***The future caretaker government could benefit from the learning experiences (including the earlier mistakes) of the previous interim authorities, and by responding to the genuine input both from the winners and losers of the earlier elections.***

DR. Kamal Hossain of Gono Forum recently warned that the future caretaker government would not be enough to assure a free and fair poll. His statement is the epitome of his political wisdom, and people should listen to such foreboding even though the next caretaker administration is yet to come. The last caretaker government was the outcome of a political expediency — to get out of the disastrous confrontation between the BNP government and the Awami League-led opposition alliance.

Those who thundered for it exaggerated the capacity of the interim authority to solve the intractable distrust between the government and opposition in Bangladesh. Its institutional vulnerability is clear, since the compelling mass movements created the new authority, its credibility might also be eroded by such protests in the future. The well-known political history of the caretaker government does not deserve a full recital here. But I believe that the very idea and creation of a stopgap neutral executive was an admissibn of the politicians' failure to work parliamentary democracy through a mutual give and take.

Stipulated by the 13th amendment of the Bangladesh Constitution, the chief advisor (a retired Chief Justice) and 10 advisors would constitute the caretaker government. The chief advisor has been given the status of the Prime Minister and together with the advisors, enjoying the benefits and privileges of Ministers, would run the day to day administration during the interim period besides overseeing the election conducted by the Chief Election Commissioner. When Begum Khaleda Zia stepped down to make room for the caretaker authority in 1996. Sheikh Hasina. then the Opposition

leader called it a "democratic triumph". But that "victory" had come after the 22-month bitter impasse, and widespread agitation. and for a period of time in 1996 there was a strident noncooperation movement and violence. So the real cost of creating the caretaker institutional provision had been heavy indeed.

Former Chief Justice Habibur Rahman assumed authority under the amended constitution. and his interim government was the second interregnum in five years (the first one came when General H.M. Ershad resigned). That non-po-litical and temporary administration ordered a fresh election on June 12, 1996, which brought the Awami League to power under Sheikh Hasina’s leadership. Ironically, the caretaker government was created by the newly elected Parliament that the Awami League had earlier denounced as illegal, and the BNP was compelled to dissolve it to pave the path for a fresh election. Once thrown out of office, the BNP lost the political visibility that power usually offers, and the pro-opposition press unleashed a negative campaign against the BNP whose leaders and backers were in a political trauma.

Having seen the last two caretaker governments since 1991, can we say that the nonpolitical interim authorities offer a more reliable and acceptable election results? Did the caretaker administration

bridge the brawling politicians and accomplish a smooth transfer of power? Was the last non-partisan government accepted as fair and neutral? The answer will be a mixed bag in- -eluding the reasonably peaceful power-transfer after an election that was generally considered as fair although the BNP and some of the lessor parties questioned its assumed fairness. Based on not-so-distant memories. we know that all the political leaders and groups were not excited to cooperate with the caretaker authorities: we also know that the parties maintained their respective armed gangs and mastans. Both during and after the elections, the BNP charged that the last caretaker advisors were "tilting" towards the present ruling party. In a public outburst, Khaleda Zia alleged that the Chief Advisor was not impartial in dealing with the BNP.

Electoral reforms are difficult to accomplish and it is even harder to enforce such rules. There is no realistic way for the caretaker government to exorcize the festering mastans in the Bangladeshi electoral process. and money will possibly play even a bigger role in the future elections. For the musclemen. the party activists and even the village matbars, election is the season to make some money! And they will not hesitate to utilize that opportunity. Nor will the romanticized civil society be of much help to daunt

the goons who will steal the ballot boxes or staff them whenever they can, and intimidate their rivals whenever possible. Because both the musclemen and the moneyed people were already operating through the perceived "educated civil society" since most of them were formally educated, and more importantly, they had friends in the high places! From the experience of the last interim authority. it was more like a dyarchy, one half of which functioned under the chief advisor but the Defense Ministry was controlled by the President's Office. Dyarchy is not an effective institutional arrangement.

There was no perfect electoral process even in the solidly established representative democracies. The opposition parties, their cohorts and a section of. frenzied vernacular press had overblown the Awami League allegation that the BNP had blatantly rigged the elec-tion in Magura. And now the Awami League, saddled in power, is faced with the same hartal-thumping rhetoric that they used against the BNP in power. But so far it has failed to pick up a momentum, and the opposition is trying to focus on fresh issues. The worst fear now is that whoever loses the next election will blame the caretaker government along with the election authority that is already under a sharp criticism by the opposition alliance, and the future losing parties may

start another violent movement. Sadly. Bangladesh politics is locked in a game of tit for tat. and the caretaker government is not a panacea in such a political landscape. As we recall from the past, the opposition vehemently demanded a caretaker government, but once they got it in 1996, the credibility ofthe advisory cabinet came under fire, and the advisory ministers were unable to mobilize the disparate groups to cooperate. I wonder if the future non-political cabinet would have a better luck.

There was a lot of frustration that the caretaker government did not take any decisive steps against the politicized bureaucrats that openly defected to the opposition-sponsored agitation, and this question is expected to reappear in the future. Many were disturbed by the swaggering conduct of the civil servants that are expected to remain above party politics. From time to time, it has been charged that the politically recruited (in the early 1970's) bureaucrats were not acceptable as the future supervisors of polls of any sort.

The gushing accusation of the Awamization of the police, local bureaucrats and the local leaders, recently elected in the opposition-boycotted local elections. would add even more headache to the. prospective caretaker advisors and the election authority. Another area of opposition attack was the NGO activities in support of

the present ruling party, and that allegation is likely to pick up momentum, as the election will be drawing nearer. As a source of mobilization outside the bureaucracy, the NGOs have a desirable role to play, but the voluntary bodies are expected to shun direct or indirect partisan politics. But certain NGOs had been avowedly partisan during the 1996 election, according to numerous allegations. Even the regular administration finds it difficult to regulate the NGOs, frequently funded by the international agencies. How will the caretaker government restrain the NGOs from supporting or undercutting different parties? The newspapers may play a constructive role reporting such NGO activities that are emphatically politicized, but most dailies and weeklies also report according to their respective political slants!

The caretaker government's adhocism is its institutional malediction! It's an institution that can only work through mutual cooperation and mutual respect, a rare phenomenon in Bangladesh. politics, as President Justice Shahabuddin recently reminded. The burden of offering a free and fair election that will be acceptable to all the parties concerned is possibly too much for an adhoc institution to deliver. Its liaison with the. Election Commission deserves to be close and mutually productive. More importantly, the future caretaker government could benefit from the learning experiences (including the earlier mistakes) of the previous interim authorities, and by responding to the genuine input both from the winners and losers of the earlier elections. Otherwise a constitutional mandate and even a pious passion for a fair election would not guarantee the future caretaker government's success!