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PERSPECTIVES

Pakistan Back on US' Strategic Agenda?

by Brig (Retd) M Abdul Hafiz
***When Madeleine Albright visits India in next November, the thorny issue of America's renewed 'tilt' towards Pakistan is bound to come into focus whatever may be the shape of subsequent Indo-US relation as its result.***
TWO years before when Hank Brown amendment was enacted in the US Senate allowing its government a military hardware transfer to Pakistan the mood in Islamabad was ostensibly festive while there was a corresponding gloom In New Delhi's south block. Apart from $ 370m package that Included, among other things, the spares for F-16 aircrafts. Orion anti-submarine aircrafts and Harpoon missiles from the US. the waiving of a stringent Pressler sanctions of 1990 to oblige Pakistan was significant and in itself a great moral booster for a country torn by ethro-sectarian strifes, plagued by a sagging economy and continuously rebuffed by India on Kashmir issue.
However, the US with a rejuvenated Indo-US relationship following Indian PM's 1994 Washington visit in mind as well as her eyes fixed on India s vast market after recently-initiated economic reforms took care in allaying India s anxiety over the transfer. She advanced several reasons and excuses for the 'partial' and one-time’ amendments with her tone apologetic. The US. on the whole, remained on the defensive repeatedly drawing the critics' attention to the moral dimension of the deal i.e.. the fairness of the equity of a paid-up arms contract between her and Pakistan.
Now only after two years the Harkin. Warner amendment to the US Foreign Assistance Act authorising the resumption of cor-। tain form oi economic assistance and military trai-| nlng facilities to Pakistan and the-1 reby reinforcing I Brown amendment of 1995J confirm many of ' the assumptions and speculations raised then about a possible US-Pakistan strategic consensus. In retrospect, the Pressler sanctions were imposed essentially to contain the region's arms race and dilute its nuclear programme, particularly to bring under leash Pakistan's nuclear ambition after giving It almost a decade of freehand. Because Pakistan had to be kept in good humour during the period for America's own Interest. The US stand on the implementation of Pressler amendment hardened since the fall of Naiibullah government In Afghanistan, precisely tne time when Pakistan's role as a conduit for Afghan war was over.
Pakistan, the most allied ally' of the US had similar experience also in the past when she was let-down more than once and deceived by her American patrons. After 1971 she was virtually abandoned by the US and its successive administrations unequivocally endorsed India's pre-eminence in the subcontinent. Only the unfolding of Afghan crisis salvaged Pakistan from an impending ignominy. After the crisis she obviously proved redundant and the US was reluctant to accept the liability of a nuclear-ambitious Pakistan.
Yet an overwhelming urge for security prompted Pakistan to maintain her link with the US. the lone superpower of the post-cold war world She even joined the US-led multinational forces in the Gulf in 1990 much to the chagrin of its public to revive American interest in her, but failed to make any dent on American attitude. After the cold war. Pakistan's position in US' security calculation was one of decline. So much so ,lldl by early 90s it was about to be branded as a backlash' stale of Islami fundamentalism sponsoring international Icrturiklli and almost lumped up in that category with countries like Iran and Libya. All Pakistani efforts 10 cosy up ' with the US as its old ally were ho avail.
When viewed against this backdrop, two ex traordinary US legislations favouring Pakistan baffled many. But then as much of the dust settled down after the cold war and a clearer picture emerged out of the haze of initial uncertainties and ambivalence with a new battle line drawn the West found itself confronted with new situations as well as adversaries. In its consideration, dealing with them would be easier with, among other things. Pakistan on their side. The Harkin-Warner amendment by the US administration alms more at ensuring Pakistan's loyalty and cooperation on the basis of a quid pro quo to be worked out while the US would launch its threepronged grand strategy vis-a-vis China, Russia and Iran where Pakistan is going to be a relevant strategic player.
Although the US professes a constructive engagement with regard to China, yet she is compelled by the ground realities to move fast towards a 'contain China' policy-making a confrontation inevitable by the turn of the millennium. Her desire to exploit Central Asian market as well as resources brings her sharply in clash with Russia's inherent interests in its near abroad’. America's policy of dual containment' in the Gulf aims at isolating Iran from international community. In all these future conflicts the US cannot achieve her objectives without the help of Pakistan. This partly explains why the US has suddenly started wooing Pakistan.
