to this on 5 June 2000 in a news conference while replying to a question on the issue of tight security in the JS building).
The most recent cases of the fate of the elected governments with a weak opposition can be found in Pakistan and Fiji. In Pakistan. Newaj Sharifs Muslim League made the PPP (second largest force in Pakistan's short-lived democracy) almost redundant in the last days of his regime. In the parliament, Sharif wanted a free ride since Ms Bhutto was thrown out of the country, thanks to the corruption charges against her. The major objective of Sharif was to make the opposition irrelevant, so that he can rule the nation with an iron fist. The Fijian example. on the other hand, is more tragic. A few armed terrorists have robbed the nation of a democratically elected government. One does not suggest that this may happen in Bangladesh However, these events remind us the past conspiracy witnessed by the nation in its early days after liberation. One must not forget that the conspirators are well and alive in the nation.
Therefore, making the large opposition party irrelevant is not a healthy environment to nurture democracy effectively in the long run. The AL govern-
ment must abandon this path If it had in this regard a slightest Intension In mind. One does not have to mention that (his is the only party In the nation that Is proud of Its history and of its former leaders. To preserve its trust and dignity In the eyes of the electorate it must ac-commodate reasonable grievances of the opposition, specially BNP. On the other hand, as far as (he BNP's present role Is concerned, it does not make any sense at this stage of BNP's stature (when they once governed the nation with popular votes) to make an electoral alliance with rejected forces. One should remember that it was the swing voters who unseated BNP in the 1996 general election. It is In no way the BNP can bring them back by making alliance with undemocratic and anti-liberation forces. One may argue that the AL also waged movement against the earlier BNP government taking Jamaat under its fold. Wlille it is true to some extent, but as an opposition leader. Sheikh Hasina never shared a stage with either Go-lam Azam or General Ershad. Moreover, the suggestion of forming a coalition government by Khaleda Zia, General Ershad and Golam Azam after their successful bld In the next general election is ludicrous. One hopes that common sense will prevail in BNP's democratic and pro-liberation forces and make its leader abandon the present course.
What Future?
With democracy's roller coaster ride under the two large political forces during the last nine years, the future is hard to predict. However, democracy's fortune in Bangladesh at least in the medium term hangs on two strong personalities:
Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia. Since they are not even in talking terms. It is not a healthy environment for the democracy to be nurtured effectively. The next general election is only a year ahead. One can expect three possible outcomes from the 2001 general elec lion: I) a second term lor the AL. II) a win for the BNP-led alliance. and ill) a chaos. The Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has expressed that she wants a second term. The way events are unfolding now In the opposition camp It may not be unlikely that the PM's desire is fulfilled. However, it Is not going to be a plain sailing. There are at least two sensitive spots one can Identify which could make or break the AL’s image to the electorate: I) proper handling of the Bangbandhu murder case (keeping watchful eyes on the conspirators and equally not to be provoked by the conspirators) and 11) managing effectively the Greater Dhaka' factor. What is the 'Greater Dhaka' factor? The greater Dhaka (Dhaka City, Narayan-gonj. Manlkgonj. Munshlgonj. Narshingdi and Gazipur) has the nation's 12 per cent parliamentary seats. These are intensely contested by the AL and BNP with low margins and there was a huge swing to the AL In the last election The AL won 17 and the BNP won 18 seats in the 1996 general election. No second greater district In the nation has a neck and neck result like Dhaka. The outcome of these seats will be the litmus test for winning the next election. There are three more greater districts adjoining Dhaka where the nations swing voters live and like Dhaka these are the regions where the elections are fought on national than local issues since they are close to the capital. If the AL can maintain the status quo in these four districts without upsetting swing voters during the next one year, it is likely that the AL will return.
However. Sheikh Hasina rightly Identified recently that there are 35 constituencies where the AL members have been indifferent. For winning a second term the AL cannot afford to become indifferent in
such a large number constituencies In democracy there is a word called "late swing" and the AL Is supposed to know It well from the 1991 outcome
Regarding the second outcome, a win for the BNP-led alliance Is a lesser possibility. Whatever equation Inc BNP has in mind, the electorate is not yet prepared to forget and forgive the anti-liberation and fundamental forces Moreover, the swing voters know it well that any coalition between the BNP. JP Ershad and Jamaat Is not going to last long and will create further Instability in for the nation. Also, the BNP's electoral alliance via a seat sharing formula is of little sense. This will have almost no effect in the short run (2001 general election), however. Is likely to benefit the JP Ershad and the Jamaal In the long run In order to win 2001 election, the alliance must win seats currently held by the AL in Dhaka. Comilla. Mymenslngh and Pabna districts. Under the pre-sent circumstance, it is highly unlikely that the divided JP. Jamaat and IOJ will be able to Inflict the AL any serious blow in these districts with the support of the swing voters. It was possible by the BNP and BNP alone since they held most of those seats once. With the present seat sharing formula with its alliance members, the BNP seems to have sealed that possibility. The BNP political strategists perhaps forgot that under the leadership of a civilian leader. Khaleda Zia. it won a parliamentary election on its own right in 1991. Since it lost the subsequent election, it does not mean that it will never win again on its own right. This is a classic case of low moral after a defeat and the BNP perhaps has been suffering from it. Making alliance is not a solution to a low moral or for that matter winning the next election. The solution lies to face the ruling party face to face in the parliament and also keeping a constant contact with the electorate. Over the last year, the BNP parliamentary members had hardly done any work after boycotting the JS sessions. While in the politics the major objective is to win an election, it is also equally important that when the party faces defeat it must keep itself integrated for the sake of long term gain. The integration in the BNP will be more effective if only it brings nationalist forces under its fold and not by an alliance with indifferent and rejected elements.
Chaos, the third outcome, is not likely to happen if the election is won by either forces with a decisive majority (at least a
margjn of 15-20). Only, a hung parliament or a soft caretaker government witli a polarised EC may invite chaos. This also remains a remote possibility since there will be a presence of strong national and International observers in the election. However, one hopes that the electorate will avoid electing a hung parliament and will act decisively for democracy's sake. In Bangladesh's present political environment a hung parliament can be a recipe for disaster.
Conclusions
To nurture democracy further and to protect the nation against conspiracy, the government needs a strong opposition In the game. The AL government should accommodate and create an environment to bring the opposition BNP bac k to the negotiation table before the next general election. The PM s gesture surrounding the CEC's appointment has been a step to the right direclion The government should keep the process of bringing BNP to a dialogue alive. A genuine Interest on a dialogue will bring trust for both parties from the uncommitted and swing voters. One must accept the reality that the present environment does not permit a face to face dialogue between the heads of AL and BNP However, if an environment can be created within the tenure of the present government to engage the next tier leaders of both forces on a dialogue. the democracy's roller coaster ride In Bangladesh will become a bit smoother. In this regard 'Kibria-Saifur option can be floated again One should remember that there is no last w’ord in politics. The Opposition Leader, therefore, should consider this option again. The ball is in her court now.
Moreover, a huge responsibility rests on the shoulders of the government to avoid history to repeat There must not be any lapses on the security question. It does not need a high intellect at this stage of Bangladesh’s politics to understand that conspiracy may start brewing once again against democracy with the pretext of a w’eak opposition, a deteriorating law and order, and an unworkable parliamentary democracy. To avoid anything untoward to happen again, we hope common sense will prevail with the pragmatic forces of both sides for taking practical steps to give the nation sustained opportunity to enjoy fruits of democracy’ further.
The author works at the Griffith University. Brisbane. Australia.