

Border Trade with Myanmar

A report published by us the other day says that a border trade agreement with Myanmar is expected to be signed in Dhaka later this month. Such an agreement would allow for the growth of trade between the two countries in a stable environment. It would also cut through illegal trade — or, smuggling, as it is more commonly known — across the border.

Border trading arrangement is an internationally recognised mode of conducting exchange of goods between countries sharing a common border. However, this would be the first border trade agreement to be signed by Bangladesh with a neighbouring country. Not so for Myanmar. For years now, Myanmar had had border trading arrangements with Thailand. Myanmar is said to have signed a border trade agreement with India also earlier this year.

It's not that trade cannot go on between neighbouring countries unless there is border trade agreement. Merchandise do flow to and from countries sharing a common border under the normal global trade laws. What a border trade agreement does is to ease the process of exchange of goods between two neighbouring countries. Geographical contiguity creates certain special advantages in trading between two countries. A border trade agreement creates the environment for utilising these advantages to the full.

A common border can also thwart open trade by enabling smuggling to grow. Smuggling usually is a two-way trade, but carried out through unauthorised channels, evading customs and tax authorities, banking formalities and exchange controls. By easing these regulations for the purpose of cross-border traffic in goods, border trading arrangements would normally dissuade smuggling. The economy would then derive the full benefit of trade.

There are two countries with whom we share our borders — India and Myanmar. Unauthorised trade across the borders with India has reached such proportions that many consider this as destabilising important sectors of the economy. The authorities are trying to contain smuggling mainly by applying preventive measures through its law enforcing agencies. May be, they occasionally achieve a degree of success but smuggling still persists as a real problem for our trade and industry. The national exchequer loses revenue and the country's valuable resources are frittered away.

At the fourth Indo-Bangladesh Joint Economic Commission (JEC) session held in Dhaka last December, the Indian side had suggested that the possibilities of negotiating a border trade agreement between the two countries should receive serious consideration. The response of the Bangladesh side to this proposition has not been made public. Meanwhile, open border trade of a sort has already started — confined to import of cattle from India. However, Indian cattle is being smuggled across the borders for years. As we understand it, cattle brought from across the border can now be marketed legally on payment of a specific duty. The cattle would be brought through designated customs checkpoints.

Goods would continue to flow across the borders as long as they are needed and if the transactions profit the parties to the trade, even though unauthorised. In due course, smuggling would probably disappear if the cross-border trade can be brought out into the open. An open border trading arrangement would not only curb smuggling but also help eliminate trade distortions that give impulse to illegal commercial transactions in the first place.

This Cannot be Allowed

This is a matter of utmost concern. The launching of the Syedabad water treatment plant project is being stalled by a lack of agreement on the specifications of machinery to be installed. The consequences of any delay would be much too grave for the nation, and in so many ways.

The original sin was going for ground-water to meet the galloping needs of a snowballing metropolis. Engineers barring exceptions of the order of Eiffel are not known to be visionaries. It is our misfortune that the people who would tell the engineers as to what to devise and deliver and how to keep that up are even less so. Every time some golden-egg goose came our way or we stumbled upon it, we went for the nuggets in the womb. This has been the call with our natural gas resources as well as our metropolitan landed property potential. We have already messed up the best-in-the world possibilities of waterborne transport. We are at the moment offering in sacrifice our railways to propitiate the god of ready-lucre that thrives on throwing up thousands of kilometers of overland roads and crowding them with tens of thousands of blacksmoke belching vehicles.

The population of Dhaka should now be somewhere around eight million. WASA produces water for how many of them? Even at a niggardly flat rate of a hundred litres per person per day WASA must make available 800 million litres of water every day. WASA supply is shy of that figure possibly by 20 to 30 per cent. They will need to make that up as soon as possible. By the time they do that, there is every danger of the populace gaining in strength by another million. What would then WASA plan for?

The problem gets infinitely compounded when we look for a source for such gigantic volumes of water yielding a perennial supply. Dhaka at point of time chose to go for ground water abandoning the traditional surface water. Why at that point of switching over didn't they think of treating and recycling used water and not going for fresh water? After all water, whether surface or subterranean, is not in infinite supply anywhere in the universe in its natural liquid H_2O condition. The ground water table has already gone down, under the city, to dangerous levels. Any further thoughtless tinkering with it would positively lead to ground subsidence causing first to the crumbling of all high-rise buildings and then to all standing structures. If only we could, we would stop raising even a litre of water from beneath the metropolis surface here and now.