In the post-cold war strategic matrix, the contending parties are strikingly the same as they were after the second world war with, of course, some changes in their approaches, priorities and emphasis. And the opportunities their power struggles would be offering to Pakistan as well as the latter's equation with India, her archrival re-main more or less similar. However, unlike in the past there are chances that even the potential contenders of the US also would try to enlist the support of Pakistan, frustrated by American track record of the past. While China already has a
special relationship with Pakistan. Iran despite her differences with the later on Afghan issue would not. in the country’s present predicament, alienate Pakistan. Russia now shorn of its ideological proclivities can seek help from any quarter Including Pakistan on the basis of her geopolitical imperatives.
But Sino-Pakistan relaUons are somewhat unique and could develop despite the countries' rival systems and philosophies right from the days of ultra-conservatism of Mao era. Since the early '60s, China has been heavily investing in Pakistan which had once been its 'window’ to the world. It has been assisting Pakistan on nuclear and missile technologies. It is believed to have supplied Pakistan with highly potent M-II missile and assisted in developing Haft-III which would be indigenously produced in Pakistan with the capability of M-fl missile. Many believe that Pakistan exploded her N Bomb in early '80s in a western Chinese desert under China's supervision. China also cultivated Pakistan as its link with the Muslim world with which the former is believed to be developing an axis to counter the dominance and influence of the West. In the whole process, both China and Pakistan have developed high stakes in each other.
Now as China is rapidly becoming the globe's second-most powerful nation and challenging some of US's long standing interests in the pacific. China and the US wifi be adversaries in the major global rivalry of the first decades of the twenty-first century. Even an actual military conflict between the US and China, provoked for example, by a Chinese attempt to seize Taiwan by force or to resolve by military means its territorial claim in the South China Sea. is always possible particularly as China's military strength continues to grow If the coming conflict between China and the US escalates beyond certain limit. Pakistan as China's close ally would invariably be drawn into its vortex. Such prospect would be even stronger if the US which feels that it needs Pakistan for its great game in the region involving China, Russia and to a lesser degree also Iran coopts Pakistan's strategic partnership.
During the early '50s. both the superpowers wanted to win over Pakistan which ultimately opted for the US. In the current scenario, the question as to who would win over Pakistan is again raised: China or the US? The obvious choice could be for the US. declining but still the strongest power of the world but for her dubious role in the past and the occasional flashes of her softness' towards the 'largest democracy' of the world and of course, its vast lucrative market. Nevertheless, in any event Pakistan stands to gain in the emerging strategic milieu.
The American establishment is, however, confident that in spite of Pakistan’s linkages with China it is still in more advantageous position to manipulate the Pakistan Army and establishment in its favour. The notion of a close tie between the US and Pakistan Army is reinforced when in a recent statement Ms Bhutto declared that it was not possible to be the country s prime minister without the approval of Pakistan Army and the US. According to General Hamid Gul the former Chief of Pakistan’s ISi. the recent Senate legislation actively backed by the US ndminisua-tlonIs definitely ft ploy to appease the Pakistan Army'.
The Americans feel that the Pakistani Army and the establishment will have to be on their side in the event of any future contingency in the region. So the US attempts to keep through the removal of legal barriers, its communication lines with Pakistani Army and establishment open. Senator John Warner, the brain behind the latest amendment, says that the measure would ensure Washington's continued "constructive engagement1' with Pakistan, a nation that has a long history of being a friend and ally of the US.
In the meantime. India seems to have accepted the emerging realities in good grace. In 1995, there was a furore over Hank Brown amendment. This time there was no fuss except some soul-searching observations over the development. India has. however, been quietly, faking steps to meet the future contingenfTes ’She SnVady enjoys an edge over Pakistan with regard to its military's size, the quality of its arsenal and overall force projection capability. Her capability has now been further beefed up through the indigenous production of most of its defence requirements. It has far more advanced nuclear and missile programmes. It produces its own battle tank and aircrafts. The recently introduced Russian-made versatile Sukhoi-30 (SU-30) in the IAF fleet has been India's most prestigious acquisition in many years.
She also has been able to revive to an extent her traditional military relation with Russia notwithstanding American pressure not to release some of the sensitive military hardware to India. She steadfastly kept her nuclear option open and opposed the signing of CTBT. Now the US' relaxed attitude toward Pakistan's nuclear and missile programme will embolden India to go nuclear at long last and deploy both her Agni' and Prithvi' in a changed security environment. When Madeleine Albright visits India in next November, the thorny issue of America's renewed tilt' towards Pakistan is bound to come into focus whatever may be the shape of subsequent Indo-US relation as its result.