

South Asia— High Stakes, Hardening Positions

Diplomacy fails to make any significant headway on the Kargil front. Sukumar Muralidharan writes from New Delhi

FEW people expected the meeting between Jaswant Singh and Sartaj Aziz, Foreign Ministers of neighbouring countries which stood on the brink of full-scale hostilities, to produce any dramatic initiatives. And the outcome in New Delhi on June 12 was very much as expected. There were no efforts to contrive a scene of cordiality for the media, none of the customary exchange of courtesies. The atmosphere bristled with hostility as the two Ministers stated their respective positions and parted ways, each to brief the media separately on what had clearly been a futile effort at dialogue.

Earlier, India had rebuffed repeated suggestions from Pakistan that talks represented the only means to defuse the sharpening conflict in the Kargil region. An initial offer from Sartaj Aziz to visit on June 7 was spurned, before the Indian government indicated that June 12 would be a convenient date. The acerbic tone was unmistakable. India's official spokesman was at pains to underline that there was neither a request being made nor an invitation being extended. Rather, the intimation was only of India's "convenience".

Pakistan's ardour for negotiations was transparent in its motivations — to broaden the terrain of discussions, to utilise the vantage heights it had gained in the mountains around Kargil to prise open the long-settled question of the disposition of Jammu and Kashmir. India's disdain was in these terms entirely predictable and understandable. The early reckoning was that international public opinion had tilted India's way quite decisively, giving it the moral ascendancy in diplomatic engagements with its truculent neighbour.

The US State Department spokesman had early on recognised that the Kargil events spoke of a qualitatively new type of military engagement by Pakistan-aided insurgents. Infiltration through the porous terrain along the Line of Control (LoC) had been a common occurrence, but for the insurgents to take a position and seek to hold it on the Indian side was entirely new. Posed in this fashion, the problem admitted of only one solution — that the Pakistan-aided intruders should fall back where they came from.

The US Ambassador in India then proceeded to quash all thoughts of international mediation in the issue, insisting that it was for India and Pakistan to resolve the matter between themselves. With no effort at subtlety, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary was then quoted as saying that the country would feel free to use "any weapon" in its arsenal in order to defend territory that it legitimately regarded as its own. Although the government subsequently insisted that this had been a wrongful attribution, the


dimensions of the Pakistani strategy were clear enough by then. In the Pakistani narrative, the events in Kargil were of apiece with a 10-year long history of insurgency in the State of Kashmir. India alone bore responsibility for the escalation of the conflict by bringing in its Air Force and heavy artillery. The logic of the conflict meant inevitably that the newly acquired nuclear expertise in the region would become a factor to reckon with at some point of time. This made it incumbent on the international community to intervene to cool down matters first and then address the underlying causes of tension in the region. The global response to this rather crude move was tepid at best.

Nuclear weapons have gone so far beyond the pale of legitimacy that defence analysts worldwide have not as yet begun to factor it into calculations on the potential scope of the current conflict. Rather, what has been accepted as the legitimate basis for negotiations in the current context is the military line of control between India and Pakistan.

In this respect, Pakistan's initial effort was to question the clarity of demarcation of the LoC. When this manoeuvre failed, Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz entered the qualification that there was a difficulty in reconciling the demarcation on the map with the actual realities of a terrain dominated by sheer peaks and ridges. By early June, Pakistan's international standing had clearly taken a beating. All hopes of a favourable response were scuppered when Bruce Reidel, the US President's special assistant for national security with responsibility for the region, lent his authority to the demand that Pakistan pull back its raiders before any further progress could be achieved.

The conspicuous tilt in international public opinion stiffened India's determination not to open negotiations without its minimum condition being met. By June 8, there was a slight relaxation in this posture. That this was more formal than substantive was underlined by Jaswant Singh's own intervention in the matter on June 11.