How is WASA readying itself for that inevitable and unavoidable act? The Daily Star report of Wednesday does not speak of good enough grasp of the gravity of the situation by the decision making levels. While they squabble over whether to go for treating 50 million gallons a day or 25, the Dhaka ground water is every hour being drained off precipitously. This cannot be allowed.

When Trade Reforms may Not Succeed

by Abdul Bayes

Over the years, the developing countries have been witnessing a wave of trade reforms as had never been in evidence before. Quite in consort with the siren song of 'outward orientation', these countries have tended to embark on demolishing various trade barriers that are alleged to have hindered the flow of goods and services as per the theory of market forces. According to the conventional Fund-Bank wisdom, a necessary condition to usher in an efficient allocation of resources is to align the domestic price structure with that of the international one. To do that usually, a three-phase trade liberalization program has been advocated: (a) converting quantitative restrictions (e.g. quota) and import licences into equivalent tariff rates and thus making the restrictions more transparent, stable and less discretionary; (b) narrowing down the average level of tariffs as well as the dispersions of tariffs i.e. rationalization of tariff structure; and (c) tuning the exchange rate in such a fashion as to contribute to enhanced exports i.e. making the real exchange rate export-friendly. However, the governments' intention notwithstanding, the eventual success of these reforms is put to the gravest doubt by certain quarters. The pessimism follows from the perceived lack of credibility that attempted reforms are likely to manifest in the eyes of the actors they are designed to stimulate — entrepreneurs, workers and farmers.

Why Credibility is Important?

Prima facie, trade reform measures are likely to divert resources from less productive use (say, import substituting consumer durables) to more productive uses (say, to export-oriented industries). The success of trade reforms should, therefore, be judged by the extent to which domestic entrepreneurs respond to the need for moving capital and

labour out of low productive sectors to highly productive sectors. For example, with the emerging new signals coming from trade liberalization, the owner of an inefficient cosmetic industry might face a closure but could, if it wished relocate these resources to more productive export-oriented goods. There is thus an adjustment cost tagged with this relocation. Again, a newcomer to export-oriented industries would have to train labour and management for the challenging job. In between, some workers would remain out of work, or some entrepreneurs might face bankruptcy. But all these costs are dubbed as necessary evils by the protagonists of trade reforms.

The willingness of the entrepreneurs and workers to bear that cost or to live with that necessary evil would certainly be dependent upon the perceived staying power of the reforms. If perceived notion is positively definitive, then quick adjustments are likely to follow since a delay simply adds to the cost. But if a reversal of policy is reasoned by the private sector, the adjustment might be delayed with the assumption that the cost due to delay might be outweighed by a reversal of policy in future. We can derive important conclusions from the premises outlined so far. First, to the policy-makers, it is not trade liberalization per se, but credible trade liberalization that should warrant top priority and second, it is not merely the structure of incentives but the predictability of such incentives created by the trade regime that should steal the point of focus. According to some economists, 'a distorted, but stable, set of incentives does much less damage to economic performance than an uncertain and unstable set of (undistorted) incentives generated by a process of trade reform lacking credibility'. The readers could well gauge that the issue of credibility is deeply hooked on the supply

responses in the economy. The non-response of the micro agents to the plethora of reforms partly emanates from the lack of credibility and one should not be surprised if such incredibility, in the medium and long run, also goes to kill the macro stability. In technical terms, 'the perceived temporariness of the reform introduces a distortion' into the inter-temporal structure of relative prices ... Unstability aggravates uncertainty in the policy environment and this, by itself, can be enough to cripple the animal spirit of private investors'.

It may be mentioned here that assurance of credibility does not imply a 100% staying power of the reforms but could embrace marginal changes as and when needed. Some of the incredible reforms, as portrayed by the experiences of some countries, are: re-imposition of quantitative restrictions after liberalization (Argentina); putting export subsidies on, taking them off and putting them on again (Turkey); promising but not delivering export subsidies (Côte d'Ivoire); instituting exchange rate auctions and then abolishing them (Sierra Leone, Somalia, Uganda, Zambia); reducing tariff rates across the board and raising them again later (Morocco, Thailand).

