***(The Daily Star is serialising extracts from the book through exclusive contract with University Press Limited (UPL), publisher of its Bangladesh edition).***

TWO macro-level challenges which Bangladesh faced immediately after coming into existence were, domestically to ensure politico-economic consolidation, and to again international recognition for its sovereign existence. The problems of domestic consolidation and development were daunting. The traditionally neglected economy of Bangladesh was in shambles aggravated by military repression and the liberation war. Most of the capital and foreign exchange resources of the country, both governmental and private, had been taken away by the West Pakistan authorities. Whatever little industrial activity was there had come to a complete standstill. Most of the West Pakistani owners had fled to West Pakistan or elsewhere and the labour force had Joined the freedom struggle. The Pakistani authorities had taken away all the aircraft and ships which serviced Bangladesh. The Pakistan army had systematically destroyed ports, bridges, roads, railway lines and telecommunication facilities, ruining the infrastructure of Bangladesh economy completely. The army had gone to the extent of even destroying school and university buildings and irrigation channels.

Bangladeshis constituted only a negligible minority of the armed forces and civil services of Pakistan. Many of them were still in the process of deciding on their future as to which State they should choose to serve. This was specially so in the case of some of the civilians. Bangladeshi armed forces personnel were under suspicion from the beginning of the liberation war itself, regardless of their personal inclinations. Those who were in Bangladesh opted for the liberation war and others who were in West Pakistan or abroad were still uncertain about what to do. Three Pakistan foreign service officers of Bangladeshi origin, who later rose to high positions in Bangladesh foreign office and illustrated this dilemma, were Ambassadors K M Kaisar and Panni, the then First Secretary or Counsellor of the Pakistani embassy in China. Farookh Sobhan. Kaisar, Panni and Sobhan decided to leave the Pakistan foreign service only after the liberation of Bangla-desh. All the three served as ambassadors of Bangladesh in later years with Sobhan rising to be the Foreign Secretary in which position he served between 1995 surd 1997. The point to note is that the new Government of Bangladesh, apart from building political institutions had to find personnel for all the branches of public services. To

eration was undertaken by the Soviet Navy. The Food Corporation of India opened a branch office as part of India's diplomatic mission in Dhaka with field offices in different parts of Bangladesh to ensure adequate food distribution.

A high level economic task force was creat.ed by Mrs. Indira Gandhi under the chairmanship of DP Dhar to oversee the extensive cooperation programme. Members of this team were Sukhamoy Chakravarty. Member of the Planning Commission, and Ashok Mitra. Economic Advisor to the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance. This work was coordinated at the official level by R D Sathe, Joint Secretary. Peter Sinai, Director, and two Deputy Secretaries. Kuldip Sahdev and Mani Shankar Iyer. All these foreign service officers rose to high positions in Indian diplomatic service in later years. Sathe ended up as Foreign Secretary and Mani Shankar Iyer transcended the Civil Service to become a leading Congress Member of Parliament. Two other officials who dealt with the political and administrative side of relations with Bangladesh and coordinated the work were M K Rasgotra and KPS Menon. Joint Secretaries in the new Territorial Division dealing with Bangladesh. Both of them later distinguished themselves as Foreign Secretaries of India.

Mrs Gandhi also agreed that a brigade of Indian troops should move out to Cox's Bazar. The brigade was to establish its headquarters at Cox's Bazar and undertake final mopping up operations against the remnants of the Pakistani troops in the region and along the Bangladesh-Burma border. Brig Pandey moved down to Cox's Bazar with a full brigade which had been controlling Dhaka and its surrounding areas in the aftermath of the surrender.