Rarely has a government engaged in border skirmishes that threaten to explode into full-scale hostilities released sensitive intelligence material in its possession, least of all when it involves the chief of staff of the opposing army and one of his principal aides. Questions remain about the source of the transcripts that Jaswant Singh released on June 11, conversations between the Chief of Staff of the Pakistani Army, General Pervez Musharraf, and his Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant-General Mohammad Aziz. But apart from a rather feeble effort by Pakistan's in-



Old, but still working ...

formation Minister Mushahid Hussain and the fine technical point drawn by Sartaj Aziz about the inadmissibility of tape-recordings as evidence, there has been no convincing rebuttal of their authenticity. On the face of things, the two transcripts seem to lend support to the early reading put forward by Jaswant Singh. Minister George Fernandes, the Pakistani Government and its Intelligence (ISI) Directorate are innocent of culpability in the Kargil affair. But in Jaswant Singh's hands, the evidence that Fernandes had enigmatically referred to on occasion acquired a whole new thrust.

While Fernandes had used it to absolve the civilian establishment, Jaswant Singh used it as an accusation. This establishes beyond doubt the involvement and complicity of the Pakistani establishment in this misadventure... It raises doubts about the brief that Minister (Sartaj) Aziz carries and at whose dictates he is actually working. Jaswant Singh's references were clearly to the directions that Lt-Gen. Aziz thought it appropriate to convey to the Foreign Minister, as revealed in the transcript of his conversation with General Musharraf on May 29. "In short, the recommendation for Sartaj Aziz Sahab is that he should make no commitment in the first meeting on military situation. And he should not even accept ceasefire, because if there is ceasefire then vehicles will be moving."

Public utterances from the Pakistani military command hierarchy have revealed that the strategic purpose behind the Kargil incursion may be to cut off logistical support for Indian troops stationed in the Siachen region. Lt-Gen. Aziz's rather blunt "recommendation" to his government underlines these provocative statements by Brigadier Rashid Qureshi of Pakistan's Directorate of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR).

Curiously, the Kargil operations have led to some public disquiet in Pakistan over the army seeking to dictate terms to the civilian government. Asad Durrani, a retired Lieutenant-

General and former ISI Director-General, sought to set at rest these apprehensions in an article in *The Nation* (July 12): "We must have faith in our military brass, that they would not land the political leadership in last-minute trouble for temporary gains. And by the way, it is time that we started believing that the military in Pakistan (is) firmly under political control... Frankly, does it really matter who's in charge in Kargil, as long as it serves our purpose, and as long as we can get away with saying what suits us the best?"

Jaswant Singh's dramatic disclosures of June 11 focussed attention rather ruthlessly on this cleavage in Pakistan's apparatus of governance between the military command and the elected civilian establishment. They also served as advance intimation that the Foreign Minister of Pakistan as also the government he represented enjoyed little freedom to negotiate with India. In making these points Jaswant Singh also went further. The bodies of six Indian Army personnel who had disappeared while on a patrol mission on May 14 were returned to India on June 9. Initial examination revealed that all the bodies bore torture marks. On June 11, Jaswant Singh had the autopsy reports with him, which confirmed, in his words, "that the soldiers were tortured and then shot at close quarters". "Such conduct," said the Indian Foreign Minister, "is not simply a breach of established norms, or a violation of international agreements; it is a civilisational crime against all humanity; it is a reversion to barbaric medievalism."

ISPR in Pakistan was quick with its denials. It was simply inconceivable, said a military spokesman, that the Pakistan Army would return the bodies of soldiers killed in action; if they bore the incriminating evidence of torture. But in the heightened climate of suspicion and unease about the Pakistan Army's determination to set the agenda in the neighbourhood, these proved rather unconvincing. Rather, the impression only gained ground that the Pakistan Army had provocatively chosen the moment to

An Effective Game Plan

By creating a serious military problem for India in Kargil without "its direct involvement", Pakistan believes that it has played a winning card.

Amit Baruah writes from Islamabad.

TO take such action as will defreeze Kashmir problem, weaken India's resolve and bring her to a conference table without provoking a general war. However, the element of escalation is always present in such struggles. So, whilst confining our action to the Kashmir area we must not be unmindful that India may in desperation involve us in a general war or violate Pakistan territory where we are weak. We must therefore be prepared for such a contingency."

Directive from President Ayub Khan to General Mohammad Musa, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, on August 29, 1965, quoted in *A History of the Pakistan Army* by Brian Cloughley (Oxford University Press, 1999). Not much seems to have changed in the 34 years since Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar in 1965 by sending "hired Mujahids" and regular soldiers to take over Kashmir. The aims and objectives laid down by Ayub Khan seem to remain in place. This is evident from what India now experiences in Kargil. The start of the Foreign Secretary-level dialogue in April-May 1997, Pakistan's objective has been clear. The Kashmir issue, along with matters of peace and security, came to the fore in the agenda agreed upon for discussion in June 1997 in Islamabad.

