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Northern Powers Staking Claims on Areas of Control

Negotiations are going on among the Northern powers on how best to moderate their competition in order to maintain shared economic and military interests in the Third World, the Middle East and East Europe, etc.

by Mariano Aguirre
WITHIN the European Community, there arc Iwo tendencies on the question of how to organise Its future military system Some propose strengthening the European pillar' within a reformed NATO. Other* believe that the time has come to organise a more autonomous EC defence system around the Western European Union (WEU).
These conflicting perspcc live* surfaced most dramatically on 22 May 1992, when French President Francois Mitterand and Chancellor Helmut Kohl announced the creation of a 35.000 strong French-Oerman joint force, the European Corps, to be de ployed tn Germany beginning in 1995. They invited other European countries to con tribute to this embryonic European army
This French-German Initiative was not well received by the Americans and the British, who criticised it strongly at a NATO meeting a week later
On the same day of the Mitterand-Kohl announcement. NATO Secretary-General Manfred Worner declared that NATO force* could act as peacekeeping forces in Eastern Europe on behalf of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. NATO ministers ratified this stance on 4 June 1992.
The pro-NATO’ camp — the United Kingdom. the Netherlands, Portugal. Norway and Turkey — support a NATO In which the US maintains leadership, but with increased European military spending •and control. They also support Increasing NATO collaboration with the former Warsaw Pact countries.
Official NATO texts still insist that NATO is the basic sc curity structure; EC military plans should complement it rather than challenge It. This, of course, also suits the sole superpower stance of the Pentagon The UK, for its part, wants to preserve its role as Washington s main ally , a role which the Gulf war reaffirmed.
The second tendency sees the US as a strategic ally of Europe, but advocates a sepa rate EC 'defence identity, with Its own armed forces coordinated by the member countries. This would Include modifying the responsibilities Of the EC and integrating Ireland. Greece and Denmark into the WEU. Mitterand and Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission, have advocated pitting French nuclear forces al-the disposal of the EC.
Since the Eurocorps, not to mention the Euroarmy, have yet to be translated into reality. Mitterand and Kohl have no problem saying they are still committed to NATO. What is left unsaid 1s that they anticipate a lime when the US will be unable or unwilling lo play so great a leading military and
political role This I* certainly the Implication, though, of Mitterand * reference to the lx>» Angeles rebellion as evidence that the US has Its own problem* to which it must attend.
The debate on out-of-ares operations thus alternate* be tween those who propose reforming the 1949 Treaty of Washington to allow such operation*. and thoae who believe these operations belong In the hand* of the WEU Washington and London hold that the WEU be allowed to take out-of-area actions but only under NATO command.
This would give Europe both more influence within NATO and the capacity to respond with the US to world events , says Britain s Minister for Foreign Affairs Douglas Hurd. "We could build on the WEU's experience in the Gulf when looking at how a European military role could be further developed
An alternative approach would subordinate NATO to a US-dominated UN Security Council. In cases of perceived threats to a NATO country. Article 53 of the UN Charter would be applied. This stipu late* that the Security Council can make use of regional agreements and organisations , if the need should arise, to apply coercive measures under UN authority.
The UK would most likely support the US on this, with France in an ambivalent position and Russia and China ab staining. This path would lend UN legitimacy for military Intervention on behalf of inter ests defined primarily by Washington and London, as was the case in the GUlf war.
In January 1992. France proposed to the UN General Assembly the creation of an in tervention force under UN command This is France s way of restraining US intervention ism and at the same time rein forcing the idea that there could and should be other in-terventionary (AKA peacekeeping) forces.
A report to the North Atlantic Assembly by NATO member country parliaments promotes reinforcing the se curity of the Mediterranean region through economic aid. coordination of asylum and immigration policies, and Middle East arms control. It also includes the capacity to respond rapidly lo the military challenges that may present themselves, particularly in peacekeeping missions’.
'Peacekeeping Is the rubric under which each party attempts to consolidate its post tion. For the US there is the cover of UN Security Council resolutions. In 1991, France and Germany proposed sending a WEU peacekeeping force to Yugoslavia, largely to buttress the concept of European armed force. The Netherlands also proposed sending a
peacekeeping force, but under NATO command. No doubt fearing for its position in Northern Ireland, the UK rejected that proposal outright
British and US forces, together with those of other European countries. Intervened In northern Iraq in 1991 to protect Turkey from Kurds fleeing Iraq. This action was a continuation of the war but it opened the floodgate* on the debate over national sovereignty and human rights
Rapid Reaction Forces
While the tsaue of out-ofarea operation* 1* debated, the potential military structure* for future intervention* are being organised. During the 198Os. the UK. France and Italy each created their rapid deployment forces, following the US example. Spain ac qulred its own in 1991 In May 1991, NATO reorganised the structure of its force and created is multinational Rapid Reaction Forces.
According to Cen Peter Heinrich Carstens, commander of NATO’s Allied Mobile Forces (the embryo of the Rapid Reaction Forces), The Gulf War demonstrated the extremely risky and dangerous crises may arise which must be countered ... The means of confronting them must be forces which can be deployed rapidly outside the country of origin ... It's quite clear that the more multinational the make-up of the force", the greater the political impact of employing It.'
Referring lo NATO's Rapid Reaction Forces. Gen John Galvin told Congress that among the Important issues NATO would tackle in the future arc instability In the Southern Region', and out-of-area conttngpncies.'
