The best ways to be a strong state is to build national unity, bridge economic gap, acquire military deterrence capability and cultivate a partnership among the political leaders and groups.

THFEE controversial steps bv Prime Minister Sheikh Haiina - the CHT-accord. an un«n water-treaty with India aid the proposal for transshipment facilities r‘ (he later have spurred the nerceptlm that Bangladesh surely behaved like a soft state* in dealing with Its big nelghbou*. But wait a mlnutd Of late the Indian press has been spiming the same kind of misgiving — is India a soft state"? Only last year, following the military coup there Pakistan was characterized is the ’soft state" — some cvei called It a lalled state But he present anxiety of India acting like a weak stale comes in he backdrop of the Kargtl episode, the deteriorating Kashmir situation and more importantly the hijacking of an Air India plane that ended in New Delhi s dramatic capitulation to the terrorists. All the irajor South Aslan states. India. Pakistan. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka could fit irto the paradigm of soft states proportionate to their respective level of Institutional sltmp. governance crises, escalating domestic conflicts. and their relative unimportance in the global strategic arena.

Which one is softer than the other? And In what respect? Generally speaking, the national states, in recent decades, have been weaker than ever before. and it's not a wringing rhetoric. Indeed, the old concept of omnipotent sovereignty is dwindling, and indeed, the ecology of he statehood itself has been shifting — sovereignty

Is no longer the Holy Grail, and the stale-power is migrating to a variety of non-state institutions.

In I he parlance of international politics, power should match power — a state Is soft when it cannot effectively de lend itself against an invading country or fall to resist diplomatic or economic pressure mounted by an external power, he it a neighbour or a distant state. A successful state should also be able to deal with the centrifugal tendencies within Its border. There Is a kaleidoscope of views about the weakness of the stale apparatus In Bangladesh, wnich could stretch itself from the domestic to the international arena. Whether we like it or not. the future of the CHT may become the litmus lest for Ihe Bangladeshi state-apparatus including the military resources. For those who opposed the CHT deal. Dhaka's hasty acceptance of a New Delhl-brokerea agreement was more In India’s strategic interest, which demonstrated the Bangladeshi weakness before the rebels and India's pressure while the military successfully contained the separatist insurgency.

There are other vital security challenges to be taken into consideration. The military In Bangladesh has withdrawn from politics, but the armed forces’ national security role remains paramount. Without a viable military deterrence, a state hardly Inspires political prestige in the global or regional arena — it becomes a pliable "lamb stale'. 1 am not sug-

gesting that India is planning an Impending attack on Bangladesh, but any future unraveling In the neighbouring Indian (northeastern) states could be a calamitous security threat to Bangladesh, no matter how much of friendship New Delhi might cherish towards the political leadership In Dhaka and Ihe vice versa. Already there are Indian allegations that the separatists from the northeastern states had their sanctuaries Inside Bangladesh although the authorities in Dhaka have denied such charges. It is dangerously simplistic to count on the goodness from across the border, and Ignore the national strategic capacity. Both theoretically and practically, the military Is the ultimate weapon of the state power. Even with a political set tlement in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) being implemented. the porousness of the peace accord periodically reveals itself, but the worst may not have unraveled Itself yet.

1 cannot predict how will the strategic calculations between Bangladesh and India will exactly work — I don't know who can. but by its size, capability and weapon acquisitions, the Indian military is a formidable machine that will grow phenomenally in the next few years to come. Closely related to tills is India s mind-boggling nuclear arsenal — India could eas-

ily bully the smaller non-nuclear countries in the region, and there are lessons to be drawn from the history of asymmetrical equation between the atomic weapon and non-alomlc weapon states. Dimly aware of ils importance, It is frequently argued that Bangladesh, a very poor country. could not afford a substantive military force. More than once, the top leaders were unable lo confirm. In public, if Bangladesh had any long term security planning. Even a perceptively strong slate cannot expect to solve all international disputes (and Internal rebellion) through peaceful means, and when the chips are down the military power becomes the last resort.