However, it was part of a composite dialogue process, a part of the "two plus six" round of discussions in October 1998 between the Foreign Secretaries must have made it clear to Pakistan that India would not yield on the Kashmir issue. In fact, India made it clear that the first confidence-building measure Pakistan needed to undertake was to stop pushing infiltrators across the Line of Control (LoC).

Pakistan's decision to send in hundreds of infiltrators in the Kargil-Drass sector was part of a plan to put the spotlight on Kashmir and simultaneously, undermine the LoC as a frontier that had basically

held good during the last 27 years. Pakistan needs to remember that only borders are properly demarcated; not a ceasefire line which was turned into an LoC. Pakistan's interest in securing the involvement of the United Nations in demarcating the LoC on the ground is obviously a part of its propaganda tactics.

As Brian Cloughley, a writer sympathetic to Pakistan, points out in his book on the "Pakistan Army: The Delimitation of the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir Resulting from the Cease Fire of 17 December 1971 in Accordance with the Simla Agreement of 2 July 1972 is an 'unambiguous' document. "Its territorial precision is remarkable," writes Cloughley, whose book reflects the access granted to him by the Pakistan Army.

According to Cloughley, it contains these descriptions: "The Line of Control runs from NR 313861 to NR 316865, thence to NR 319867, thence EAST to NR 322868, thence NE to NR 331872, thence to a monument on ridge line at NR 336874 approximately 500 yards SE of Point 10008 (NR 3387), thence to a point NR 338881 on the Nullah such that point NR 338874 and point NR 338881 are connected by a radius of 500 yards, thence NE to junction..."

Cloughley admits that the only point that was not precise was what happened after NJ 9842. At the time of delimitation, Indian and Pakistani officers agreed that "anyone who wanted to lay claim to ice, snow and rocks was welcome to them." At some stage during the India-Pakistan composite dialogue, the Pakistani establishment realised that this process would not benefit it on the Kashmir front. It became clear that India's real interest was in trade and a general improvement in relations, and that as far as Kashmir was concerned, it simply wanted an end to infiltration.

In contrast, Pakistan's policy of bleeding India, executed

first by President Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s in Punjab, and then in Kashmir, and later by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the intelligence agencies, is a constant; the Pakistani establishment has never envisaged a change in this. Clearly, India must continue to pay for aiding the formation of Bangladesh. Kargil is the new front where Indian soldiers must pay with their lives, apart from the serious loss of face for New Delhi. Pakistan's game plan is simple and has been executed excellently in military terms. AP Nawaz Sharif with Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff, Gen. Pervez Musharraf.

The Lahore Declaration is today not worth the paper it is written on if Nawaz Sharif has indeed been kept in the dark by his Army with regard to the current situation in Kargil, then he must distance himself from it. At the very least, he should replace Gen. Pervez Musharraf as the Chief of the Army Staff. (Gen. Jehangir Karamat was given the marching orders in October 1998 by Nawaz Sharif for criticising civilian authorities.) In the absence of such a move, it must be construed that the Pakistani military and political establishments are, for all practical purposes, working in tandem.

By creating a serious military problem for India in Kargil without its "direct involvement", Pakistan believes that it has played a winning card. Unlike Operation Gibraltar, the mercenary militants are in a good position to pick off Indian soldiers. The joy over Indian losses is apparent from a remark made by Gen. Musharraf to Lt. Gen. Mohammad Aziz, his Chief of General Staff, during a telephone conversation on May 29, the transcript of which has been released by India. A portion of the transcript goes as follows: "Aziz Sahab (Sartaj Aziz) has discussed with me, and my recommendation is that dialogue option is always open. But in their first meeting, they must give me understanding or no commitment on ground situation." True to the

brief given by Lt. Gen. Aziz, Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, who was in India to hold talks, made no commitment on the ground situation in Kargil. Sartaj Aziz stuck to the brief "given" to him by the Army.

