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Bangladesh-Nepal Transit: A Momentous Beginning

by Dr Abul Kalam
***Bangladesh-Nepal Transit agreement serves not only as "the beginning of a new chapter of economic cooperation" fulfilling a long felt "desire and dream" of peoples of the two countries, but should also provide the much-needed momentum towards cooperative endeavours further along.***
Bangladesh-Nepal transit route was formally opened on 1 September 1997 at Bangl-abandh. allowing the land-locked Himalayan kingdom the use of Bangladesh's Mongla port. Bangladesh's Commerce Minister Tofael Ahmed and his Nepalese counterpart Saroendra Nath Sukla Jointly inaugurated the transit. This was, indeed, an extraordinary occasion, one of momentous significance towards furtherance of tripartite relations in the Eastern Himalayan subregion or, as Tofael Ahmed called it. "a historic event" and "a milestone In harnessing well-defined complementarles among SAARC member-states and sharing resources for mutual benefit''
Since 1976 when Dhaka and Kathmandhu signed a transit agreement. Nepal had been in-sistlng on getting the use of the transit route through Indian territory and Bangladesh up to Mongla port for the transportation of its goods, because the use of Mongla port was expected to be more cost-effective and Nepalese truckers can carry cargo for a longer stretch over their home territory than if it is transmitted through Calcutta port, as had been the practice.
Overcoming Lingering
Misperceptions
The 1976 bilateral agreement signed during the period of the late President Ziaur Rahman between Dhaka and Kathmandhu provided for transit for Nepal, but the accord remained inoperative so long due to India's fingering misperception and consequent denial of a transit route through India up to Bangladesh. Therefore the bilateral transit agreement literally remained ineffectual in the last two decades without India agreeing to the use of a 61 -kilometre route for transit between Banglabandh and Kakarbhitta in Nepal.
Any amount of cooperation, or lack of it, is always conditioned by the existing pattern of perceptions and relations between and among the nationstate actors concerned. An element of perceptual viciousness existed for a long time in the triad of relations in the Eastern Himalayan subregion. The very geo-physical largeness of India, the size of its population and economy, its military strength and potential in South Asia subsystem almost automatically conferred upon New Delhi a "unit veto" attribute. Such an attitude found concrete expres-
sion in India's vetoing of the bilateral transit agreement, denying the landlocked Nepal transit through its territory and in its failing to respond to lower riparian Bangladesh's demands for a continued natural flow of waters of the international rivers.
All this seemed part of an asymmetric reality, generating natural apprehension about India's "big brotherly" postures, and motivated the two smaller neighbours to seek support from extra-regional actors in order to counteract perceived Indian domination and hegemony. Consequently, there was a cleavage of dominance and subordination providing asymmetric inputs, adding body to the continued perceptual divergence and confrontational politics.
From India's point of view, there was perhaps a genuine se-^urlty concern. New Delhi might have perceived that in the event of a recrudescence of violence along the Sino-Indian borders, a determined Chinese thrust from the Tibetan Chumbi Valley and/or from the Bay of Bengal through Bangladesh could sever off the narrow Siliguri corridor, which separates Nepal and Bangladesh only by a few miles. The fall of this vital 20 km wide Indian tract of land — the so-called "chicken neck, the military strategic point in the northeast" of India — would cut off India's north-eastern states and union territories, resentful but with rich potentials, from the rest of India. Hence India was most unwilling even to consider any such politi-cal/trade menu in the IndoNepal negotiation table.
Nepal also expressed its displeasure over the 1950 bilateral treaty of peace and friendship with India and suggested a revision of the underlying "security umbrella concept" so that Kathmandu would be free to serve as a "bridge between India and China." Until recently India clung to a position that there was no scope for a revision of the treaty and that Kathmandu might contemplate scrapping the treaty altogether.
As for Bangladesh, the country no doubt lives under the shadow of India. The prevailing perception is that the
country suffers from the "tyranny of geography." being almost "India locked." surrounded in the east, north and west by India, while in the south powerful Indian navy remains watchful cruising the waters of the Bay of Bengal. On the other hand, with its strategic location as a ' landbridge" between Southeast and South Asia and placed at an elbowpoint towards the lowest edge of the Bay of Bengal. Bangladesh also conceivably features as strategic courtyard of India, serving as a strategic elbow to an expansive power external to the subcontinent out to divide the subcontinent further and determined to use the territory as a forward base or shield in a wider regional rivalry for position and influence.
These mixes of strategic asymmetries did not contribute to any reconciliation and/or understanding either at the subregional or regional level. India at times was even unwilling to discuss, not to speak of conceding to demanas and needs of the neighbouring countries. whether It was for transit or for augmentation of water and/or development of water resources.
Consequently. Bangladesh-India relations steadily degenerated into a posture of mutual rigidity. There are many elements In this perceptual divergence. Including the diversion and denial of the much-needed water from the Ganges and the consequent perceived "economic strangulation" of Bangladesh, the perpetuation of Insurgency In the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) from the India-based sanctuaries etc.