As of now. there is no solid International guarantee for the so-called soft states, and the Kuwait example of being saved from a bnital aggresglon Is a rare phenomenon unless the superpowers are Involved. An empowered United Nations, the glooal guardian angel for the smaller nations. Is not anywhere near although some form of global governance through a central planetary authority in the future could not be dismissed out of hand. But let us think of the reality now. Thanks to the unstoppable forces of globalization spreading its tentacles all over the

world, the sovereignty of the small states will. In the years lo come, continue to be In a melting pot, and the traditional po lltical demarcations will be under a threat, some subtle, some abrasive. The future political posture in Bangladesh can only ignore that reality to its peril.

The state-based governance arrangement In Bangladesh, like most other nations, Is being eroded by global political economy. Information technology. and the non-govemmental organizations (NGOs), domestic and international. The Bangladesh government's agenda Is no longer an exclusive expression of the groups and leaders in power — the transnational associations, and the non-state actors frequently claim rights over the head of the traditional governance structure. From time to time. Bangladesh has come In direct confrontation with what has been taken as the donor countries' and funding agencies’ Intervention In domestic politics — Interestingly, both the ruling party and opposition groups nave grumbled against It over a period of time. In such disputes between the NGOs and the government, it Is the Bangladeshi authorities that frequently yield to the non-state institutions, and it is usually a quiet retreat for a poor nation with few leverages.

But a state is also weakened

by a variety of Internal dissensions. and for that the leaders. Intelligentsia and finally the civil society are largely liable. We arc aware of the inflexible bitterness that divides the political parties and their leaders in Bangladesh — a lol is being said and written on this uncompromising battle with no end In sight. But that Is not the only fault line that divides the nation. In some ways It is more disturbing that the civil society in Bangladesh has an ozonelayer size hole In it — and sadly, there is no visible effort to repair it. Seldom will you find a university, school, college, club, professional association, cultural forurn and Intellectual establishment where the members are not only fighting along personal, partisan and factional lines, but they wallow in calling each other ‘enemies’ of Bangladesh, sometimes openly, sometimes tacitly. Few of the important leaders, and not even the members of the intellectual community are coming forward to mend the "We" versus They’ divide, potentially, the most damaging of all the divides in Bangladesh. The nation Is bifurcated by a form of political frisking in the name of nationalism. patriotism and proven or unproven charges where history is used as a tool of fjower and a punishing device

or the opponents. You cannot build a strong state by tainting

numerous people with motivated allegations, nor can you achieve national strength by purveying a notoriously onesided history.

How do you transform a weak state Into a strong one? No single recipe of course! The weak vs. strong differentiation of states is not meant to be a frozen caste system among the nation states — a weak state could conceivably become strong, and the strong state may also become spongy. You could find weak states among the practicing democracies, but the non-democracies are not the best specimen of strong slates either — indeed, they proved to be potentially unstable. Both Bangladesh and Pakistan have made sudden and sharp turns and twists between democracy and military regimes, which made the global community wonder If they were close to the failed statecrafts. In case of Pakistan. In not so distant past, democratic hopes were raised by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharifs assertiveness as an elected leader, but the blazing expectations were douched again when General Pervez Mosharraf fired the elected government and established a military-led non-elected regime. Whatever the military rulers may say or do in order to legitimize their take over, their action has only generated more questions about Pakistan’s future. For more than one reason, it seems that the military has become the ultimate guardian of the state of Pakistan. That may be acceptable to many Pakistanis. but eventually, the mil-

itary-led state is not a strong state. Bangladesh had Ils own share of military regimes, bul that did not necessarily make the state a strong one. Nor do« a state become strong when Its charismatic leader's towering height dwarfs all others; such hypnotic leadership spell Is all but transitory even though one spell may last longer than the other, as we have seen in several countries.

Bangladesh has successfully reinstated the Westminster form of denibcracy. and there are even two strong parties — one balancing the other.

Those are good Indicators ol a working statehood — yet the leaders nave been unable to take advantage of a mutually respectful two-party system. Much to our dismay, the Bangladeshi national parliament is on the brink of an impasse; it's the victim of the tumult and bitter standoff between the ruling party and the opposition The politicization of the civil bureaucracy has a long history in Bangladesh, but that process has recently reached the dizzying depth. As a result, the good governance has taken a back seat. For such a degradation of institutional environment, the political leaders have to shoulder the ultimate responsibility. The best ways to be a strong state is tc build national unity, badge economic gap. acquire military deterrence capability and cultivate a partnership among the political leaders and groups

The writer teaches Political Science at Rowan University. Glassboro. New Jersey. USA.