It may be worthwhile at this stage to analyse Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's personality and his mindset as I discerned them in the first year of my assignment in Dhaka. I feel this is relevant to understand the drift of events between January. 1972 and August. 1975 ultimately leading to his tragic assassination along with his family and several of his close associates. The political background of Mujibur Rahman from his youthful years merits recall. He was a student of the Islamia College at Calcutta in pre-partition days. He was an active member of the Youth Wing of the All India Muslim League in mid-forties. He was a follower of Fazlul Huq and Hosseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy. two great leaders of the Muslim League Movement in Bengal. Even in his youth, he was a charismatic leader and an outstanding public orator. However, his oratory was more effective in arousing emotion and intense passion rather than being an exercise in reasoning with or educating the public. He emerged as the foremost leader of the young in the Muslim League in East Pakistan. In the immediate aftermath of T the;partition Jie started getting disillusioned with the attitude of nis west Pakistani compatriots. While being committed to Pakistan, he also had an intense sense of Bengali identity in terms of language and culture. Mohammed Ali Jinnah's declaration of Urdu alone being the national language of Pakistan, without giving due status to Bengali, within a year of partition was the beginning of his disenchantment. Jinnah's death and Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination followed by the shabby manner in which East Pakistani leaders who became heads of government and State in Pakistan (Suhrawardy, Nazimuddin and Mohammed Ali Bogra) were treated by West Pakistani political circles and civil service establishment accentuated nis sense of alienation. The brutal manner in which the Bengali language movement was suppressed by federal Pakistan culminating in the shooting of East Pakistani students on February 21, 1952 radically transformed his political thinking and orientation. He still believed in the legitimacy and the unity of Pakistan but, by the early 1950s, he had come to a clear concluslonTha® Pakistan's survival-as one country can only be guaranteed by East Pakistanis getting an . appropriate share in tnepowebstructure of the country. Equally the linguistic and ethno-culturaj identity of the East Pakistanis I needed- to be given due recognition in the institutional and political organisations of the Pakistani State. The feeling of alienation only increased with the advent of Field Marshal Ayub Khan's military regime in Pakistan. The phenomenon of exploitation and discrimination of East Pakistan was deeply felt by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman which first led to his demand for decentralisation and, ultimately, autonomy (the six-point programme). The last straw was the denial of Prime Ministership of Pakistan despite his winning a clear majority in the first ever democratic elections held in Pakistan. That this denial was backed up by brutally coercive military action, led to his demand for and declaration of independence. By the late 1950s and early 1960s Mujibur Rahman had emerged as the charismatic leader of East Pakistan and the foremost articulator of all Bangladeshis' aspirations.

It is the next phase of his life, especially the eleven months of incarceration in West Pakistan and his trial and sentence to death for high treason which profoundly affected his mindset. The sense of let down at not being allowed his due despite a favourable electoral verdict and the military suppression embittered him against the Pakistani military establishment. Even more profound was the frustration at not being able to lead the liberation struggle of Bangladesh throughout 1971 while his junior colleagues managed the liberation struggle and brought it to a successful culmination. He felt cheatedof the historical role that he believed he was destined to play. The consequence was a sub-conscious resentment against leading members of his own political party, the Awami League, who constituted the Mujibnagar Government. This resentment ultimately found open expression in the manner in which he treated Nazrul Islam. Tajuddin, Kamaruzzaman and Mansoor Ali, Senior Awami League figures, who constituted the Mujibnagar Government and who led the liberation war at the political and strategic levels. {Continued)

compound the problem there were segments of pro-Pakistani elements in .Bangladesh including supporters of Pakistan with the capacity to generate internal violence and disturbance. 1

The most critical development was that groups of Pakistani army stragglers, having escaped to South eastern parts of Bangladesh? had set up base camps around Cox's Bazar and in the Chittagong Hill Tracts to carry out subversive activities. There was also a shortage of food supplies and basic health facilities. Mujibur Rahman sent three requests to Mrs Indira Gandhi immediately after assuming charge. He desired Indian personnel with experience in district administration to come and serve in Bangladesh on deputation for a period of three to six months till Bangladeshi civil servants could replace them. The second message was that a part of the Indian armed forces should remain in Bangladesh for about a year more to neutralise pockets of anti-Bangladeshi resistance within the country. He particularly desired, the deployment of Indian troops in Chittagong Hills to mop up the remnants of the Pakistani army trying to consolidate themselves there. The third request was that India should render across the board economic assistance and help create a Bangladeshi national airlines and shipping. He desired that India undertake the repair of main roads, bridges and railway communications. India was prompt in responding to these requirements. A number of Indian Administrative Service Officers were deputed to Bangladesh to carry on district administration and to manage essential supplies and food distribution. India handed over two ships and two Fokker Friendship aircraft to Bangladesh for the establishment of Bangladesh's commercial airlines and shipping lines. These ships and aircraft were offered to Bangladesh as gifts but Mujibur Rahman desired to purchase them on long-term credit with no interest. This was in keeping with his sense of self-respect for his country. India agreed to this suggestion. Indian military and railway engineers were deputed to restore surface transport communications. The Indian Navy was assigned to clear the Chittagong Port of mines laid by Pakistan.

The technically more difficult aspect of mine clearing operation was undertaken by the Soviet Navy. The Food Corporation of India opened a branch office as part of India's diplomatic mission in Dhaka with field offices in different parts of Bangladesh to ensure adequate food distribution.

