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Hebron accord-a defining moment for Netanyahu’s govt
JERUSALEM. Jan 16: The Hebron agreement was a defining moment for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu s gov ernment — even if it arrived more by accident than design, reports AP
The US mediated accord drove Israel's hard-line premier into the arms of his old enemy Yasser Arafat and went a long wav toward ending the guessing game about whether Netanyahu would honour Israel s peace agreements.
Netanyahu, who defeated the liberal Labour government in Israels Mav 1996 elections, campaigned on a get-tough wlth-Arafat platform. He called the peace process bom In Oslo Norway, a giveaway and rode to power on the backs of right wingers who want to annex the West Bank
Now all rhetoric to the con-
trary. Netanyahu is a full-fiedged member ol the Oslo club. He has staked his own political reputation on the success of the Israel PLO agreement and pledged to make three further troop withdrawals in the West Bank after the Hebron redeployment.
What brought about the transformation seems to be less a grand design by Netanyahu than external events — especially the September riots by Palestinians frustrated with Netanyahu s delays on Israel s peace commitments and angered by his opening of a tourist tunnel near a Muslim holy site in Jerusalem.
Until then. Netanyahu was playing hard-to-get about meet ing and dealing with the Pales-Unlan leader that he long condemned as a criminal and ter rorist.
"Events played upon Netanyahu and Arafat rather than it being their own initiative." said political scientist Yossi Alpher.
US Presidenl Clinton's intervention also played a large part in steering the course of negotiations and overcoming the deep suspicion the two sides had for each other.
"I think trust Is a serious problem." said Dore Gold. Netanyahu's chief negotiator
The help of US mediator Dennis Ross was sought because it was considered too risky after the dots to slowly cultivate a relationship while' Arab-Israeli relations declined.
"We didn't have a year or a year and a half to build trust." Gold told The Associated Press. "If we had given that kind of time the whole situation could
have declined. It's for that reason that the US role was far more pivotal than it was under the previous government.
Even though many of the changes negotiated in nearly four months of talks are relatively minor, perhaps what matters most Is that the accord is now one that bears Netanyahu's stamp of approval. Thai — and Ihe faci that a relationship has begun where many thought none was possible.
Netanyahu has now created his own Oslo agreement." said Alpher. Mideast director of the American Jewish Committee. "It is no longer the one he Inherited. It is Netanyahu's own agreement which reflects his own commitment."
Understanding, if not trust is also building.
For example, after long
hours of negotiations in hotel conference rooms. Gold and Arafat s chief deputy. Mahmoud Abbas, also known as Abu Mazen, have developed warm relations.
"One has to see beyond the tough give-aud take of negotiations. and you find there are people very likable and whom you regard as friends. 1 think they feel that way about us."' Gold said.
What’s on paper, however, is vague and sets the stage for a major conflict with the Palestinians over the extent of Israeli withdrawals and. ultimately. Palestinian hopes for statehood.
Israel promised to leave 80 per cent of Hebron and then make three further troop withdrawals. starting in March and ending In mid-1998.
Palestinian expectations are
that Arafat s government will control 80 or more per cent of the West Bank by the time the withdrawals are complete.
But loopholes exist that allow Israel to keep as much West Bank territory as it wants — according to Israel's interpretation. at least — to protect set dements and to prevent Israel from an invasion by Arab countries.
The expectations of the Arab world and the United States clearly impose some constraints. but Netanyahu policy adviser David Bar-Illan said there was enough flexibility in the agreement to allow Israel to keep most of the West Bank.
"1 assume we will be able to keep under the present agree ment over 50 per cent of the West Bank if we find it necessary." he said.