The Foreign Minister took the position that it was India which had escalated the conflict situation by resorting to air and artillery strikes; and that expert-level talks between the two countries would be possible only if India turned down the heat. Clearly, Pakistan wants to sustain the crisis in Kargil as long as possible. In such a situation, where Pakistan's links with the mercenary militants stand confirmed by the phone conversation between Lt. Gen. Aziz and his Chief, there seems little to talk about between the two countries. All those Indians who sincerely believe in the need for better relations with Pakistan must be afflicted with a feeling of being let down. A parallel and India track was continuing even as Vajpayee's bus rolled up to stop before Nawaz Sharif at Wagah on February 20. The Lahore-Delhi bus diplomacy remains confined to the status of bus diplomacy.

While Pakistan has played its cards well on the military front, its hopes for diplomatic success in the international arena have been belied. The United States has called for a return of those who have crossed the LoC; there has been no "emergency meeting" of the U.N. Security Council envisaged by Pakistan. Despite the failure of the Sartaj Aziz-Jaswant Singh talks, Pakistan will, in all probability, remain interested in continuing a "dialogue" with India on Kashmir as long as it can use the Kargil lever. And for now, Islamabad has nothing to gain by undoing the Kargil intrusion. And, it has demonstrated conclusively that the Pakistani establishment is not to be trusted and is manned by the masters of double-speak.

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Better 'Net' Than Never

As Bhutan leaves behind a history of self-imposed isolation and joins the world of television and the Internet, social change is inevitable, Thujil Lhamu writes


"THE net is an open platform where intelligent ideas can be discussed," says Dr Eric Loo, Head of the Graduate School of Journalism at the University of Wollongong (UOW) and a lecturer for Online Journalism. "It empowers the Bhutanese to put forward their ideas and be part of discussions taking part around the world. There is greater interaction between people on the net and it has, today, become an increasingly used social tool."

For a country practically cut off from the rest of the world, the Internet will prove to be a valuable research tool, giving Bhutanese access to diverse information from a library of worldwide resources.

Like other countries linked to the Internet, Bhutan's tourism and lodging music and movie industries are areas that would benefit from the exposure brought on by television and the Internet.

The Internet will also help counter the anti-Bhutan propaganda posted on various international websites — a contentious issue among Bhutanese students overseas.

David Blackall, television producer and lecturer at UOW, says that television as a powerful medium with a wide reach can be an effective tool to showcase Bhutan's rich culture and traditions. "The Bhutanese can show the world the beauty of their country in their terms, through their eyes, instead of foreigners coming in and doing it for them," he said.



New learners showing eagerness

Recent high school massacre in Colorado, where two classmates gunned down their fellow students leaving 17 dead and 25 injured, has sparked debates about the dangers of television and forced policy makers to action. Knowledge that television, the Internet and violent video games do lead to violent streaks.

An article by psychiatrist Dr Brandon Centrewall in the *American Journal of Epidemiology*, says that violence in South Africa rose by 130 per cent after the introduction of television. He further estimated that half the homicides in America are related to violent television exposure.

Television is a powerful medium because the use of sound and visuals portrays emotions which people can relate to realistically. Mr Blackall said.

"Most often families watch television together in an environment of false security and that's when people are most vulnerable. The seductive images of American culture can penetrate the family unit and people can be manipulated without being aware of it."

The greatest risk is perhaps the over-exposure of children to violence leading them to become insensitive to the violence around them.

A study by the American Psychological Association shows that after prolonged exposure to violence children may become immune to the horror of violence to gradually accept violence as a way to solve problems, imitate the violence they

observe on television, and identify with certain characters, victims or the perpetrators.

Even among adults at first images of startling happenings, like the massacres in Rwanda, can bring out a positive reaction generating public opinion and international action said Mr Blackall. "Prolonged portrayal can desensitize people where they can't do anything about the issue and they feel helpless. It is the same with children."

Dr Loo feels that it is misleading to attribute the two mediums as directly causing violence among children.

There is no direct cause although the audio-visual mediums may reflect it, prompt a viewer to think about it, but it does not necessarily mean it makes one violent," he said. "People with a tendency to violence do not need to switch on to the net or the television to get ideas of violence. They can go out and read about it or find some other sources. It does not necessarily come from television or the Internet."

But policy makers have been forced to sit up and take notice of possible threats television and the Internet can pose on impressionable minds.

