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Toward Strengthened and Effective Local Governance : Constraints and Opportunities

by Zarina Rahman Khan
****Because government officials are the decision-makers and the "providers" in the eyes of the ordinary peopl too, they are perceived as the "master" — the natrons and the capacity given to them to deliver strengthens this notion. The UP members, on the other hand, are seen as their agents to bargain for, acquire • and channel resources to the unions
THIS article brings forth some of the findings of our ongoing research on local governance in Bangladesh sponsored by the Ford Foundation. An important finding of pur study with respect to institutional arrangements is that not only is local government far from being decentralized because of the central government's political, administrative and financial controls, but that government offices and officials dominate local level planning and im-Ipiemantation of development ’projects. The union parishad (UP) has been reduced to playing the role of an implementation agency of the central government and its traditional and important role as an arbitrator of disputes among citizens has been diminished by the growing role of elected members as "brokers" in acquiring developmental projects.
This state of affairs creates tension and conflict between local elected bodies and the local bureaucracy, leading to a non-congenial environment for effective local governance. In the absence of a self-governing and financially sound local elected body to plan, run and oversee local governance, the government officials and NGOs play their respective roles in the unions without any accountability to the local populace. who are conditioned to accept whatever is dished out to them. Until the political institutional constraints on UPs are removed through major legal reform, elected councils cannot operate as self-governing, responsible. and accountable people's bodies.
Turning to the relationships between the UP and the local bureaucracy, including the chief thana executive, our research has found that there is a
power imbalance favouring the officials. According to the legal framework, the local bureaucracy has been given a free hand to exercise its control over local affairs. The thana officials, with whom the UP chairman and members mostly interact, are technically skilled and function on the instructions of the district and central administration. This means they are only accountable to the central authorities which leads them not only to ignore the elected representatives but also to take a condescending attitude towards them. The elected UP members, on the other hand, approach the officials as people's representatives with their mandate but cannot deal confidently with them because they are not "empowered" to function on equal terms with the bureaucracy or hold it responsible for its actions.
The elected officials are dependent on the bureaucracy for technical inputs as well. For example, one of the important reasons for the inability of the UPs to operate effectively is their administrative limitations. The UP has no support staff excepting the secretary who is recruited, partly salaried, and.transferred by the district administration. He. therefore, becomes accountable to the district officials. Since the secretary keeps records and minutes of meetings and prepares the budget proforma and annual reports, the elected representatives become dependent on him for such skills but we often found the UP secretary to be defiant to the chairman and members in obeying instructions.
Even though, technically, the UP has to supervise the role of all developmental agencies which include NGOs working in
the union, in reality it cannot play such a role. This is mainly because, the UP has not been provided with the commensurate authority to hold the NGOs responsible for any irregularity. The UP can only report about any NGO or agencies' activities to the higher authority — the thana administration. Such reporting usually falls on deaf ears as the NGOs are in reality accountable only to the NGO Bureau at the national level. Our observation is that the UP. if it is to become a viable local government unit, has to have the dominant role in local governance with the powers and authority to supervise and hold accountable government departments and NGOs functioning in the union.
Because government officials are the decision-makers and the "providers" in the eyes ol the ordinary people too. they are perceived as the "master" — the patrons and the capacity given to them to deliver strengthens this notion. The UP members, on the other hand, are seen as their agents to bargain for. acquire and channel resources to the unions. This perception of the people has a deep sociological and psychological impact both on the elected members and government officials. It reinforces the confidence of the bdreaucrats while reconfirming the subordinate status of the elected body in the power configuration between the two.
Yet despite the persistence of such a deep rooted colonial practice leading to certain perceptions. our study shows that, in recent years, the relationship between the elected members and the officials has-been changing, at least at the behavioural levels. During our intensive interviews with both
•types of functionaries we learnt the pattern of decentralization in the upazila parishad requiring thana officials to operate under the elected chairmen and depend on their recommendations for career advancement was indeed a very "humbling" experience for the officials. While the officials adjusted to their new and reversed roles, the elected chairmen gained considerable confidence and experience and were found to feel the need to equip themselves with detailed information about their constituencies in order to be able to discuss matters on par with the officials in the upazila parishad.
The UP chairman in the union we studied is an ex-up-azila chairman and his manner of relating to the upazila officials in his work with them and the cautiously "respectful" response given to them by the officials illustrate to us the impact of such a development. This encouraged us to hope that the continuance of such a relationship and its institutionalization through the formation of a truly empowered local government body at the thana level could not but advance the cause of good governance. Mutual trust and respect are the preconditions of a healthy relationship of two groups of functionaries who are at the core of local governance.
Dr Zarina Rahman Khan is a Professor in the Department of ■ Public Administration. Dhaka University. The original article ivas presented at a workshop hosted by The Asia Foundation on March 10-11 for government. donors, and NGOs on "Elected and Administrative Local Government Relations." This version has been specially prepared for The Daily Star