& çâÌæÚUæð´ ·¤è ¥ôÚU Îð¹Ùæ ÁæÚUè ÚU¹ð´ ¥ÍæüÌ ¥ÂÙð ÜÿØ ÂÚU ŠØæÙ ÚU¹ð´Ð ãæÚU Ù ×æÙð´, €UØô´ç·¤ ·¤æ× ·¤ÚUÙð âð ¥æÂ·¤ô ©gðàØ ·¤è Âýæç# ãôÌè ãñ ¥õÚU ÁèßÙ ·¤æ ¹æÜèÂÙ ÎêÚU ãôÌæ ãñÐ ÖÜð ãè ÁèßÙ ×ð´ ç·¤ÌÙè Öè ·¤çÆÙæ§ü €UØô´ Ù ¥æ°, çÁ™ææâæ ¥õÚU ©ˆâæã ÕÙæ° ÚU¹ð´Ð ŠØæÙ ÚU¹ð´, ÜÿØ ã×ðàææ ¥æÂ·Ô¤ Âæâ ãôÌð ãñ´ çÁ‹ãð´ ÂæÙð ·Ô¤ çÜ° ÂýØæâ ¥æÂ ·¤Öè Öè àæéM¤ ·¤ÚU â·¤Ìð ãñ´Ð