From the conceptual point of view, functionalism, advocated for promoting cooperative endeavours at the regional and subregional levels often proved to be dysfunctional. The nuild-ing of communication blocs or linkages for regional cooperative purpose also proved to be inoperative, as the South Aslan societies seem so verbal, rumour and propaganda-based, disinformation-oriented and symbol conscious that these very often intruded into social ana cultural life as well as Into economics and politics, and as a result even the existing blocs seemed to fall apart.
Then came a change of heart, with change of governments in 1996 both in Dnaka and New Delhi. The new Awaml League government of Bangladesh came to power with specific commitments to seek bilateral understanding with neighbouring India on issues aJfecting mutual relations. Similarly. I K Gujral at first becoming foreign minister, and then Prime Minister, of the United Front Coalition Government in New Delhi, articulated a "unilateral and a more pro active” vision and committed not to carry the baggage of the past.
With a steadily improving atmosphere across the Himalayas and a diminution of Sino-Indlan threat perceptions. Gujral candidly acknowledged the overall asymmetrical nature of relations between India and Its smaller neighbours such as Bangladesh and Nepal. He took the argument further along and stated that India's relations with its neighbours should be asymmetrical, meaning that "India was a larger country with a larger economy and larger resources" and hence "has more responsibilities towards Its neighbours. It has more to give to its neighbours than expect from them. The result was the Ganges Water Treaty of December 1996. which despite Its shortcomings both In its agreed terms and the process of Implementation, was generally welcomed as a shift from the past pattern of India's policy vis-a-vis Bangladesh.
Similarly, in pursuing relations with Nepal, last July Ouirai also communicated India's "unilateral" decision to permit the use of its territory for third-country transit, allowing the Nepalese to use the Mongla port in Bangladesh for their external trade. Even on Issues such as Nepal's longstanding grievances on the trilateral treaty, of late New Delhi asked Nepal to come up with specific proposals for revision of the treaty so that both sides could discuss a review of the treaty. Such an approach contributed to "necessary trust and confidence" for carrying forward the idea of cooperation at both bilateral and subregional levels.
"Win-win Approach"
It is the foregoing context
that the new trilateral understanding on transit has to be viewed through. Apart from 1976 bilateral Bangladesh-Nepal transit accord, the South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) spoke of mutual understanding on issues such as transit facilities among the member countries of the SAARC for promotion of trade and commerce. Transit through Bangladesh for Nepal will obvl-ously benefit both the countries. reducing transportation cost of exports and imports for Kathmandhu and increasing revenue earnings for Bangladesh. Under the new arrangements. the Nepalese importers will use the Mongla-Banglabandh-Fulbarl-Kakarbhita route for the transportation of their Imports and exports, now about a million tons a year. And the quantity is most certainly to grow every year, which would have created heavy pressure on the Calcutta port where cargo handling remains a major problem and. for that, cost would have been much higher.
Bangladesh will also benefit from higher utilization of its port facilities and new jobs will be created in the service sector, as Tofael Ahmed said. "This will create a wln-wln business atmosphere in both the countries." The Nepalese Minister agreed and said that the two countries would be able to offer various agricultural and indus-trial products following the easy access to each other." The Nepalese government officially expressea its gratitude to Bangladesh for extending transit facilities, but Kathmandu also knows about Dhaka's priorities and needs. The expectation is, therefore, high that Nepal would reciprocate accord-
It is Indeed time to contemplate furtherance of cooperative endeavours between and among the three countries.
Bangladeshi people of all political shades are indeed happy to see the Implementation of an agreement, precisely because the original agreement was signed by the administration of the late Ziaur Rahman and now It has found Implementation under the Awaml League administration of Sheikh Hasina.
Towards a New Subregionalism
Given the wide margin between the conceptual framework for regional cooperation and the reality in South Asia, together with the prevailing perceptual divergence, dogged mutual relations in the past and prevented fruitful cooperation. However, with recent positive movement in the relationship pattern of the three countries and a commitment to overcome the past barrier of disharmony, as reflected in the organizational expression of South Asian Growth Quadrangle (SAGQ). it would be most appropriate to identify new areas of understanding which would cement the bond of cooperative relationship.
Now that India has finally agreed to extend permission and the bilateral transit agree-Knt has been implemented.
way is paved to open a new horizon in trade and economic cooperation between the two « SAARC countries in the light of SAPTA." Strong Indian backing for Dhaka's current peace effort In the CHT. together with a joint development plan involving water augmentation and energy in the Eastern Himalayan subregion would build the necessary momentum toward creating a dynamic area of growth, so much-desired and projected by many a South Aslan specialist within and backed up by international funding agencies, such as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank — seemed eager and willing to offer patronage.
The implementation of the Bangladesh-Nepal Transit agreement thus serves not only as "the beginning of a new chapter of economic cooperation' fulfilling a long felt "desire and dream" of peoples of the two countries, but should also provide the much-needed momentum towards cooperative endeavours further along, especially in the area of augmentation of water and development of water resources, to the mutual advantage and immense benefit of the teeming millions of the three countries. To attain such cherished objectives, both Dhaka and New Delhi have to go beyond their current emphasis on bilateralism and rephrase their conceptual' framework towards a people-oriented multilateral community in the Eastern Himalayan subregion.
The author is a Professor of International Relations. University of Dhaka.