

Law and Our Rights

"All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law"-Article 27 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh

Judicial Accountability

Only Separation from Executive Can Ensure It

by Dr Shahdeen Malik

If we take the attitude that a court is a good one if it decides in my favour and a bad one if the decision goes against me, then we are on the verge of absolute lawlessness. Such an attitude surely undermines the core notion of the independence of judiciary.

POLITICIANS perhaps need to generate stories to capture newspaper headlines. After all, even a negative coverage in the media is better than no coverage at all. And more absurd the comments, the bigger are the headlines.

Newspapers, in recent weeks, have reported that there were suggestions from very high quarters that since the executive and the parliament are accountable, there was no reason why the judiciary and the press should not also be similarly accountable. The positioning of the issue in such a manner have raised the question of 'judicial accountability.'

This write up is an exercise in speculation. The issue of 'judicial accountability' can not but be discussed only in the realm of speculation because within the four-corners of our Constitution, as far as I understand it, there is no such thing as 'judicial accountability' in the recently projected understanding of the term. But then one could possibly retort that there was no such thing as a 'Caretaker Government' in the Constitution. That is true. Soon after the notion of the Caretaker Government was floated back in 1994, I did write in the columns of this newspaper that for the notion of a Caretaker Government to take shape we needed to amend our Constitution. The resignation of the 147 members of the parliament of AL deprived the Parliament of the constitutional requirement of a minimum of 221 sitting members to vote for an amendment. The election of the 15th February, 1996 did not re-establish the Parliament and after the election there were sufficient members of Parliament to adopt an amendment of the Constitution, though the election was very questionable and dubious. Nevertheless, at least formally, constitutionality was maintained.

I mention the above because it seems to me that the recent issue of 'judicial accountability' can not possibly be explained with the conventional rationality of constitutionalism. That, obviously, does not mean that there can not be a novel concept of 'judicial accountability'. There can be, but to accommodate a novel concept 'judicial

accountability we might have to discard our present notions of legality, constitutionalism and the rule of law.


The judiciary, in the constitutional scheme, does have its own mechanism of accountability as appropriate for this organ of the state. Any deviation or even tinkering with the present and existing concept of such accountability can be achieved only at the cost of the rule of law.

Now, what does 'judicial accountability' mean? And accountable to whom?

At the conventional level, the answer is pretty obvious. Judges like most of us, are not absolutely infallible. They are human beings, after all. Hence, like all human beings, they do and will make mistakes.

However, like any other institution, be it public or private, the judiciary is also subject to its rules and procedures of administration and accountability. A Judge of the subordinate court is recruited by the Public Service Commission, following the standard procedure in such matters. During his tenure, a Judge is subject to all the rules and procedures applicable for a public servant. Therefore, if a Judge of the subordinate judiciary acts in a manner which is contrary to the applicable law and rules, he/she is subject to appropriate steps and measures, like any other public servant. To put it bluntly, if there is an allegation of corruption against a Judge, there is a proper system and procedure for lodging complaint, of investigation of the complaint and further steps as appropriate.

Now, if the highest executive of the country feels that a Judge is tainted by credible allegations of malpractice or is abusing his/her power for undue considerations, there is the well known process of initiating steps to look into such complaints, including the Anti Corruption Act. This, as every one surely knows, is the conven-



Judiciary — accountable to whom?

tional mechanism of 'accountability'. The Constitution provides, in article 116A that "The control (including the power of posting, promotion and grant of leave) and discipline of persons employed in the judicial service including magistrates exercis-

ing judicial functions shall vest in the President and shall be exercised by him in consultation with the Supreme Court."

So, if there is any allegation against any judicial official, is any one preventing the government from initiating appropriate

measures for investigation into such allegations? If not, then is it wise for the chief executive of the country to imply such allegations instead of actually doing anything concrete and specific about it? Though the above Article 116A mentions the President, yet it has to be remembered that the President is under a constitutional obligation to act on the advice of the Prime Minister, i.e. the government. In fact in all matters except two (appointments of the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice) the President is obliged to follow the advice/recommendation of the government.

Similarly, if there is any complaint of wrong doing by a Judge of the Supreme Court, the Constitution provides, in Article 96, for a Supreme Judicial Council, "to inquire into the capacity or conduct of a Judge." If the President has reason to believe a Judge "may have been guilty of gross misconduct" the President may direct the Judicial Council to "inquire into the matter and report its finding..." So, if there is any specific and concrete allegation, let the Supreme Judicial Council be activated.