A SERIES OF INTERVIEWS AND ARTICLES ON THE CURRENT POLITICAL CRISIS

Some Options to Resolve the Impasse

by Rehman Sobhan
***The solutions suggested are far from ideal. Compromise solutions, designed to avert an imminent political conflagration, rarely are. It is however hoped that lessons will be learnt from the fate of this parliament which, just four years ago, held out so much hope for a democratic renewal in Bangladesh.
In .in earlier piece in The Daily Star. I attem pled lo identify the issues, as they stand today, which underline the prevailing political impasse in Bangladesh. Since I wrote that piece at the end of January, there appear to have been no moves to break the Impasse. Rather the nation has been exposed to the sideshow at the law courts where we were led to hope that our judiciary would solve problems which had defied political solutions for these last 9 months. The outgoing Chief Justice had rightly warned the nation thal political problems had to be solved through politics. The Supreme Court has recognised this hazard and In its landmark judgement of 23 February deftly returned the stick of political dynamite placed In I heir hands back to the Speaker.
The Speaker has with quite superhuman legal acumen managed to then give a multipaged ruling within hours of having the issue returned to him by the courts, where he has declared the en massi ■ resignation of the opposition MP's to be invalid- Did ihis Lycurgus of Bangladesh .H tually write his epic ruling in 6 hours? Or had the Speaker already worked on las ruling for many days in anticipation that the courts would 'Render unto Censer, the things that are Censer's?
1 am not competent lo comment on ilie jurisprudential mesiis of the Speakers ruling. As a layman It appears to me that the pith o| the ruling stales that a valid resignauoii by an MT hum the Jaiiya Sangsad requires dial.
(a) Il should be submitled Jn then own handwriting undo' their signature.
(b) 11 should, unless circumstances compel otherwise. be.submitted In person.
(c) No reason should be given for the resignation.
Without again commenting on the merits of these preconditions, it couM be argued that if all ihe opposition MPs were to now present themselves to the Speaker in person and in ills presence write on a slip of paper I hereby resign from the Jal iya Sangsad as of today', sign it and hand it over to the Speaker, this would, under the terms of his ruling, be deemed a valid resignation.
The juridical significance of the long harangue of the Speaker in the .course of his ruling on the constitutional improprieties of the opposition resigning, en masse, remains unclear. People may agree or disagree with the Speaker's observations on the merits of the resignation. But in practice does the ruling itself. in any way. invalidate a MP's decision to resign, provided it is done in the format prescribed by the Speaker? If no reason is given by the MPs for their resignation. Is not the Speaker bound to accept it? Or does the Speaker's ruling now lay down a new parliamentary jurisprudence that en masse resignations are unacceptable even if submitted in an appropriate form? The Speaker thus needs to clarify his ruling, if the reigning confusion Is not to be further compounded.
Depending on the interpretation of the Speaker's ruling. the opposition Is presented with the following options :
(fl The opposition may Ignore the ruling of the Speaker and continue to remain outside Parliament. This seems to have been the decision of the A warn I League Working Commitlee in its recent meeting as well as by the other opposition parties.
(11 ) The opposition MP's may re-submit their resignations in person In the format prescribed by the Speaker.
(11 # If (i) is to be the course of the action, then the opposition will, perforce, legallyreniafn Members of Parliament. can draw their allowances. but may remain free to continue to boycott Parliament. Furthermore, now that ihe MP's are involuntarily bound to the Parliament by the Speaker's ruling, their only recourse appears to be to make the Parliament redundant so that the Prime Minister feels obliged to dissolve the Parliament as early as possible. This by-product of the Speaker's ruling promises a long hot Falgoon and even Summer for Bangladesh after the Eid.
(iv) The opposition may. tp theory, still return to Parliament and see it through to its conclusion by the end of 1995. within which time they can negotiate with the government for a constitutional amendment to permit the holding of elections under a caretaker government run by an advisor^ council. This prospect, at the moment, seems rather remote. if not actually nonexistent.
Within the above range Of options, the choices of the opposition will be influenced by their capacity lo intensify and sustain an agitation over the next several months. How far they are able and, more to the point, willing to go. will require careful calculation within the opposition. Here the arithmetic of each opposition party may not yield the same results. A party which hopes to win an election may deem the price of civic disruption to be rather higher than a party with less elevated expectations.
i The Speaker's ruling poses the following equally serious dilemmas for the government which will need urgent address :
(1) Is the government tn a position to now make an offer lo the opposition, which they cannot refuse, as an inducement to return to Parliament? Obviously the Speaker s juridical rhetoric is not going to bring the opposition back to the Sangsad. Indeed he has, perhaps without realising it, done the opposition a great favour by his ruling. He has let them resume their MP's status, which carries many advantages in dealing with the affairs of their constituents and the administration. The fact that the MP's could risk 9 months on the streets without cover of their MP status undoubtedly made many opposition MPs uncomfortable over the Issue of resignation. Now that the Speaker's ruling has legally restored the MP status of the opposition but has freed them of any obligation to attend Parliament, the restored MPs can agitate to their heart’s content, in part at government expense, to bring about the dissolution of the parliament. If there Is now no scope for the opposition to resubmit their resignations, then they should each certainly send the Speaker a bouquet of roses for doing them a great favour.
(II) Some in the govern ment perhaps believed that an opposition wh)ch had resigned had played out its trpmp card long before the game was over. The resultant tenancy of the opposition on the streets was thereby deemed an advantage to the government with voles to be won from the Incendiary behaviour of an opposition on the rampage. Now that the Speaker has legally rehabilitated the opposition. the government will have to decide whether they will negotiate a solution acceptable to ihe opposition to gel. them ofl ihe streets aixl into the Sangsad or they will nmilnue to live with nine months of agitation led by the sitting members of. Parliament A Parliament with nearly half of Its members in the streets, agitating to seek the dlssO lution of this same parliament, is no longer a credible institution of democracy, no matter how.solid the democratic mandate of the ruling party. Such a rump parliament will expose the country to the worst of all possible worlds, it will compel the country to live with a parliament withoiA any opposition for close to a year and a half. This Is, if anything, even longer than Ershad's 1988 parliamentary charade, with its comical opposition led. by ita£ resident clown prince. Such sr dysfunctional parliament, sans opposition, can only serve to bring lliv institution of parliamentary democracy into public contempt and undermine the credibility of the government as a legislator. Since this is an elected government with a bqnafide electoral mandate it is needlessly politically hazardous lor i hem to bring their own democratic credentials Into controversy by perpetua-ling the life of a parliament which has clearly outlived its utility.
So what can the government do? it has in the present circumstances three clear options :
(i) It can let the opposition, led by its restored MPs. intensify their agitation on the streets. The government can hope to brazen it out till December. In the hope that the disruption of civic life will be politically costly to the opposition. However permitting a <*lvll agitation to continue unabated. with the resultant disruption of dally life, commerce and industry is no less risky lo mi Incumbent government. It is the job ol it government to ensure' lln- mu in.ik v of civic life mid they will be held as accountable by the voters as will be the opposition, for their failure to find a political solution which restores normalcy in public life. No Finance Minister, let alone one who has heavy agenda of reforms to carry through, can feel com-fortaBle with an open-ended agitation which can subvert productivity gains, frustrate new investments and. as a result. leave him with little to show for his reforms.
Ill) It can revert to its implicit offer of 28/29 December on the caretaker government. This, io gain credibility with the opposition, will have to be presented In the form of a wrfiii n proposal, whicli spells out ihe lollowtng points ol agreement :
la| The general elections will be held under a caretaker government presided over by a ten membet advisory council with five members nominated from each side This council may be headed by the President or by an interim Prime Mlnistet who would be nominated by the ruling party from amongst the five jwrsons nominated to the advisory council.
(b) The Prime Minister will step down from office prior to the holding of these elections.
(c) A team from both sides should sit together and work out a constitutional amendment which would vest executive powers with the Advisory ICouncIl lo preside over the caretaker government. This learn may also agree on the period when the Prime Minister would step down and hand over authority to the caretaker government, review the need for further legislation to enhance the powers of the Election Commission and also work out a code of conduct for the political parties In the election which addresses. inter alia. such Issues as excessive expenditure, the use of violence and other malpractices deployed to influence the election results. This team should also decide on a date lor ihe dissolution of Ihe parliament and lor the general elections.
(d) This draft agreement should be discussed and finalised on a person to person basis by the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition. The consensus agreement emerging from this dialogue should be announced Jointly before the nation by the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition so that the people of Bangladesh would be made political guarantors of the sanctity of the agreement negotiated al (c) above.
(e) The opposition should return to the Sangsad lo pass the constitutional amendment as worked out in (c) above. Following the passage of the amendment, the Parliament should be dissolved and the election campaign for the new parliament should be formally iniliated.
(Hi) An alternative offer to the opposition could be based on a modification of the Ninian Steven proposal. Here 5 members of parliament-would be nominated by each side to constitute the caretaker government. The Prime Minister would step down as the caretaker government takes over and one of the members of the caretaker government would be. by agreement of both sides, nominated as caretaker Prime Minister. As an inducement to the opposition to accept this proposal the government would agree lo dissolve the Parliament immediately and go for an early election. Tills move would require no constitutional amendment and would >spare the country the need to live with a dysfunctional parliament as well as the tension and uncertainty of civil strife. All other issues covering the modalities of the transfer and the holding of elections would remain common fo alternative Kill c-e| as spelt'out alxive.
The solutions suggested above are far from ideal. Compromise solutions, designed to avert an imminent political conflagration, rarely are. It is however hoped that lessons will be learnt from the fate of this parliament which, just tour years ago. held out so much hope for a democratic renewal In Bangladesh. These lessons may be assimilated by all parties expecting to lie represented In the next parliament and a code of conduct for the new Parliament negotiated in advance when the outcome ot the next election is still indeterminate. Failure to agree to such ground rules In advance could make the Hie of the next Parliament even less secure than that ot the present one Two successive dysfunctional Parliaments, lollowtng In the wake ot long years of presidential autocracy may dissipate whatever faith that remains In the Institutions ol patliamentary democracy In Bangladesh