The American government has been insisting on television companies using a V-Chip, a technology parents can use to block out programs they don't want children to use, while Australia is going for stronger television ratings with violent or sexual material being relegated to late night hours.

However, there is only so

much that regulatory bodies can do.

While it is easier to regulate the content of television it is not easy to do the same for the Internet. The concept of the World Wide Web itself denies censorship privileges. Information packages are passed from one electric node to the other so while service providers can block the download of offensive material onto the web, the user can still download the information from another site outside Bhutan.

While adult ratings can restrict minors from watching adult programs on television it is much more difficult to regulate the content of the web.

Although most adult Internet sites have a disclaimer stating users have to be over 18 years to access the information the system does not work too well. As the Internet system is based on computer links actual contact between the user and the provider is minimal. The over 18 years clause protects the provider but not the underage user.

How does Bhutan handle these issues especially when Internet and television savvy users, like America and Australia are still unable to do so?

Mr Blackall says self-censorship is the way to go. "As journalists and producers of a powerful medium we must be careful not to overkill issues which depict extreme violence. We have to tell the truth but it has to be done tastefully," he said.

Courtesy: The Kuensel of Bhutan.

Human Bombs, Again

An LTTE human bomb kills a "Tiger Hunter" in Batticaloa, leaving the future of the anti-LTTE campaign in the East uncertain. D. B. S. Jeyaraj writes

THE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has a reputation for the use of suicide killers. Members of its suicide squad, called 'Black Tigers', have driven explosives-laden vehicles onto military and economic targets. The first Black Tiger was Miller, who rammed a truck into a Sri Lankan Army camp at the Nallady Madhya Maha Vidyalayam on July 5, 1987.

The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi at Sriperumpudur in Tamil Nadu on May 21, 1991 was carried out by a suicide killer. There were five significant "first time" aspects to that operation: it was the first time that the LTTE targeted an Indian political leader; it was the first time that it conducted a major operation outside Sri Lanka and on Indian soil; it was the first time that a woman suicide killer was engaged; it was the first time that the belt bomb, a device strapped to the body, was used; and finally, it was the first time that a 'human bomb' was used for the purpose of assassinating a single individual. Sri Lankan Defence Minister Ranjith Wijeratne, who was killed on March 2, 1991, was the victim of a car bomb.

Initially the LTTE plan was to use human bombs only to target important personalities, such as President Ranasinghe Premadasa or Opposition leader Gamini Dissanayake. In recent times, however, it has lowered its sights as far as targets are concerned. A female cadre was used as a human bomb in an attempt on a mid-level police investigator a few months ago.

On May 29, for the first time the LTTE killed a leader of a rival Tamil group using a human bomb. The target was 35-year-old Muthulingam Ganeshkumar, whose *nom de guerre* was Razeek. Based in Batticaloa, the capital of the Eastern Province, and leading an unorthodox entity called the "Razeek Group", he had acquired a name for himself as one who had dedicated himself to fighting the Tigers in the east.

Razeek himself had a simple, unambiguous approach towards the LTTE. Unlike some Tamil groups such as the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) and the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), which align

themselves with the Sri Lankan Army on the one hand and act sympathetically towards the LTTE on the other, the Razeek Group fought along with the Army while retaining operational autonomy. The group formally belonged to the National Auxiliary Corps and was designated the ninth battalion of the Sri Lankan National Guards. The 250-strong unit was trained in the North Central Province Infantry Training School at Minneriya. Razeek himself had undergone an officers' training course. He was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant but refused to accept formal appointment saying that he was entitled to the rank of Major or at least Captain. Razeek was posthumously promoted Lieutenant. Razeek had a fascination for guns and motorcycles. On the day of his death, he had gone with some of his cadres to a motor vehicle workshop called Ivan's, situated in the heart of Batticaloa town, to purchase a motorcycle from a trader, Mohammed Ali Thahir. Another motorcycle, which was seized from a Tiger cadre, was being repaired at Ivan's.