What else can the complaints be about, which have prompted this hoopla about 'judicial accountability'? Is it about judgements, orders or decrees passed by courts? Well, isn't there provisions for appeal and revision? If any one is unsatisfied with any decision of a court, the law of the land provides for opportunities for appeal and revision. In most litigation, one side does lose and the losing side, it can be safely assumed, is usually unhappy with the outcome. If the government is the losing party in any litigation, there is nothing to prevent it from filing an appeal (including an appeal against granting of a bail) to the next higher court. At the end of the day, however, all the parties

must accept the final order of judgement of the highest court. That is the foundation of the rule of law, of constitutionalism and, in fact, of the very basis of an orderly society. This is reflected in Article 112 of the Constitution which specifically provides "All authorities, executive and judicial, in the Republic shall act in aid of the Supreme Court."

Now the most dangerous implication of the recent claim about 'judicial accountability' could be that the executive authorities are not pleased with some of the judgements of the Court, particularly the Highest Court. If we take the attitude that a court is a good one if it decides in my favour and a bad one if the decision goes against me, then we are on the verge of absolute lawlessness. Such an attitude surely undermines the core notion of the independence of judiciary.

If the judiciary is not in a position to take decisions, based on fact and law alone, then do we need a judiciary at all? Let the executive take all the decisions in all the disputes and ensure that all these decisions are to its liking. Let's forget law and let the arbitrary power prevail! Let the concerned Ministry decide who is guilty and who is not.

We should desist from such exercises if we want to preserve an orderly society whose primary pre-condition is the non-interference of the executive in judicial matters, in any pretext whatsoever. One has to understand that if the judiciary is prevented from taking decisions which are unpalatable to the executive, there is not much point in having a judiciary at all. If we want and need to have an independent judiciary, it must, at all cost, be free to be accountable only to the applicable laws and the Constitution. In fact, to ensure proper accountability which only complete separation of the judiciary from the executive can ensure, the government must take steps, including amendment of the Constitution, to make the judiciary independent from the executive.

The writer is an advocate and Adviser, Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST).

Investigation and Trial of Criminal Offences:

In Quest of Capacity Enhancement

by A. K. Roy

The Court distribution system in our country somewhat is faulty. The number of courts must be proportionate to the number of pending cases. The causes should be sorted out and despite some complexities, some standard based on practical analysis must be evolved to bring reasonable equilibrium in the hierarchy of our court system.

Continued from last week
THE often cited axiom "Justice delayed is denied" sufficiently reflects the essence of speedy and prompt trial. If the trial is delayed, there is a danger that the real culprit may escape justice due to the scattered evidence and that the innocent must suffer unnecessary pains. If the defendant is under detention, the damage is more irrecoverable. Furthermore, delayed trial will deprive the criminal judgment of the deterrent effects on the offender. The sense of retribution loses its significance when the judgement is delivered after a long passage of time. Additionally, delayed trial will increase the number of remand prisoners and cause overcrowding.

It may not be so difficult to seek only the speed of the criminal proceedings. However, slipshod proceedings will not attain the purpose of administering justice. The difficulty lies in the fact that the expeditious trial should be secured without compromising the quality of judgment and the fairness in the process. It goes without saying that delayed trial diminishes largely the attributes of fair justice. In our legal system the delay in the dispensation of justice has been a chronic problem. The back-log of cases in almost all tiers of the judiciary among others is the main cause of delay in the disposal of cases.

The cause of justice many times is defeated or frustrated due to inordinate delay. When justice loses its savour people loses confidence in the judiciary and that is the point where lies the peril of the civilisation. To get speedy trial under the legal dispensation is the constitutional right of the people. It is the foremost duty of the state in democracy to ensure speedy trial and fair justice. Broadly speaking the causes of delay may be summarised under two heads such as court's delay and law's delay.

The reasons and causes of delay are manifold which mainly include heavy caseload on the judges, insufficient number of prosecutors, inappropriate case management, split trial dates, non-appearance of witnesses, non-cooperation of dilatory tactics of defence counsel, absence of specialised courts system, lack of proper co-ordinations among different sections of prosecution, absence of effective mechanism of judging the judges and above all criminal justice system itself. The judges' caseload will decrease if the number of cases is reduced.