Why Credibility might be Lacking?

Private sector might reckon that the government is in the liberalization business just to satisfy the donors and hence a reversal might take place with the diminished importance of conditionality. The same politicians and bureaucrats who had upheld import substitution in the past are upholding outward orientation at present. Why should entrepreneurs believe that the blocks see the light now and didn't see it before? Second, on many occasions, the re-

forms packages are drawn up via dialogue between the more efficient donor bureaucrats and their counterpart less efficient and more corrupt domestic bureaucrats. A further scorn is added by the fact that on many occasions, the bureaucrats and the politicians can hardly convince the people of the economic and social rationales of trade reforms. Third, despite the best will on the part of the government, a ring of political dissonance might creep in (and this could be fuelled by major parties) to insert heavy political costs into adjustments and the economic agents might wait to see the dust settle. Fourth, the distributional implications of trade reforms are, on many occasions, misunderstood by the actors in the economy and the conflicting interests (right or wrong) tell upon the credibility.

Bangladesh Scenario

Since independence till late eighties, Bangladesh followed a restricted trade regime where exports and imports of goods and services (as well as their production) were put under various nooses of government control. It was, in fact, a time when the world at large converged towards domestication of policies and hence the growth rate of world trade lagged behind the growth rate of output. However, with the rediscovery of Adam Smith's 'invisible hand', the policy shifts promised to open the domestic and international sectors. Import liberalization and industrial deregulation were essential policy initiatives to provide an environment attuned to private sector-led growth. Import liberalization took the key birth in Bangladesh's policy agenda mainly because it tends to reduce the: (a) anti-export bias of restrictive import policy regime; (b) disparities in industrial incentives; and (c) overvaluation of currency caused by import friendly exchange rate. The argument

runs that in a country where the domestic market is very limited and where the aim is to attain 6-7% GDP growth rate over medium to long run, the necessary requirements that the share of exports to GDP be raised from the current 9% to 13% by the second half of the decade. Trade liberalization thus warrants top agenda in policy formulations.

There has been some progress towards liberalization. For example, the level of tariff that stayed at 0-35% earlier has now been unified and slashed to an average of 50% dispersing over 32 items. Quantitative restrictions have been dealt with although about a fifth of all traded items still faces such restrictions. Rationalization of tariff structure and fine — tuning of exchange rates are some of the other measures contributing to trade liberalization.

With the gradual shift from inward to outward looking strategy, the shift of resources from non-tradeables to tradeables should proceed but a general presumption is that necessary responses from micro level are not coming about to buoy up the on-going reforms. Many would like to argue that the 'incredible' syndrome, like the 'incredible Hulk', pervades the economy with its might to negate the required responses. The principal sources of lack of credibility are reported to be: (a) the perceived notion of an imposed conditionality; (b) lack of 'teeth' on reforms by the government represented by the beneficiaries of a restricted regime; (c) the non-recognition of a 'level playing field' while opening up; (d) the unequal pace of trade liberalization vis à vis domestic liberalization; and (e) the presumption that such measures would wither with the change of the government. Added to these agonies are some of the policy reversals depicted on various occasions.

Thus Bangladeshi entrepreneurs, workers and other agents are waiting to see

that the dusts settle. And this only adds to the adjustment cost and minuses the confidence on ongoing reforms.

To minimize the rot, the government of Bangladesh should immediately consider the following propositions:

(i) By and large, the exchange rate still remains overvalued and hurting exports. While India and other countries are going for 25-30% devaluation, ours is in the range of 2-3%. On the other hand, the US\$ appreciated vis à vis other currencies over the years so that Bangladesh currency has also appreciated with others.

(ii) Even of lower prices of inputs from import liberalization are not going to help entrepreneurs unless the prices of non-tradeables are lowered. ADP in respect of infrastructure, transport, power etc is urgently required to satisfy investors.

(iii) Domestic regulatory measures are reported to be recoupling on trade liberalization. An administrative package commensurate with new philosophy of growth and development is urgently called for.

(iv) Frequent dialogues with trade and industry circles are required and timely intervention with incentive package is needed.

(v) It is being alleged that there are a lot of tariff anomalies which need due attention.

(vi) Trade liberalization is one of the many factors contributing to more investment. Necessary emphasis needs to be placed on all factors.

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