SMOKING GUNS seem set to scorch slender olive branches in Srl Lanka. The April 22 fall of Elephant Pass, the garrison which guards the northern Jaffna Peninsula, signifies a drastic shift in the military balance in favour of the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the decades of fighting against Srl Lankan security forces.

It also raises serious questions about the direction the proposed peace talks between the rebels and the Government will take. 'The guns' and roses strategy of the Sri Lankan Government which followed the war for peace approach to conflict-resolution has come under its most serious challenge.

Cutting off the well-fortified military complex which sits imposingly on a narrow causeway linking the northern Jaffna Peninsula to the mainland. the LTTE forced a pullout by Government troopers from the base — for the first time In 17 years of the conflict.

From the hit-and-run guerrilla tactics of the '80s and the early '90s. the Tigers moved on to the use of suicide-cadres to bust defence lines and overrun military camps as in the Mul-laltivu (1996) and Klllnochchl (1999) takeovers.

With the conflict gradually escalating during the last few years, the warfare of the Tigers is now based on long-range artillery fire. Especially since late last year’s Vanni debacle.

In November 1999. for instance. when the Vanni offensive commenced, the LTTE moved from the eastern sector of the four Tamil majority districts and. cutting away supply lines, brought Government defence positions within LTTE artillery range. "We pulled out the soldiers to minimise casu-alties." an army officer had

reasoned. Consequently, the Tigers gained considerable territory which took them to Paranthan, Just south of the Elephant Pass garrison, in the second phase of their operations.

The fall of Elephant Pass was always on the cards. Military officers were "prepared for the worst", though there was some scope for optimism that the most-fortified Government position In the entire Island would hold through a rebel on-slauglit.

But. in a changed tactic, the Tigers gained control over Elephant Pass without launching a direct attack on It but by cutting supply lines to the camp from Government-held territory. Isolated from the mainland, the sprawling Elephant Pass complex depended on an eastern sea route and a northern land route for supplies.

Since December 11. the Tigers have been gaining vital positions In Jaffna's soutneast-ern theatre. Rather than taking Elephant Pass head on, the LTTE entered the Jaffna Peninsula through a side-gate — an eastern coastal stretch which would, ultimately, take the Tigers to a position from which they could choke Srl Lanka's strongest military base.

Hovering aboqt on the southeastern theatre and consolidating the arm which links the Peninsula to eastern Mullaitlvu district In a string of operations since March 27, the direction In which the Tigers would move was anyone’s guess. A direct move Into Jaffna, leaving behind Elephant Pass, or a direct thrust on Elephant Pass were among the possibilities. The

Tigers did neither, but cut across a narrow lagoon and took control of a patch of the road between Elephant Pass and Government-held Jaffna territories. Uncertainty prevailed over the Tigers’ next moves: to the north was Jaffna and to the south. Elephant Pass.

The siege of Elephant Pass had well and truly begun. Following the Vanni debacle last year. Srl Lankan security forces had relocated the well-trained 53 Division to the Elephant Pass garrison. Comprising four brigades, this division, which is the main fighting force of the army, was supported by the 54 Division as well as a brigade of the 55 Division.

While a direct attack by the Tigers on Elephant Pass was the most considered scenario, the LTTE clearly had different Ideas. Deploying their conventional strength to the north of the garrison, the Tigers lay hi wait. Gaining control over Vet-Lllalkerni - a key naval supply route for the Army — the Tigers were choking off supply Unes to the Elephant Pass complex. Any direct attack on the Elephant Pass by the Tigers could have been repulsed effectively given the terrain and manpower situation.

While intense fighting took place around Elephant Pass, the Tigers did not attempt an incursion into the Government stronghold. Rather, they trained the focus on lyakachchi, the northern segment of the Elephant Pass complex. which was also a vital logistics base. The Tigers lay In wall north of Elephant Pass giving their prey the option to either vacate or face a mas-

sacre.

Fighting along the road linking the military complex to Government territory further north had severed the army's main supply route. An alternate supply route was opened, but that too was considered more temporary and seen as a passage through which troopers could pull- out.

The LTTE claimed to have seized a haul of military hardware Including five artillery guns - three 152mm guns and two 122 mm guns. The Army boss, however, said that “only one gun was lost to the Tigers* as the other guns were ’disabled" by withdrawing troops. The Army has not ruled out retaking the Elephant Pass complex.

A cross-over point for civilians from the Sri Lankan mainland to northern Jaffna. Elephant Pass gets its name from its pre- colonial days when elephants were used to carry goods across the shallow waters, which have since been bridged by a narrow causeway. This bridge has passed into LTTE control, and changed the military balance. This also raisers several imponderables about the fledging peace process which recommenced with an international effort at brokering talks between the Government and the LTTE in February.

With the Norwegians accepting the challenge of initiating direct talks between the rebels and the Government, attempts are on within Sri Lanka to forge a bipartisan consensus between the sharply opposed political formations — the ruling Peoples Alliance (PA) and the Opposition United National Party ,

(UNP). The differences between the two parties have been the biggest hurdle to peace, and the polarised opinions expressed by the southern parties had, in substantial measure, contributed to the escalation of Tamil demands from greater provincial powers in the 1950s to a full-fledged secessionist aggression during the past two decades.

In this backdrop of a history of scuttled opportunities, the President. Chandrika Kumaratunga. offered a set of comprehensive

constitutional reforms to Parliament in October 1997. The draft proposals aimed at providing greater devolution of powers to the regions and attempted to move away from the unitary nature of the Constitution. Differences between the PA and the UNP on the nature of devolution, however, scuttled the effort and the reforms were, for all purposes, unlmple-mentable as the Government could not go ahead without the required support from the UNP for a two-thirds majority In Parliament.

Bipartisan bickering continued for the past two years, while the LTTE maintained its pressure on the security forces. Commencing with the bombing of the Temple of the Tooth Relic in Kandy — considered to be the most sacred to Buddhists — in January 1998. the Tigers stepped up their attacks on both civilian and Government targets. The assassinations of two Jaffna Mayors. Sarojlni Yo-geswaran (May), who was elected In the Mayoral elections January, and Pou Slvapalan (September), effectively took

the bottom out of the Government's attempts to restore a semblance of civilian authority in the Peninsula. In 1999, the assassination of the renowned Constitutional expert, Neelan Tiruchelvam. dealt a significant blow to the path of peace taken by the Government. The unresolved killing of a Tamil political leader and vocal supporter of the Tigers, Kumar Ponnambalam. in Colombo this January also comes, as a matter of concern for Tamils.

Then the two political formations started bilateral talks on narrowing differences. The thinking behind these talks, which are centering around broadbasing powers in the regions. is to present the Tigers a set of proposals accepted by the Iwo major Sinhala parties.

The next round of bipartisan talks is set to resume on May 5. The UNP leader. Ranil Wick-remesinghe, while confident of continuing talks with the ruling party, sees the latest LTTE gain as giving It considerable “clout" at the bargaining table — if and when talks are held.

Calls for cessation of hostilities. from those who have been pushing the line of talks, to those for a further escalation of the military efforts, from hardliners. mark the Immediate aftermath of the Elephant Pass debacle. A larger question also arises: would the Tigers be keen on talking at all and. if they do. what would their demands be?

Now. more than ever before, as the separatist conflict enters a defining moment with the Tigers knocking at the doors of Jaffna with military might, is the time for Srl Lanka to address in full measure, more jx)-litically than militarily, its decades-long battle for Identities.

Courtesy : The Hindu of India.