***The message was clear, "AP,ny should not support Ershad to hold on power aA^^omore involvement of Army personnel in politics". ... The President was loosing support from all corners and the movement against him was gaining ground very fast.***

T was sitting idle in the of B Jice^Jon^y and feeling re jK. But I knew the at-reHs of Dhaka were taking war like postures. President Ershad was sitting in his office. Just few meters away from mine, apparently looking unruffled and placid as if nothing was happening. He had thrown his last card, perhaps eagerly expecting for turning of table In his favour again. I was too perturbed with frustration and bitterness and decided to go to Army Headquarters (AHQ); it was 12:30 pm. 1 rang up Maj Gen Abdus Salam. Chief of General Staff (CGS), a long-time friend and colleague. It seemed he too was eager to meet me. He said. "Sir. we have very important things to talk to you, please come to AHQ immediately". His words Induced both sense of purpose and urgency to me. I went to the President for his consent. He was talking to someone on telephone, seeing me he dropped the telephone and looked at me., I told him of my intention to visit AHQ. He readily agreed and told. ’Yes, you should go and find out reactions of Army on my address of last night."

When I entered CGS's office few minutes later, I found Maj Gen Nurul Haq, Director General of Medical Services, sitting with him. Gen Salam welcomed me cordially and said. "We are looking for you and need to talk serious matters. Do you mind if I call other generals who afe also keen to talk to you." He called Maj Gen Fazlur Rahman. Quarter Master General (QMG) and

Maj Gen K M Abdul Wahed. Master General of Ordnance (MGO) through intercom and told them about my arrival. They reached within few minutes. Gen Salam told me that earlier in the morning. Chief of Army Staff Lt Gen Nooruddin Khan addressed all officers of AHQ in the auditorium. He wanted to apprise them of the current political situation of the country and highlight President's Radio and TV address of last night. After his address, something unpleasant had happened. Perhaps on instruction of the President he wanted to brief the officers. Once it was a routine practice of Presidents. Zia and Ershad, to address officers of AHQ or hold conference with senior officers whenever there were political movements or crises in the country. Scenes of the conferences used to be telecast on BTV in the evening for the view of the public. This time it was an exception when President Ershad did not hold any conference or meeting at AHQ with top brasses of the military and the nation did not see it on TV.

Gen Salam told me that after Chief of Army Staffs briefing, some officers showed open annoyance and resentment. He was showered with political questions relating to Army's continued support to President Ershad. Some said

that the whole nation was blaming the Army for supporting the President and his ministers In their corrupt practices and misdeeds. They were holding on power due to Army's backing. They ques-. iioned as to why the Army should take blame and side with him. Some even told that officers and men had become targets of taunt and ridicule when they go outside the cantonments: people Jeer at the soldiers and often hurl abuses calling them as men or Ershad. They said that the President should sort out his

political differences with the opposition leaders without involving Army. What I heard was not a normal gripe of military to be overlooked by the Army top brasses. It was enough to feel the pulse of the Army, particularly when a strong political movement was going on throughout the country.

It was meant for the Chief of Army Staff to convey to the President. The message was clear: "Army should not support Ershad to hold on power and no more Involvement of Army personnel in politics". I

added what was happening in the civil services of the government and informed them that in the Secretariat, officers and staff had stopped working. Foreign Service officers declared that they would not attend office, most of the government or semi-government offices were not functioning. The President was loosing support from all corners and the movement against him was gaining ground very fast. He had to support other than the Army's. But what was expressed in the AHQ auditorium should be a clear fiointer

now. I expressed my views and said that other than resignation there was no alternative for the President and he shoulfd be dissuaded from utilizing the Army for his rescue.

I was happy to find that some of the top brasses of the Army understood the mind of the mid and Junior level officers and could apprehend consequences if Army was pressed into action against a popular movement. There was no opposition to what officers vented out In the morning i.e.

'Army to be kept away from President Ershad's politics of power'. Gen Salam asked me what should be done and if I could do something. I explained that the political situation was fast turning against him and soon he would use Army to rescue him. If the Army supported him this time or somehow he engaged troops to suppress the movement the whole fury would turn against the men in uniform. Moreover, there might be opposition from within the Army creating disorderly situation. Therefore, the President should be given correct picture of the growing resentment within the Army and advised to solve political problem without Involvement of the military.

I told that this standpoint should be conveyed to the President by the Chief of Army Staff immediately and I would arrange a meeting. I also suggested that all generals should accompany the Chief of Army Staff. But Gen Salam hinted me that probably the Chief of Army Staff would not agree to it and there might arise some problems. I understood his point. He stressed that other than me there was none to apprise this to the President. I agreed to convey to President Ershad what I heard from them. I greatly appreciated Gen Salam's move to call me and others for discussion and make a move to inform the President. I was confident If President was given slightest hint of disgruntlement within the Army over the issue of Army's involvement, he would quit sooner than anticipated Before leaving I apprised them of my discussion with him on 1 December aboard helicopter where he expressed willingness to resign. And though he had changed his mind but would not hesitate to quit if he could be rightly told what happened at the AHQ in the morning.

1 left CGS's office assuring that I would Immediately convey to the President what 1 heard from them. I rather felt very encouraged to see that a section of officers expressed their dissentions. Never be fore, neither during Zia’s time nor during Ershad's nearly nine-year period, officers so openly showed such resent ment against their Supreme Commander I had been wit nesslng power games of two chiefs of staff of the Army since Aug '75 Army was their springboard to ascend to power. It started with Gen Zl aur Rahman who took full ad

vantage of the then political situation He used Army sources and manpower, blatantly defying military rules and regulations. Both found the Army's Institutionalized system of obedience and loyalty as easy tools to use for seizure of power first, then consolidating it and lastly to retain. Officers and troops in general had seen who were benefited in the long run. Only a couple of officers close to the boss who tow.ed their line prospered in numerous ways.

President Ershad's policy was to keep military happy and contended. In doing so he transformed military personnel and their families into a privileged class, isolated from rest of the society. They became subject of criticism and animosity of politically conscious part of the population. It was a preplanned and calculated move. Military personnel wvre provided with few benefits and privileges which served two purposes. Their loyalty to boss was ensured in one hand and on the other, public disaffection was created against them. Rulers are always comfortable if relationship between general public and military is not cordial. Gen Ershad achieved this aim very successfully. But things had changed over the years. Men in military are part and parcel of the greater society of the country. They are bound to react the same way.

After finishing discussion in CGS's office I went to meet the Chief of Army Staff to know his mind. We had very short discussion on the current political situation. I told him that opposition movement was gaining momentum and there was every likelihood of more disturbances of serious nature in coming days. I said that opposition political par ties had rejected President s 10 point offer. They did not trust him anymore and took It as a trick to cool off their ongoing movement. 1 hinted that In the long run. the President would involve the Army for his salvation. I warned him if Anny, someway, sided with the President this time, the consequences would be disastrous He agreed with me and said that he was watching the developments. Surprisingly, he never mentioned anything about his address to officers of AHQ in the morning and the unpleasantness he had to face there Maybe he did not want me to know his embarrass ments. Since he avoided Informing me thia Important de velopment. I also did not give him any hint of my discussion with Gen Salam and other general*

Tomorrow Army Not to Sids with Ershad.