A good example of the practical application of the combined reform of NATO in relation to the Southern threat' is NATO's planned maritime force structure. This will be based on the principle of a modular multinational naval task force, and among its task* will be limiting proliferation of threatening weapon* and capabilities...: maintaining defences against such proliferated threats: suppression of the narcotics trade'. All of this would happen without regard to the claims of many countries to 200 nautical mile territorial walers, or ’economic exclusion zones'.
NATO's New Strategic Concept indirectly considers
the possibility of NATO out of area actions arising from the global context including pro literal ion of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resource* and action* of terrorism and sabo
The WEU Is. for Washing ton London and the Hague, a concession to the other Europeans, in return for military contributions for Intervention In Eastern Europe and the Third World that would augment those of NATO. During the Gulf war, the WEU member countries conducted joint patrols in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea. the Gulf of Oman and the l*vnian Gulf. In the summer of 1991, the president of the WEU proposed formation of a WEU Rapid Reaction Force that would share equipment and forces with the proposed NATO Rapid Reaction Forces.
NATO Secretary-General ‘ Worner commenting on the proposed Euroarmy. said. Maybe this new body could as sist NATO. In this case we would undoubtedly support its formation. If ft could take out of area actions, all well and good. NATO forces could also be assigned to assist them under the umbrella of the WEU.
From these various proposals. the idea taking shape is that In this period of transition the US and Europe could shaife military resources and apparatuses until roles solidify. In some cases national armies will take action on their own. In other cases action will lie coordinated by the WEU. or NATO may act on its own Thi* system of multinational forces and Intervention resources with multiple commands for different operations is known as double hatting'.
We advocate a "transatlantic contract",' states Willem van Eekclcn, secretary-general of the WEU. A new kind of "double hatting" of forces will become possible, allowing forces assigned lo the Central Region lo act as a rapid deployment force for the entire European theatre and in sonic . cases for out-of-area contingencies as well.' He goes on to explain that Europeans will want to limit joint NATO action to the defence of the treaty area... In ou|-of-Europc contingencies, European coun-Irics should play a larger role lo protect their security inter ests but this should be pre scnlcd as a two-pillar approach with appropriate liaison ar-rangcmcnLs with the US,
A US Army War CaHegr Mody prop— that a I— be forged between the WEU and NATO to Implement out-of
The purpose of achieving a liaison between these two or-K^hTwfU to the
necessary political framework lo the WEU nations to en^qp- ■ in out of area cooperation, while employing largely extol Ing NATO expertise It la tn crcaalnMy clear that the WEU nations alone would find It very difficult lo meet the dual chai tenges of power projectton and sustainment Whether Europ cans appreciate II or not. the Involvement of the US military could be crucial tn worst case scenarios and very welcome Indeed In fess challenging contingencies
In May NATO staged Operation Dragon Hammer 92. a major air land and sea escrctoe in the Mediterranean The commander* Involved cited Algeria. Libya and Turkey, a* w-H as Yugoslavia, as potential trouble spots requiring NATO capabilities
Centres of Power
The debate over the future of European military forces is not about different approaches to security, development or access to resources, but about whether there will be one or several centre* of power, and where those will be In early June 1992 Washington made a point of calling attention lo the war In Yugoslavia and the fact that the Europeans and the UN are Incapable of stopping It The implication Is clear: the US is necessary to keep ihe peace in Europe via NATO
With regard to the Third World, the tendency Is to establish special relationship* with some countries and zones, white leaving the rest to the margins of the global economy To match and to preserve this emerging pal tern of discriminate eco nomlc lie*, the rich countries are debating the most appropriate means of coordinating discriminate intervention.
The Persian Gulf and the Maghrib arc Iwo key areas of traditional control, sometimes contested. by the powers of the North. Along with Eastern Europe and Ihe former Soviet Union, tlx- Middle East is a ri
■torn where Use U». Europe * devise way* of moderating their rompsUtton in o—r to maintain shared interests
la the former Com—f— territories the Issue* ar*
Immigration and nuefoar leakage In the f— Gulf Ose mu; i* acres* to oil and markets In the Maghrib the environmental degradation le g the Mediterranean)
In some places - preemi aently the Middle East - the US. Europe and Japan will continue to be both —Me rivals and military allies Washington, supported mainly by London, want* to maintain a preeminent rote In the Be—in Gulf white tewing the Maghrib lo Europe s Mediterranean countries Even tn the OuW though. the US needs European assistance — ft nan cial assistance bases. dlpki matte support and economic aid to specific Third World countries
Government, military and media elite* In Europe and Japan perceive a continuing need for a military alliance with the US. but many also perceive that Europe to aecru a the economic weight and
Ural potential to stand on its own by the beginning of the next decade They do not want to break with Washington dur Ing this period of transition
The Middle East — the Persian Gulf In particular — is an area of Intersection for US. European and Japanese inter e*ls By ex lenston. the debate over out-of area Intervention l» also one of intersection be tween current military structures and projects such a* NATO and the WEU In the military arena. Europe and the US (and to a lesser extent Japan) are negotiating the most appropriate mean* of maintaining Western (or more appropriately Northern) con trol of the Persian Gulf Into the next century and beyond
— Third World Network Features /Middle East Report
MARIANO AGUIRRE is Director of the Centro de Investigacion para la Paz in Madrid, and Associate Director of the Transnational Institute fn Amsterdam.
(Translated from Spanish by Penny Fischer)