A high level economic task force was creat.ed by Mrs. Indira Gandhi under the chairmanship of DP Dhar to oversee the extensive cooperation programme. Members of this team were Sukhamoy Chakravarty. Member of the Planning Commission, and Ashok Mitra. Economic Advisor to the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance. This work was coordinated at the official level by R D Sathe, Joint Secretary. Peter Sinai, Director, and two Deputy Secretaries. Kuldip Sahdev and Mani Shankar Iyer. All these foreign service officers rose to high positions in Indian diplomatic service in later years. Sathe ended up as Foreign Secretary and Mani Shankar Iyer transcended the Civil Service to become a leading Congress Member of Parliament. Two other officials who dealt with the political and administrative side of relations with Bangladesh and coordinated the work were M K Rasgotra and KPS Menon. Joint Secretaries in the new Territorial Division dealing with Bangladesh. Both of them later distinguished themselves as Foreign Secretaries of India.

Mrs Gandhi also agreed that a brigade of Indian troops should move out to Cox's Bazar. The brigade was to establish its headquarters at Cox's Bazar and undertake final mopping up operations against the remnants of the Pakistani troops in the region and along the Bangladesh-Burma border. Brig Pandey moved down to Cox's Bazar with a full brigade which had been controlling Dhaka and its surrounding areas in the aftermath of the surrender.

It may be worthwhile at this stage to analyse Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's personality and his mindset as I discerned them in the first year of my assignment in Dhaka. I feel this is relevant to understand the drift of events between January. 1972 and August. 1975 ultimately leading to his tragic assassination along with his family and several of his close associates. The political background of Mujibur Rahman from his youthful years merits recall. He was a student of the Islamia College at Calcutta in pre-partition days. He was an active member of the Youth Wing of the All India Muslim League in mid-forties. He was a follower of Fazlul Huq and Hosseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy. two great leaders of the Muslim League Movement in Bengal. Even in his youth, he was a charismatic leader and an outstanding public orator. However, his oratory was more effective in arousing emotion and intense passion rather than being an exercise in reasoning with or educating the public. He emerged as the foremost leader of the young in the Muslim League in East Pakistan. In the immediate aftermath of T the;partition Jie started getting disillusioned with the attitude of nis west Pakistani compatriots. While being committed to Pakistan, he also had an intense sense of Bengali identity in terms of language and culture. Mohammed Ali Jinnah's declaration of Urdu alone being the national language of Pakistan, without giving due status to Bengali, within a year of partition was the beginning of his disenchantment. Jinnah's death and Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination followed by the shabby manner in which East Pakistani leaders who became heads of government and State in Pakistan (Suhrawardy, Nazimuddin and Mohammed Ali Bogra) were treated by West Pakistani political circles and civil service establishment accentuated nis sense of alienation. The brutal manner in which the Bengali language movement was suppressed by federal Pakistan culminating in the shooting of East Pakistani students on February 21, 1952 radically transformed his political thinking and orientation. He still believed in the legitimacy and the unity of Pakistan but, by the early 1950s, he had come to a clear concluslonTha® Pakistan's survival-as one country can only be guaranteed by East Pakistanis getting an . appropriate share in tnepowebstructure of the country. Equally the linguistic and ethno-culturaj identity of the East Pakistanis I needed- to be given due recognition in the institutional and political organisations of the Pakistani State. The feeling of alienation only increased with the advent of Field Marshal Ayub Khan's military regime in Pakistan. The phenomenon of exploitation and discrimination of East Pakistan was deeply felt by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman which first led to his demand for decentralisation and, ultimately, autonomy (the six-point programme). The last straw was the denial of Prime Ministership of Pakistan despite his winning a clear majority in the first ever democratic elections held in Pakistan. That this denial was backed up by brutally coercive military action, led to his demand for and declaration of independence. By the late 1950s and early 1960s Mujibur Rahman had emerged as the charismatic leader of East Pakistan and the foremost articulator of all Bangladeshis' aspirations.

It is the next phase of his life, especially the eleven months of incarceration in West Pakistan and his trial and sentence to death for high treason which profoundly affected his mindset. The sense of let down at not being allowed his due despite a favourable electoral verdict and the military suppression embittered him against the Pakistani military establishment. Even more profound was the frustration at not being able to lead the liberation struggle of Bangladesh throughout 1971 while his junior colleagues managed the liberation struggle and brought it to a successful culmination. He felt cheatedof the historical role that he believed he was destined to play. The consequence was a sub-conscious resentment against leading members of his own political party, the Awami League, who constituted the Mujibnagar Government. This resentment ultimately found open expression in the manner in which he treated Nazrul Islam. Tajuddin, Kamaruzzaman and Mansoor Ali, Senior Awami League figures, who constituted the Mujibnagar Government and who led the liberation war at the political and strategic levels. {Continued)