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THE "GUJRAL DOCTRINE"

India's New South Asia Policy?

by Brig (Retd) M Abdul Hafiz
***The important point is that nowhere has Gujral doctrine been projected as a substitute for India Doctrine'. India doctrine has been evolved by the nation's founding fathers and was sustained for half a century through a "national consensus". Can Prime Minister Gujral replace it with his own dictum?***
BY any reckoning the time was crucfaJ when in December 1989 Inder Kumar Gujral. known both for his penchant for and wide experience in diplomacy aptly filled in the slot of external affairs minister in the National Front government led by Vishwanath Pratap Singh. It was a time when, at global level, a bipolar structure of international system was crumbling down and at home India had reached a new peak of tension with her South Asian neighbours. In 1987. under a controversial Indo-Lankan accord she despatched peace-keep-ing troops to Sri Lanka making the situation still more messy in that strife-torn island. Barely a year later she carried out an airborne rescue operation in the Maldives in a clear display of her burgeoning military might. The year 1989 witnessed the Indian blockade of transit points into land locked Himalayan Kingdom of Nepal and the expiry of memorandum of understanding between Bangladesh and India causing fresh uncertainly in the Ganges water sharing arrangements. During the late 1989 there ensued another spell of Indo-Pakistan bitterness over renewed violence in Kashmir. Against this dismal backdrop Gujral took his office on the second December 1989
During his.first stint in the south block GMjral deftly handled India's adaptation to the newly emerging realities of the global politics and was able to forge totally hew relationship with the west Under his stewardship India went along with the west during the Gulf crisis and even permitted overflights and refuelling by US combat aircrafts en route to the Gulf. The similar initiatives however lacked in India's backyard where no significant steps were taken to assuage the anxiety of her embittered neighbours who nervously watched the region's politico-strategic developments of late eighties. India's South neighbours were, in a . a.i.!, ,. jn, expec ,,
some relaxation in the regional politics from a non-Congress government like it was during the 'Janata interregnum of 1977-80. That hope was soon dampened and they were curtly told that there would be no broad changes in India’s foreign policy and that there was a national consensus on it. When the National Front government fell after a year Gujral however left an impression of being a credible practitioner of India's external affairs to best protect its interest. So much so that his views were earnestly sought on foreign policy issues even when he was out of office. And five years later when a fractious United Front was catapulted to power he was again the; phoice fof his old office.
A year ’before when Gujral was back to his turf surrounded by a familiar team he moved swiftly to bring about a set of changes in the interstate relations of South Asia with an unusual alacrity. I K Gujral. embattled for a while with the politics of CTBT. soon switched on to the neighbouring front and seemed determined to put the intra regional relation in a new mould. He seemed to have held out olive branches to the estranged neighbours of India in South Asia. Within a short time he was credited with producing a few 'simple principles' which later came to oe termed as the Gujral Doctrine'. It is no wonder that a patriarch of his stature and experience would evolve a policy doctrine which
has rather been reinforced now by his own upgradation as India s prime minister. What is however surprising is why after all another policy doctrine was to be evolved when there had been no dearth of such doctrine in the past. What was its compulsion? Does it contain anything new? It is worth going a little back to the past of India's quest lor security to find an answer.
Ever since independent India's Inheritance of a body of strategic doctrine evolved by the British as the basis of her own defence and security, the founding fathers of India developed a kind of paranoia of'»-trategic unity' of all South Asian countries. At independence, with the loss of strategic north west frontier the safeguard of which was one of the ramparts of British India's defence. India now moved to prevent other areas in her neighbourhood from falling under the control of a foreign power and consolidate her influence part,''"larly in Sri Lanka in the Indian c-can and Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim in the Himalayas. India brought these countries under a number of treaty obligations the way the British did with them. Soon after the British exit India also delineated for her smaller neighbours the line beyond which the sovereign manoeuvre of those countries would be restricted by India. Later, when Bangladesh came into being in 1’971, the new republic was Siromptly drawn into India's old through a friendship treaty and carefully cultivated pplltfcO’Cv’^'ral ' .. s. Although Pak’°' ent her r way as India - .. al the 1.. . .eaders repeatedly decried the former's military linkages with extra regional powers. With such postures and series of actions India's first Prime Minister was really proclaiming in the early fifties a "Nehru Doctrine' in South-Asia. Indian interests thus expressed — in the territorial inviolability of her small neighbours by any external power — came to be seen as the Indian version of Monroe Doctrine'.
Later during the premiership of Indira Gandhi, amidst intense security debate both among the public and the opposition in the backdrop of India's 1962 war with China and 1965 war with Pakistan as well as her poor defence preparedness, she wanted anew to, tighten India's grip over its neighbourhood. In order to do that she strengthened India's Monroe Doctrine and elaborated more aspects of it through various speeches and pronouncements. Although the doctrine has been inter-cnangeably referred to as Indira Doctrine or India Doctrine it. in its simplest form, aimed at ensuring that the South Asian region remained an Indian backyard. By extension the doctrine also implied that New Delhi would not hesitate to intervene militarily or otherwise to ensure it. The underlying message of the doctrine could be traced from one of the speeches by Mrs Gandhi in Lok Sabha in the wake of 1983 Tamil crisis in Sri Lanka: "We have made it clear... that
India does not pose any threat to Sri Lanka nor do we want to Intervene in their interna) affair....At the same time I pointed out to President (Jayawardene), that developments in Sri Lanka affect us also. In this matter India cannot be treated as Just any country.'' Such assertions found expression in myriad Indian writings during the period.