Some practical measures can be adopted for functioning quite effectively to reduce burden of the courts. The measures are — (a) Conciliation or mediation — For proper consideration to utilize the Conciliation or

Mediation in the criminal proceedings, 'Court Mediation Centre' as exists in Singapore may be established. Under the supervision of the Court Mediation Centre, mediation may be conducted to deal with minor criminal offences where there is a relationship between parties, and where it is desirable to preserve that relationship; (b) Alternatives to prosecution — like Japan and the Republic of Korea, Bangladesh may have a system called 'Suspension of Prosecution' whereby under particular circumstances, the public prosecutors have the discretion not to institute prosecution even if there is sufficient evidence to sustain prosecution. This system may be introduced to alleviate the over-crowding problems in prisons. It may function as a rehabilitation measure for a suspect to facilitate his reintegration into society; (c) Traffic infractions — minor traffic violations may proceed under the traffic infraction system. A person who commits a traffic offence may be given a notice by the police to pay a non-penal administrative fine. Failure to pay the infraction money may be a pre-requisite for criminal prosecution.

Summary procedure may help relieve the courts' workload and possible burden on the parties if their cases are brought to trial and if fines are imposed as punishment in minor crimes. Pre-trial Conference may be adopted in criminal proceedings where prosecution and defence may be urged to disclose their respective cases as well as evidences and may be urged to agree on facts which are not in dispute. In this way, the courts as well as both the parties can identify real factual and legal issues and will have reasonable prospect for the trial and there is also a likelihood that in the course of the process, the accused may plead guilty when faced with the prosecution's case and evidence. Moreover, the last minute proposal for a witness examination may be avoided.

Time limit also plays effective role to avoid the delay of criminal trial. A restriction of the detention period serves considerably to avoid delay of criminal proceeding. In this regard section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 is an effective provision. Providing a time limit for completing trial is a more straightforward method to a speedy trial and in this respect repeated provisions of section 339C of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 may

be restored with necessary amendments. Modification of rules of evidence may be done. Strict rules of evidence may be amended to widen the admissibility to some kinds of evidence in the trial process. For instance, under the current Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, in Bangladesh, the confession of an accused before an investigator is not admissible in court. Similarly, finger prints and blood samples obtained at the investigation stage are not admissible in trial proceedings.

Nonetheless, in the light of technological advancement, such evidence is quite useful exonerating suspicious but innocent person and confirming the identification of a suspect. It seems quite clear that if such evidence acquires the qualification to be proffered in the court-

To overcome the prevailing situation the Supreme Court may take initiative in concert with the government efforts and undertake comprehensive programme for updating the judiciary, raising efficiency and improving judicial skill to ensure fair and speedy justice. The judges, magistrates and prosecutors must be given proper training about judicial norms and standard untrammelled by unnecessary time consuming exercise and rigid technicalities.

room, the trial process would be expedited to a considerable degree.

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to speak about the new cases coming to the scenario. This is the position only with Dhaka.

Frequent adjournments of hearings granted by the courts and non-production of witness are among other causes of delay.

In most cases lawyers are in the habit of dragging the cases by taking adjournment after adjournment. Some courts are over burdened by case-load. Sometimes hearings are unnecessarily prolonged mostly by irrelevant talks and arguments. The task of the judges is undoubtedly arduous requiring

facts. Law does not approve of taking irrelevant lengthy evidence and writing of unnecessary lengthy judgment. Similarly improper recording of evidence and writing slip-shod judgments are also not permissible. The whole adjudicatory process requires adequate knowledge of law, strong sense of proportion, and dutifulness, integrity, skill in the art of writing judgment on the part of the judges. Keeping regard to all these aspects, the process of recruitment of judges in all tiers of our legal system must be fairly sound.

In a country of 120 million

people, the question of decentralisation, restructuring, and remodelling the judiciary is not a mere slogan but a dire necessity. We must think in the practical concept of the things keeping in view regard to the question of welfare of the people. As regards the composition of our Supreme Court with Appellate and High Court Division some positive thoughts may be given on the question whether a full fledged separate Supreme Court and three or four separate High Courts located at Dhaka, Chittagong, Jessore and Rangpur with more number of judges to each in a month's a year basis. If the number of disposal goes in this proportion 23 courts of sessions will require 10 years to dispose of this 8430 pending cases not

in 20 to 23 at Dhaka.

Number of pending cases increased from 4915 of the year 1995 to 8430 at the end of 1997. The increase in the number of courts was 15% and that of pending cases was more than 80%. In 1996 the disposal came down to 775 from 806 of the previous year and in 1997 the disposal however increased to 875. The disposal did not increase proportionately with the increase in the pending figures.

On average each court disposed of 38 sessions cases in 1997 that means each court disposed of roughly 4 cases in each month.

As the courts enjoy one month vacation in a year the calculation has been sown on 11 months a year basis.

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