Bangladesh already has virtually the highest population density in the world — 718 people per square kilometre — and the population will double within the next 35 years. Restraining population growth has. therefore, been one of the Government's highest priorities. So far it has been remarkably successful. Population growth has slowed : between 1974-84 and the early 1990s. the average annual growth rate fell from 2.8% to 2.2%. Fertility has fallen steeply : I between 1975 and 1990. the average number of births per woman dropped from 7.0 to 4 6 Even more remarkably, between 1971 and 1990. contraceptive prevalence increased from 3% to 40%.

Why the dramatic change? Little else seems to have altered significantly over this period — few pf the Increases In wealth or security that usually herald a demographic transition The cause seems to lie further back. At the beginning of this century, the total fertility rate was 7 births per woman, but on average only 2.» children survived to maturity, so families thus remained small. But by the early 1960s the picture had been transformed : out of the 7 children born. 5.1 were surviving, so family sizes were expanding. When, from the 197Qp onwards. the Government put more emphasis on family planning millions of parents seized the opportunity.

Can this apparent momentum be sustained? At first sight t lie answer might seem to be no'. After all. infant mortality levels remain high, so parents pan still expect similar numbers of childrep to die. Nor have families become notice ably richer or better educated In the last Iwo decades. AJ of which suggests that the easy' population targets have already been reached and that reducing family sizes still further wtll be much more difficult.

There are still good reasons why people might want large ■ families. Children bring satisfaction and joy to poor parents but. they also bring practical benefits — especially in terms of security. At a time of general lawlessness in the rural areas, strong sons offer reassurance. With very little support forthcoming from the police or other institutions, families have to fall back on their own resources. Security is also to be considered in the long1 term : parents worry about who will support them in their old age — a pressing concern for women who generally marry older men and find themselves .widowed or deserted at an early age. In both the long and

short terms a robust family may be the only protection against disaster or destitution

Parents may also want children because of the work they can do and the income they can bring. Children in poor families are expected to pull their weight : at times of scarcity everyone has to lend a hand. But whether most parents have children In order that they might work is much less certain. Those parents who do think about the costs of raising and educating children might find that they represent a net loss at least until early adulthood — an extended time-frame for families struggling for day-to-day survival.

These and other factors come into play when parents consider how many children they should have. In 1989, surveys showed that parents on average wanted only 2.9 children — this may be close to family sizes In Bengal at the beginning of this century. The suggestion that jhere is some Inherent drive to large families

and benefits may be so evenly balanced that this Is not a crucial issue for many parents : their decision is a fragile one. it can easily go either way.

One factor which could tip the scales towards larger faml lies is son preference. The ideal family may have three children, but if this has to consist of a minimum of two sons then by the law'of averages this will keep the fertility rate permanently above 4 The evidence on this, however. Is not decisive — though It has been found that parents without sons are indeed much less likely to practice contraception.

Given that the decision is evenly balanced, what can be done to Influence it? The most effective way Is to reduce the obstacles to family planning Many of these are social and cultural. Couples may be embarrassed even to talk about contraception — particularly if the discussion will cause any disharmony within J he extended family. Then there is

in Bangladesh could therefore be wrong. The expansion In the second half of'this century may have been something of an aberration : families could traditionally have been small and they could be small in the future.

But not yet. Parents may want few children but the total fertility rate is still 4.6. Even allowing for a high mortality rate this will produce larger families than desired. Why the gap between preference and practice? It could be that while parents, and particularly women, might prefer small families, this conviction is not firmly held. Perceived costs

the confined role of women : those in purdah and unable to move freely outside the household will have their contraceptive choices restricted.

Societies which are. cultur. ally and religiously conservative have often been resistant to family planning. Chittagong, for example, which is economically more advanced than other divisions, but culturally more conservative, has both higher preferred family sizes and lower levels of contraception.

Finally, there are obstacles related to specific contraceptive methods. Couples may worry about the costs of pills

or condoms or be concerned, that a particular method will affect their health

Bangladesh's population programme has been relatively successful so far because ft has addressed all of these concerns simultaneously. Cultural objections have been met. for example, by offering counselling to couples and also orientation courses to religious leaders. "Difficulties of travel have been reduced by outreach services which have contacted women In their homes. Cost objections have been overcome by distributing free supplies for the reversible contraceptive methods as well as offering financial compensation for sterilization. Health worries have been addressed by offering a diversity of methods to those who might have doubts about any specific method.

But if this success is to be sustained, the programme will have to become much more efficient. The programme suffers many of the bureaucratic and staffing impediments of other government departments. Delivery services are disjointed and the costs are high. Current expenditure on population Is around $1.50 per capita, a rate of expenditure which might be difficult to sustain. To increase prevalence from 40% to 50% would mean covering about 12 million contraceptive user's — at an estimated cost of around $30 million per year.

The second major condition for progress is an improvement In tpe status of women — both to reduce desired family size and to increase the use of contraceptives. Giving women a stronger position, inside and outside the family, will reduce the pressure on them to have children early jn marriage. And increasing their levels of education makes I hem much more confident about using contraceptive methoA iqgq 86. for example, the total fertility rate for wppien with secondary or higher education was 3.3 while lor women with no schooling at all ft was 4.4. Family planning programmes cannot.’howeve r, be confined to women. Until men take, more responsibility for contraception family slze^ are likely to remain unnecessarily high.

Bangladesh's demographic future is still fraught wtth difficulties : in. the next 35 years the country will have to cope wtth an Inevitable doubling of population. But there is still cause for optimism : the gains can be consolidated and in the longer term the population could be stabilized.

The writer, a consultant for various UN agencies, is the author of A Fork tn the Path -Human Development Choices for Bangladesh'.