Rajiv Gandhi had however been the first to experiment with the doctrine. At least two events i.e.. the despatch of IPKF to Sri Lanka and airborne •troops to Maldives on a rescue operation manifested the doctrine as real life test cases'. Indeed the doctrine reinforced and further strengthened during Rajiv period provided the conceptual raison d'etre for Indian militaiy moves in Sri Lanka and Maldives. During the late eighties the doctrine was aptly referred to. at times also as Rajiv doctrine or India's South Asia doctrine. Nevertheless. in essence it was India's doctrine for the guidance and conduct of the relationship with her South Asian neighbours and its content and thrust remained the same. It is interesting, however, that never the existence of the doctrine with any of the name given to it had been officially acknowledged like the Monroe doctrine itself.
Neither was it contained in any official document. Yet it enjoyed unusual prominence in contemporary Indian writings, academic discourses and policy pronouncements by Indian political leaders. The doctrine, it is claimed, was the product of a series of conversations between the incumbents and opposition political forces to that it reflected Indian national consensus.
It is difficult to establish whether the spirits of the doctrine were shared by Gujral who had been in the government and politics also earlier, he however hardly did anything to break the stalemate in India's relationship with her neighbours during his short tenure in the government in 1989-90. In contrast, during his present tenure he has generated a lot of warmth, if not anything else, with the neighbouring states within eaually short span of time. He nas also broken the traditions and not only acknowledged the existence of the Gpjral doctrine', he himself has elaborated it to an extent, in his address at a USI (United Services Institute) seminar in January last. He enunciated five principles as the basis of the doctrine. Firstly, with its neighbours like Bangladesh, Bhutan. Maldives. Nepal and Sri Lanka, India does not ask for any reciprocity, but gives and accommodates what it can in good faith and trust. Second, India believes that no South Asian country should allow its territory against the interests of another country of the region. Third, that none should interfere in the internal of the region. Third, that none should interfere in the internal affairs of another. Fourth, all South Asian countries must respect each other's territorial integrity
and sovereignty. And finally, they should settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations.
A close view of the principles would reveal that there is nothing extraordinary in the doctrine notwithstanding its novel approach. On the other hand there are in it enough of grey areas requiring explanation, clarification and even specification. Almost all treaties, accords, memoranda, declarations etc. among the nations already reflect most of these principles. Even between the rivals like India and Pakistan, with the renunciation of the use of force and acceptance of bilateralism by Pakistan at Simla in 1972, these principles have already been upheld. But purely from a Bangladeshi perspective one would stumble at the formulation of principle number one. What does the lumping up of Bangladesh with the countries in the periphery of the subcontinent imply? Can Bangladesh be categorised on the same footing with the countries which were classically the neighbourhood of India from British period? On the contrary, Bangladesh is a core country of the subcontinent involving separately a trilateral relationship between India. Pakistan and Bangladesh which are concerned with the issues and problems, peculiar only to the subcontinent of former British India. Interestingly, in the proposed dispensation of Indian generosity without reciprocity where does Pakistan — the only SAARC country left out — go?
The international relation
essentially rests on reciprocity in some form or other however subtle that may be. In 1974 when Bangladesh handed over Berubarl to India, she very much hoped that India would reciprocate with the transfer of Tin Bigha'. So. reciprocity can be obligatory even on the part of a big neighbour. When a big neighbour wants to give' and accommodate' it is indeed encouraging but who would determine whether something has really been given or accommodated? In my understanding Bangladesh would be happy only to receive what is due to her. According to Gujral. India is ready to go "extra mile to inspire confidence and generate momentum towards a new partnership in South Asia". Only the treaty on sharing of Ganges water has been quoted by Gujral to be the solid achievement in his new endeavour. As the sharing of the water has bumped into trouble just in its beginning, would people be quite inspired by Gujral s call for "constructive collaboration. in all areas of our interaction"?
However the important point is that nowhere has Gujral doctrine been projected as a substitute for "India Doctrine'. India doctrine has been evolved by the nation's founding fathers and was sustained for half a century through a "national consensus". Can Prime Minister Gujral replace it with his own dictum? 'India doctrine' with its inherent tenets stays while I K Gujral In his own ingenuity may be trying to remove the stupor that has totally gripped the relationship among
South Asian countries. I K Gu-iral is a visionary and none but ne can diagnose the malady of age old Indian policy in the region The conflicts among the nations in South Asia, he knows, have been a zerosum game and apparently there is no winner. Moreover Gujral also knows that it is disastrous to fight battles on more than one front. If India has to gain tier rightful place tn the county of the nations through perhaps a long diplomatic struggle, she has to keep first the neighbour hood quiescent.
Nehru once dreamt of India s place to be only alongside the USA the USSR and West Europe but after several decades a notable commentator on Indian affairs observed that India's self image was that of an important middle power seeking to attain its proper status in the world despite many internal and external constraints. India once aspired to be the permanent member of UN Security Council. Now she cannot get even a temporary seat. Although a post-Cold War scenario initially witnessed a strengthening of Indo-US ties coinciding with harder American line against Pakistan the nuclear proliferation and missile technology, human rights and trades and investment had all become issues on which rifts appear to be emerging on both sides. Moreover, the collapse of Soviet Union came to India as a stunning shock for several reasons. Soviet disintegration has thrown India's weapon procurement programme into disarray. entailed the end of IndoSoviet treaty of 1971 and resulted In Russia's new South Asia policy. Also India's world view based on non-alignment has wholly shattered. By all probability India's rehabilitation on international front is going to take indefinitely long time. I K Gujral rightly appreciates that mending fences with the neighbours at this Juncture is an overwhelming Imperative for India.