Around 12-30 p.m., a teenager came cycling on the Trincomalee road. Razeek was standing in front of the garage, chatting with Thahir. His bodyguard, Chandran Jayakumar, stood a few yards away. Alongside Razeek was 27-year-old Paramanathan Thayaparan alias Thaya. Further away was a double cab vehicle with four armed cadres. The teenager suddenly entered the garage premises, pedalled towards Razeek and jumped on him. The human bomb exploded. Razeek, Chandran, Thahir and the killer died on the spot. Nine to 10 others, including five of Razeek's cadres, were injured. Of them Thaya succumbed to his injuries in hospital. The Tigers had struck again.

The Razeek Group was firmly entrenched in Batticaloa. Its main camp was a mansion and the sprawling property that surrounds it on Lake Road, opposite the lagoon. It was at one time the residence of former parliamentarian Sam Thambimuttu. Both he and his wife Kala were gunned down in 1990 by the LTTE in Colombo. The Razeek Group had a pervasive and dominating presence in the town and

were always on the alert for Tiger infiltrators. As a result, the LTTE found it itself unable to penetrate the areas that fell under the Batticaloa Municipality.

Investigations are on in Batticaloa to find out how the LTTE obtained intelligence on Razeek's movements. According to preliminary revelations, though unconfirmed, at least one of the employees at Ivan's was a Tiger informant. More important, there seems to be evidence that the Razeek Group itself had been infiltrated by LTTE cadres. Reportedly, one of the cadres who had come to the garage with Razeek complained of sickness and got Razeek's permission to return to the camp. It is said that the man never reached the camp. He is the prime suspect for having tipped off the LTTE. Also, a group of cadres reportedly "deserted" the Razeek Group after the assassination. At present a cleansing process is under way within the group. It is supervised by the acting head, 33-year-old Sivaguru Navaratnarajah alias Gandhi.

A group of journalists had visited Batticaloa and interviewed Razeek a few days before he was killed. A confident Razeek claimed that in recent operations his group had killed 30 Tigers and had lost 21 men. He also referred fondly to his association with the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) in the late 1980s. He claimed that he had killed 374 Tigers during that period. When he was asked whether he feared that the premises, pedalled towards Razeek, replied: "No. It is a way of life. We have been in this game since 1983. Razeek was born in the ancient Tamil village of Karaitheevu in Amparai district. His father was a government clerk and mother a schoolteacher. In school, he became an activist of the General Union of Eelam Students (GUES), the student wing of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). He, along with hundreds of Karaitheevu youth, joined the EPRLF after the 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom. The village itself was an EPRLF stronghold. After being trained initially at an EPRLF camp, he was selected along with 119 other EPRLF cadres to undergo intensive training in Uttar Pradesh in

early 1984.

Upon returning to Sri Lanka, he was involved in the activities of the EPRLF in the east until 1986, when he was promoted and sent to Mullaitheevu. The LTTE struck against the TELO in April 1986 and against the EPRLF in December 1986. The comparatively weak EPRLF found itself helpless in the face of the fratricidal onslaught. Razeek was forced to witness the killing of his comrades by members of a fellow militant movement. At one point, cornered by the Tigers, Razeek had no choice but to take his chances with the traditional enemy, the "Sinhala" Army. He surrendered at the Mullaitheevu army camp. This was perhaps a defining moment.

Thereafter Razeek, along with some others, cooperated with the Army. He served as a "spotter" when Operation Liberation was conducted in Vadamaratchchi by the Army in 1987. When hostilities broke out between the IPKF and the LTTE, the EPRLF was propped up as an alternative to the LTTE to represent the Tamil people. Soon the EPRLF took over the newly established North-East Provincial Council, and its leader Varadaraja Perumal became Chief Minister. Razeek, a confidant of Perumal, was elevated in rank. He functioned for a while as the leader of an auxiliary unit of the IPKF. Later he became a regional commandant of the Civilian Volunteer Force (CVF), also known as the Tamil National Army.

Razeek continued to be active in the East even after the Indian Army left. He tried to form an independently for some time and then teamed up with the Sri Lankan Army. He left for India in 1991. Not much was heard of him until he surfaced in Colombo after war broke out with the LTTE again. The secretary-general of the EPRLF, Suresh Premachandran, was not willing to resurrect the military wing of the EPRLF. Razeek, however, wanted to go on with his mission of fighting the Tigers. So he entered into a deal with the Army's intelligence section and formed his own group. Initially it was considered a breakaway faction of the EPRLF.

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